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New expensive technologies and aging populations increase the 
pressure on health care budgets. To promote an effi cient use of 
limited health care resources, priorities must be set and choices 
regarding access to health care become inevitable. Economic 
evaluations are increasingly used to inform such decisions. However, 
there seems to be a discrepancy between the recommendations 
from economic evaluations and public preferences for the 
allocation of health care resources. This thesis investigated two 
methodological issues related to the measurement and valuation 
of outcomes in economic evaluations. The fi rst part of this thesis 
investigated concerns in society for the distribution of health and 
health care. The second part explored happiness as a broader 
outcome measure for economic evaluations. 
This thesis contributes to the improvement of economic evaluations 
with the overarching aim to make economic evaluations a more 
useful source of information for health care decision making, 
better aligned with distributional preferences in society. 

Valuing and Refining Outcome 
Measures for Economic Evaluations 
in Health Care
Liesbet Lawerman-van de Wetering
© Copyright 2016 Liesbet Lawerman-van de Wetering
All rights reserved.
No part of this thesis may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means 
without prior written permission from the author.
ISBN: 978-94-6169-846-9
Layout and printing: Optima Grafische Communicatie, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Valuing and Refining Outcome Measures for  
Economic Evaluations in Health Care
Het waarderen en verfijnen van uitkomstmaten voor
economische evaluaties in de gezondheidszorg
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
op gezag van de
rector magnificus
Prof.dr. H.A.P. Pols
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties.
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op
donderdag 12 mei 2016 om 11:30 uur
door
Elisabeth Josine Lawerman-van de Wetering
geboren te ’s-Gravenhage
PROMOtiECOMMissiE
Promotor
Prof.dr. W.B.F. Brouwer
Overige leden
Prof.dr. M.P.M.H. Rutten-van Mölken
Prof.dr. C.D. Dirksen
Prof.dr. J.J. van Busschbach
Copromotor
Dr. N.J.A. van Exel
COntEnts
1. introduction 11
1.1. Allocating scarce resources in health care 13
1.2. Economic evaluations in health care 13
1.3. Distributional concerns in economic evaluations 16
1.4. Broader outcome measure 18
1.5. Objective 19
1.6. Outline 20
2. Balancing equity and efficiency in the Dutch basic benefits 
package using the principle of proportional shortfall
25
Abstract 26
2.1. Introduction 27
2.2. Economic evaluation and equity 28
2.3. Fair innings and prospective health 30
2.4. The principle of proportional shortfall 32
2.5. The practice of proportional shortfall 34
2.6. Discussion 38
3. Are some QALYs more equal than others? 41
Abstract 42
3.1. Introduction 43
3.2. Methods 45
3.2.1. Identification of attributes and levels 46
3.2.2. Questionnaire 47
3.2.3. Design choice sets 48
3.2.4. Analyses 49
3.3. Results 52
3.4. Discussion 55
4. Valuing QALYs in relation to equity considerations using a 
discrete choice experiment
61
Abstract 62
4.1. Introduction 63
4.2. Methods 65
4.2.1. Discrete Choice Experiment 65
4.2.2. Questionnaire 68
4.2.3. Analyses 69
4.3. Results 72
4.4. Discussion 76
Appendix 4.1:  Selection number of classes in the LCM 81
5. Equity-dependent social willingness to pay for a QALY 83
Abstract 84
5.1. Introduction 85
5.2. Analytic framework and hypothesis 87
5.2.1. Severity as Proportional shortfall 88
5.2.2. Severity as Burden of illness 88
5.2.3. Severity as “End-of-life” concern 88
5.3. Methods 89
5.3.1. Scenario design 90
5.3.2. Analysis 91
5.4. Results 93
5.4.1. WTP estimates 94
5.4.2. Severity as proportional shortfall – testing H1 and H2 95
5.4.3 Severity as the end-of life concern - testing H3 97
5.4.4. Composition of the QALY gain - testing H4 97
5.5. Discussion 98
Appendix 5.1: Attributes and levels per age group 104
Appendix 5.2:  The equality of the main parameters to be estimated, for each 
age group
106
Appendix 5.3: Undiscounted result 107
6. the risk of conditional reimbursement: stopping 
reimbursement can be more difficult than not starting in the 
first place!
109
Abstract 110
6.1. Introduction 111
6.2. Methods 113
6.2.1. Discrete choice experiments 113
6.2.2. Identification and presentation of attributes and levels 113
6.2.3. Questionnaire 115
6.2.4. Data collection 115
6.2.5. Analyses 117
6.3. Results 118
6.3.1. General public 119
6.3.2. Policy makers 119
6.3.3. Compensating variation and probability of acceptance 121
6.4. Discussion 122
Appendix 6.1: Additional questions for pilot study and policy makers 126
7. Health or happiness? A note on trading off health and 
happiness in rationing decisions
129
Abstract 130
7.1. Introduction 131
7.2. Study design and hypotheses 132
7.3. Results 136
7.3.1. Sample 136
7.3.2. Health versus happiness trade-offs 136
7.4. Discussion and conclusions 137
Appendix 7.1: Example question (version 1, scenario 1, choice ➊) 140
8. Piecing the jigsaw puzzle of adolescent happiness 141
Abstract 142
8.1. Introduction 143
8.2. Background 144
8.3. Methods 147
8.3.1. Participants 147
8.3.2. Materials 147
8.3.3. Procedure 148
8.4. Results 150
8.4.1. Characteristics of the Study Population 150
8.4.2. Happiness Scores 150
8.4.3. Domain-specific Happiness 150
8.4.4. Overall Happiness 157
8.5. Discussion 159
8.6. Conclusion 161
Appendix 8.1: Analysis based on ordinality assumption 162
9. How important is health for happiness? 165
Abstract 166
9.1. Introduction 167
9.2. Methods 169
9.2.1. Data 169
9.2.2. Specification of the models 169
9.2.3. Selection of instrumental variables 170
9.2.4. Additional tests 171
9.2.5. Measures of interest 171
9.3. Results 173
9.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the sample 173
9.3.2. Instrumental variable analysis 174
9.3.3. Regression results 175
9.3.4. Sensitivity analysis 177
9.4. Discussion 177
10. Discussion 181
10.1. Part A: Distributional concerns in society 183
10.1.1. Methodological considerations 185
10.2. Part B: Happiness in economic evaluations 186
10.3. Limitations and research implications 188
10.4. General conclusion and policy implications 190
10.5. Final remarks 192
Summary 197
Samenvatting 201
PhD portfolio 205
About the author 209
Dankwoord 211
References 213
tABLEs
Table 2.1: Illustrating fair innings and prospective health 31
Table 3.1: Overview of attributes and levels 47
Table 3.2: Demographic variables (n=1,001) 52
Table 3.3: Results of the NL model (n=1,001) 53
Table 4.1: Overview of attributes and levels 66
Table 4.2: Demographic statistics (n=1,205) 72
Table 4.3: Results mixed logit models with QALY gain and proportional 
shortfall
73
Table 4.4: Results mixed logit and latent class models original attributes 74
Table 5.1: Attribute levels 91
Table 5.2: Summary statistics 93
Table 5.3: OE(WTP) and WTP per QALY (in €, values rounded to hundreds) 94
Table 5.4: The impact of the most relevant predictors on raw log(WTP) 
estimates
96
Table 5.5: WTP variance per QALY accounting for LE without treatment in age 
group 70
98
Table 6.1: Attributes and levels 114
Table 6.2: Demographic variables 119
Table 6.3: Results MNL and Mixed MNL 120
Table 6.4: Statements policy makers (n=90) 121
Table 6.5: Changes in predicted probability of acceptance and the 
compensation variation value if the intervention already exist 
(compared to new intervention)
122
Table 7.1: Summary statistics (n=1,015) 135
Table 7.2: Choices in scenario 1; underlined number varied with choices made 
(n=495)
136
Table 7.3: Choices in scenario 2; underlined number varied with choices made 
(n=495)
137
Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics (n = 1436) 152
Table 8.2: Results multiple hierarchical regressions (n=1436) 154
Table 9.1: Study Sample (n=41,936) and SHARE (n=58,000) characteristics 173
Table 9.2: Validity of the candidate instrumental variables 174
Table 9.3: Relevance of the valid candidate instruments 175
Table 9.4: Results from OLS and 2SLS regressions 176
FiguREs
Figure 2.1: Decision making framework 35
Figure 3.1: Example of choice set (Block 3) 48
Figure 4.1: Question 1. [Age group 10, version 1, choice-set 1] 67
Figure 5.1: Graphical presentation of analytical framework 87
Figure 5.2: OE(WTO) by dGQ for 10Y, 40Y and 70Y 95
Figure 5.3: WTP per QALY estimates at different levels of proportional shortfall 
and age
97
Figure 6.1: Example of choice scenario 116
Figure 7.1: Example of the iteration process 116
Figure 8.1: Happiness rating scale 147
Figure 8.2: Variables selected for analysis 148
Figure 8.3: Average happiness scores, correlations and regression results 
(n=1,436)
151
1 
Introduction

13
Introduction
1
1.1. ALLOCAting sCARCE REsOuRCEs in HEALtH CARE
Due to new expensive technologies and aging populations, the pressure on health 
care budgets is increasing rapidly. To ensure an efficient use of the limited health care 
resources priorities must be set and choices regarding access to health care become 
inevitable [1]. These choices are a sensitive topic in society since their outcomes neces-
sarily imply that some health care interventions will not be funded, withholding these 
interventions from patients in need. At this moment most allocation decisions are still 
rather implicit. However, the growing pressure on health care budgets and the social 
impact of allocation decisions ask for a more consistent and transparent decision mak-
ing process, if possible based on explicit decision rules. In that context, economic evalu-
ations, which provide insight into the costs and (health) benefits of new technologies, 
are increasingly used to inform decisions regarding the allocation of scarce health care 
resources [2, 3]. The use of economic evaluations should contribute to a more systematic 
and transparent decision making process with the aim to stimulate overall health and 
welfare [4].
In order to contribute to these goals, economic evaluations need to be methodologically 
sound. Although the additional value of economic evaluations seems to be generally ac-
cepted there are still many methodological challenges to deal with. This thesis focusses 
on two important methodological issues related to measuring and valuing the benefits 
of new interventions. The first relates to the differentiation of the (monetary) value of a 
QALY according to distributional preferences in society. The second issue concerns the 
scope of the outcome measure, since happiness as a broader outcome measure than 
health may be better capable to capture all benefits of an intervention. Before address-
ing these issues further, economic evaluations are introduced.
1.2. ECOnOMiC EVALuAtiOns in HEALtH CARE
Economic evaluations are rooted in welfare economics and traditionally take the form 
of a cost-benefit analysis. In such an analysis, two treatment strategies are compared in 
terms of their costs and benefits. The costs and benefits are both expressed in monetary 
terms which makes the decision rule fairly straightforward: reimbursing the technol-
ogy is considered welfare improving if the additional benefits of the new technology 
outweigh its additional costs, compared to the old technology.
In health care, cost-benefit analyses are less common, primarily because expressing the 
value of health gains in monetary terms is difficult and contentious [5]. Hence, economic 
evaluations in health care often take the form of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) or 
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cost-utility analysis (CUA). These differ from cost-benefit analysis in the way they ex-
press health benefits. In CEA health benefits are expressed in relevant ‘natural units’, for 
instance life-years gained, hip fractures avoided or percentage blood pressure reduced. 
While this relates well to clinical practice, decision making at societal level is hampered 
by the incomparability of outcomes between different diseases, also in terms of their 
value. CUA was developed to overcome this problem. In a CUA the health benefits of 
a technology are typically expressed in Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs). This is a 
preference based measure that combines length and quality of life by weighing each 
year for the quality of life during that year, with 1 representing perfect health and 0 
represents the state ‘dead’. One perfectly healthy life-year counts as 1 QALY. Imperfect 
health states receive a weight between 0 and 1, although states worse than dead (i.e., 
receiving negative weights) are possible and observed [6].
The outcome of a CUA is an incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) and reflects the 
additional cost per gained QALY of a technology compared to the best alternative [1, 
7]. As in cost-benefit analysis, a technology can be considered welfare improving when 
the value of the additional health gain in QALYs (i.e. the benefits) exceeds the additional 
cost of the new technology compared to the old one, as represented by the following 
equation [7]:
Eq. 1.1 VQALY * ΔQALY – Δcosts > 0
In this equation VQALY is the monetary value of a QALY, ΔQALY denotes the incremental 
QALY gain and Δcosts represent the associated incremental costs. The health benefits of 
the technologies are thus reflected by the term VQALY * ΔQALY.
The equation can be reformulated to demonstrate the common decision rule of eco-
nomic evaluations:
Eq. 1.2
Δ costs
< VQALY
Δ QALY
This equation clearly shows that the ICER (i.e. Δcosts/ΔQALY), ‘the price of a QALY’, 
should be lower than the value of that QALY (VQALY) to be welfare improving. Here, the 
VQALY represents the social value of QALY, what the society is willing to pay to gain a QALY. 
It should be emphasized that without an estimate of this social value of a QALY, an eco-
nomic evaluation will not be complete. A threshold value is necessary to judge whether 
the technology can be considered good value for money and should be reimbursed. At 
this moment, the threshold to be used in decision making is often rather implicit.
15
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Regardless of the exact height of the threshold, an important question is whether this 
threshold should be equal for all health gains. Often, it is (implicitly) assumed that all 
health gains are valued equally, so that one fixed threshold, or VQALY, can be used for all 
interventions. This assumption is based on the well-known rule that ‘a QALY is a QALY is 
a QALY’ [6] which implies that specific characteristics of, for instance, the recipient (e.g. 
age) or the disease (e.g. severity) are not considered in traditional economic evaluations 
[8]. Hence, priority will be given to interventions that generate most health given a unit 
investment [4], regardless of the ‘context’ of these health gains.
However, with the increasing use of economic evaluations to inform health care alloca-
tion decisions, the discrepancies between recommendations based on economic evalu-
ations and actual or socially desired decisions become more evident [4, 9]. The results 
of traditional economic evaluations do not (always) align with societal preferences with 
respect to the distribution of scarce health care resources. This may partly explain the 
still relatively limited role of economic evaluations in health care allocation decisions [9]. 
In order to become more useful for policy making, somehow the outcomes of economic 
evaluations have to reconcile with existing societal preferences for the distribution of 
health and health care.
As indicated, this thesis deals with two distinct issues related to the benefit side of eco-
nomic evaluations. The first is directly related to VQALY in Equation 1.2, the monetary value 
of a QALY. This value is commonly considered to be equal for all QALY gains. However, an 
increasing body of research suggests that VQALY should differ according to distributional 
preferences in society.
The second issue concerns the ΔQALY in Equation 1.2, which represents the benefits of 
an intervention expressed in QALYs. It has been increasingly recognized that the narrow 
focus on health may not (always) capture all benefits of an intervention [10-12]. Some 
health care interventions, e.g. in long term care, do not necessarily aim to improve health 
but rather wellbeing. Therefore, adequate measurement of benefits requires outcome 
measures capturing outcomes beyond the QALY. This may for instance be done through 
measuring happiness. In this thesis we explore the support among the general public 
for happiness as an outcome measure in economic evaluation and the relationship be-
tween health and happiness. In the following sections, the two methodological issues 
addressed in this thesis will be further introduced. Addressing these issues will contrib-
ute to the refinement of the methodology and understanding of economic evaluations 
in health care and reconciliation of recommendations based on economic evaluations 
with societal preferences for the distributions of health and health care.
Chapter 1
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1.3. DistRiButiOnAL COnCERns in ECOnOMiC EVALuAtiOns
There is increasing recognition that, contrary to conventional economic evaluations, 
society seems to differentiate between QALY gains. This differentiation appears to 
be partly related to the wish to come to a more equitable distribution of health and 
health care [13]. Society may, for instance, prefer to treat relatively severely ill patients 
even when the potential QALY gains in these patients are relatively small [2, 14]. These 
equity considerations can be incorporated more systematically in health care allocation 
decisions by weighting QALY gains according to some equity principle. After weighting 
them, they can be compared to the relevant, fixed threshold value.
The same differentiation can also be achieved by using a flexible threshold. Then, QALY 
gains are not weighted, but ICERs are judged against a flexible threshold, which varies 
with the equity characteristics of the QALY gains. For instance, it could be higher for 
younger patients or more severely ill patients. This makes it explicit that some QALY 
gains carry more social value than others. In principle, both procedures are equivalent. 
The decision rule of an economic evaluation than becomes:
Eq. 1.3
Δ costs
< VQALYi
Δ QALYi
Here, the i reflects the specific equity characteristic of the QALY gain and VQALYi the social 
willingness to pay (WTP) for this QALY.
In deriving relative social values for QALY gains a first important and normative choice 
is which (combination of ) equity principle(s) is considered an appropriate base for QALY 
differentiation. Two principles are often proposed in the literature: fair innings and 
severity of illness. Roughly speaking, fair innings strives to equalize lifetime health [15], 
while severity of illness severity of illness focusses on people’s health expectations, ir-
respective of already experienced health [16]. Some support has been found for both of 
these principles, which may imply that people to some extent adhere to both [2, 14, 17, 
18]. Therefore, the Netherlands proposed the equity principle “proportional shortfall”. 
This principle is based on the proportion of remaining lifetime health lost due to disease 
and could therefore also be seen as an intermediate principle between fair innings and 
severity of illness [19-21]. This concept may be viewed as a first, pragmatic attempt to 
operationalize an equity principle which could be used in the allocation of scarce health 
care resources. Therefore, it can be interesting for other countries wishing to balance 
efficiency and equity considerations in health care allocation decisions.
Besides learning from the first experiences of the operationalization of an equity con-
cept in practice, empirical studies can be designed to evaluate which principle better 
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reflects the distributional preferences in society by eliciting relative QALY weights. These 
empirical studies may also provide important information to better understand societal 
preferences and thus help to refine the decision making process. For instance, besides 
severity and age, other characteristics may be considered relevant by the public in 
health care priority setting, such as culpability or rarity of the disease.
For health care allocation decisions, QALY weights do not provide full information. They 
must be accompanied by knowledge on the value of the threshold, i.e., the value of 
a QALY. To be precise, in using equity weights, at least one reference case is needed 
for which both the equity weight and the social value is known. When using a flexible 
threshold, the different monetary valuations of QALY gains need to be elicited in dif-
ferent equity contexts. So far, most studies that explored public preferences for QALY 
gains in relation to a variety of equity principles and characteristics of the beneficiary 
or the disease have not addressed the monetary valuation [22]. Studies aimed to derive 
the WTP per QALY normally did not take a societal viewpoint in eliciting values and 
(therefore) did not differentiate according to the equity context [23]. In this thesis, such 
estimates of the social WTP for QALY gains in different equity subgroups are presented. 
The experiments were specifically designed to learn how respondents solve the dilem-
mas they are confronted with, and to better understand societal support for differentiat-
ing QALY values between groups of patients.
It should be noted that in light of these societal preferences, the decision framework 
and policy instruments also require attention. A direct reason for this is the increasing 
use of “conditional reimbursement” as a policy instrument. Since allocation decisions 
usually have to be made close to the launch of a new treatment, the available evidence 
to inform health care decision makers is often insufficient. However, denying access to 
the market on those grounds would delay the availability of new interventions undesir-
ably. Conditional reimbursement allows to include a new treatment in the basic benefits 
package for a given period of time until more scientific evidence about (cost) effective-
ness becomes available [24, 25]. After that, a permanent decision regarding reimburse-
ment is made. Importantly, the feasibility of ending temporary reimbursement may be 
reduced by the fact that ending prior reimbursement resembles a loss, which normally 
carries more weight than an equally sized gain [26]. Loss aversion may thus make it more 
difficult to take something out of the basic benefits package than not adding the same 
intervention to the package in the first place. In other words, people may attach more 
value to interventions already in the package than those not yet reimbursed, ceteris 
paribus.
It is important to stress here that the normative questions about which equity principle 
should justify and underlie QALY differentiation, and whether or not prior reimburse-
Chapter 1
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ment status should matter in societal decisions, may not necessarily be answered best 
(or even appropriately) through positive research. In other words, not all preferences 
of the general public in the context of an ‘equitable’ distribution of health care, may be 
considered equitable (or desirable) from a normative viewpoint.
1.4. BROADER OutCOME MEAsuRE
The second issue addressed in this thesis concerns the outcome measure of economic 
evaluations, in Equation 1.2 represented by ΔQALY. Traditionally, the analysis of benefits 
of an intervention solely focused on health effects, often expressed in QALYs, reflecting 
health-related utility. However, this narrow focus on health may not always capture the 
full benefits of an intervention. For example in long term care, interventions are not 
always (primarily) aimed at improving ‘health’ but also at contributing to other aspects 
of general wellbeing, such as autonomy [4]. Therefore, whether broader outcome 
measures capturing general wellbeing would be more appropriate to capture outcomes 
beyond the QALY, is a rising issue of debate [27].
Happiness measurement is an interesting and popular candidate in this context [28]. 
The interest in happiness as an outcome measure for economic evaluations is in line 
with the growing interest, also in economics, in happiness research. Like in the early 
days of economics, happiness can be interpreted as a proxy for utility or overall welfare 
[5]. Happiness then represents the ultimate goal in life and hence becomes an interest-
ing outcome measure of social welfare. Interventions, also in health care, could then be 
assessed in terms of their effects on happiness of individuals [29, 30].
In the literature, the concepts ‘happiness’, ‘well-being’ and ‘life-satisfaction’ are often 
used interchangeably [31]. In this thesis we will define happiness as the degree to which 
an individual judges the overall quality of his life favourably [31]. Since happiness is 
a subjective measure, there have been many discussions in the literature about its 
measurability. At this moment, there seems to be consensus for quantifying happiness 
by questions like: ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 how satisfied are you with your life?’ where 0 
represents completely dissatisfied and 10 completely satisfied. Research has shown the 
validity of using self-reports and a cardinal interpretation of happiness measures [32].
Within health care, the outcome measure happiness may more fully capture the overall 
welfare effects on individuals. This implies that happiness may provide additional infor-
mation about the value of interventions that is relevant to evaluate those interventions 
and to inform health care allocation decisions. However, at present it is unclear how in-
formation on changes in happiness should be incorporated in such allocation decisions. 
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It also raises new questions, such as: Who should be the source of happiness changes? 
Should happiness replace the QALY outcome or complement it? If both measures are 
considered, how does that influence the allocation decision? How can health and hap-
piness measures be traded off?
Given the increasing interest in happiness as an outcome measure in health care it is also 
important to improve the understanding of what constitutes happiness and in particular 
about the relationship between health and happiness. Happiness is a multidimensional 
concept and its determinants seems to differ across individuals, life stages, and life 
domains [33-35]. More detailed information of what constitutes happiness contributes 
to the understanding of the role of health and health care in the achievement of overall 
happiness.
Of particular importance in the context of this thesis is the nature of the relationship 
between health and happiness. Most studies use subjective measures of health and 
happiness which makes it difficult to disentangle the association between the two. 
Are healthy people happier or is it the other way around? Reverse causality as well as 
correlations of subjective health and happiness with other unobserved factors, such as 
personality, may bias the estimations of the effects of health on happiness [36, 37]. For 
instance, a relatively unhappy individual may experience and value her health worse 
than her true health status. Therefore, more knowledge on the relationship between 
health and happiness remains warranted.
1.5. OBJECtiVE
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the methodology of outcome measure-
ment in economic evaluations in health care. This thesis focusses on two distinct issues 
and is structured in two sections. Part A investigates the distributional concerns of the 
general public in the context of health care allocation decisions. Part B focuses on happi-
ness as a broader outcome measure for economic evaluations in health care. Addressing 
these two issues will contribute to improvement of the methodology of economic evalu-
ations in health care, reconciliation of recommendations based on economic evaluations 
with societal preferences for the distributions of health and healthcare, and ultimately 
to a more influential role of economic evaluations in health care decision making.
To contribute to the overall aim of this thesis the following research questions are for-
mulated:
Chapter 1
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Part A
a) How is the equity efficiency trade-off operationalized in the decision making frame-
work in the Netherlands?
b) What is the effect of providing information about severity of illness and fair innings 
on health care allocation decisions?
c) What is the social WTP for a QALY gain at different levels of proportional shortfall and 
in different age groups?
d) Does the social WTP per QALY depend on severity of illness and age characteristics 
of beneficiaries?
e) How does the current reimbursement status of an intervention affect the relative 
social value of a QALY?
Part B
f ) Do respondents focus on health, happiness or both in prioritizing patients in health 
care?
g) What are the determinants of happiness and the role of health therein?
h) Is there a causal effect of health on happiness?
1.6. OutLinE
Part A of this thesis addresses the issue of incorporating distributional concerns in 
economic evaluations. In chapter 2 of this thesis we evaluate how efficiency and equity 
considerations are combined in the Dutch decision making framework for health care 
allocation decisions. The operationalization of proportional shortfall appears to be a 
complex process with many methodological and normative questions. This analysis is 
directly relevant for the Dutch policy context. However, given the universality of some 
of the issues addressed, these analysis may also be relevant for other countries currently 
struggling with the formalization of equity concerns for priority setting in healthcare. 
Chapter 3 investigates public preferences with respect to severity of illness, fair innings 
and other characteristics of the beneficiaries (i.e. culpability, rarity of the disease and 
having dependents). Relative weights are obtained using a discrete choice experiment. 
Chapter 4 and 5 present the results of two studies deriving the social willingness to 
pay for a QALY considering different equity concepts. Chapter 4 uses a discrete choice 
experiment while chapter 5 is based on contingent valuation. Chapter 6 investigates the 
effect of the current reimbursement status of an intervention on the relative social value 
of a QALY. Additional characteristics potentially relevant in the decision making process 
are also considered.
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Part B addresses the scope of the outcome measures in economic evaluations. Chapter 
7 explores whether the general public considers happiness in addition to health in 
health care allocations decisions and how they trade-off health and happiness gains in 
treatment allocation decisions. Chapter 8 explores the determinants of happiness more 
generally, including the role of health therein. Chapter 9 investigates the causal relation 
between health and happiness, considering possible endogeneity bias resulting from 
the subjective nature of health and happiness.
Finally, chapter 10 discusses the main findings of this thesis, addresses its limitations and 
implications, and ends with some policy recommendations.
Note that the chapters of this thesis are based on papers published (or submitted for 
publication) in international peer reviewed journals. Therefore, these chapters can be 
read independently and some overlap may exist between chapters.

Part A 

2 
Balancing equity and 
eﬃ  ciency in the Dutch basic 
beneﬁ ts package using the 
principle of proportional 
shortfall
Based on:
Van de Wetering, E. J., Stok, E.A., Van Exel N.J.A. & 
Brouwer W.B.F. (2013). Balancing equity and e­  ciency 
in the Dutch basic bene ts package using the 
principle of proportional shortfall. The European 
journal of health economics, 14(1), 107-115
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ABstRACt
Economic evaluations are increasingly used to inform decisions regarding the allocation 
of scarce health care resources. To systematically incorporate societal preferences into 
these evaluations, QALY gains could be weighted according to some equity principle, 
the most suitable of which is a matter of frequent debate. While many countries still 
struggle with equity concerns for priority setting in healthcare, the Netherlands has 
reached a broad consensus to use the concept of proportional shortfall. Our study evalu-
ates the concept and its support in the Dutch health care context. We discuss arguments 
in the Netherlands for using proportional shortfall and difficulties in transitioning from 
principle to practice. In doing so, we address universal issues leading to a systematic 
consideration of equity concerns for priority setting in health care. The article thus has 
relevance to all countries struggling with the formalization of equity concerns for prior-
ity setting.
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2.1. intRODuCtiOn
Economic evaluations are increasingly used to inform decisions regarding the alloca-
tion of scarce health care resources. They generally take the form of cost-utility analysis, 
in which incremental costs per gained QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Year) are evaluated 
against some threshold to ascertain the intervention’s value for money. In this procedure 
QALY gains are (implicitly) valued equally irrespective of, for instance, the beneficiary 
or disease. Such practice has been an issue of debate, however, because accumulating 
evidence shows that the public may prefer some QALY gains over others (e.g., young 
over old) [2, 3, 14], often relating to a more equitable distribution of health and health 
care. Such notions of equity are normally not captured in economic evaluations where 
QALYs are typically weighted equally and often remain implicit in subsequent policy 
decisions, if included at all.
Almost three decades ago researchers recognized that equity concerns could be 
incorporated into allocation decisions in the health care sector by weighting QALY 
gains according to some agreed upon equity principle [38], such as giving more weight 
to gains in the severely ill. Nonetheless, explicit QALY weighting is still uncommon. It 
seems that little has changed since Schwappach’s 2002 assertion that equity weight-
ing, if considered at all, was at a developmental stage [14]. However, given the growing 
pressure on health care budgets – partly due to (expensive) new technologies and 
increased demand stemming from demographic changes – we can expect that the 
process of allocating scarce health care resources will require increasing attention. Since 
decision makers increasingly use economic evaluations to inform their decisions [39], 
the discrepancies between recommendations based on economic evaluation outcomes 
and actual or publicly-desired decisions may become more evident, as experienced in 
the UK, Netherlands, and Australia [40-43]. One explanation for such discrepancies is the 
presence of equity concerns that are insufficiently reflected in current economic evalu-
ations [44]. Therefore, we need a more explicit and systematic incorporation of equity 
weights to obtain sustainable decisions.
Recent developments in the UK with respect to the funding of costly life-prolonging 
cancer drugs illustrate the attention to equity concerns [45, 46]. In general, the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) would like to adhere to the principle 
that ‘a QALY is a QALY’, implying that all QALY gains should receive equal weight [8], but 
under the rule it was difficult to come to sustainable decisions in the context of costly 
life-prolonging cancer drugs. The appraisal committees thus now explicitly consider the 
“magnitude of the additional weight that would need to be assigned to the QALY ben-
efits … for the cost-effectiveness of the technology to fall within the current threshold 
range” [47]. The rule, specific in terms of applicable interventions and open in terms of 
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what weights might be considered appropriate, might be a first step in defining more 
general rules regarding equity weights.
In response to the equity problem the Dutch have developed a decision-making 
framework that defines an equity-weighted basic benefits package. Its primary criteria 
(proposed in 1991) are necessity, effectiveness, and efficiency [48]. The first refers to a 
notion of equity based on the need for medical intervention; the latter two refer to the 
merits of the intervention itself [20]. The three criteria inform the decision for including 
an intervention in the benefits package. Equity weights thus are intended to be part 
rather than exceptions to the rule. In this context, broad consensus appears to exist 
for using a particular operationalization of necessity as basis for equity weighting, i.e., 
the concept of proportional shortfall [19-21, 49]. Although choosing a specific equity 
principle may lead to a more systematic and transparent way of using equity weights to 
set priorities in the Dutch healthcare system, it also requires justification.
The Dutch and UK experiences suggest that including equity concerns in practice is not 
straightforward. Arriving at a systematic consideration raises two important questions: 
(i) which equity principle(s) are used to base QALY weights on, and (ii) how can we derive 
practically applicable QALY weights that are in line with the chosen principle(s). These 
difficult and inherently normative questions complicate the formalization of equity 
concerns.
To our knowledge, the Netherlands is the first country where decision makers and 
health economists have been involved in a joint effort to formulate an equity principle 
and develop a model for putting it into practice. Although the concept of proportional 
shortfall is not yet firmly implemented, it does appear to be the ultimate goal. Evaluat-
ing the proportional shortfall concept and the support for it in more detail is therefore 
directly relevant to the Dutch situation as well as other countries currently struggling 
with the formalization of equity concerns for priority setting in healthcare.
In this article we will evaluate the proportional shortfall concept as used in the Dutch 
health care context, with a focus on the abovementioned research questions on QALY 
weighting within the context of a chosen principle.
2.2. ECOnOMiC EVALuAtiOn AnD EQuitY
Equity weights are integrated into economic evaluations to adequately consider costs 
and benefits. The common decision rule for economic evaluations is shown in Equation 
2.1 [7]:
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Eq. 2.1 VQALYi * ΔQALYi – Δcosts > 0
where VQALYi denotes the monetary value society attaches to a QALY of type i and the 
subscript i is used to distinguish QALY gains according to some equity principle. ΔQALYi 
represents the number of type i QALYs gained; Δcosts are the associated costs. Both are 
relative to some relevant comparator. Accordingly, the term VQALYi * ΔQALYi reflects the 
benefits related to the intervention. Put simply, Equation 2.1 indicates that incremental 
benefits of the intervention need to outweigh its incremental costs to be eligible for 
funding.
In common economic evaluations, however, the monetary value component in the 
benefits is not included in the equation. Rather the focus is only on ΔQALYi (commonly 
without any distinction between QALYs, following ‘a QALY is a QALY no matter who gets 
it’) and Δcosts. This means that common economic evaluations in the field of health 
care do not directly address VQALYi. As such, these analyses are basically partial economic 
evaluations. This is easily demonstrated by reordering Equation 2.1:
Eq. 2.2
Δ costs
< VQALYi
Δ QALYi
where the costs per QALY gained of type i have to be lower than the societal value at-
tached to that particular type of QALY in order to be eligible for funding. Only then a 
common cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analysis becomes a full economic evaluation 
as noted in Equation 2.1. (Note that irrespective of how QALYs, costs and potentially the 
value of QALYs are derived, the equivalence between a common cost-benefit analysis 
and the decision rule based on a cost-utility analysis may still be questioned [50, 51]).
Commonly, one threshold is set for all QALYs, regardless of the context in which they 
are gained. However, in line with Equation 2.2, different cost-effectiveness ratios may be 
acceptable for different types of QALYs gained if the value of a QALY is allowed to vary, 
for instance, on the basis of the disease or beneficiary characteristics. If so, rather than 
having one threshold value for all QALYs, we have a range whose endpoints are defined 
by the lowest and highest possible values attached to a gained QALY in a particular 
context. These different contexts may well refer to notions of equity. Note that such a 
practice is equal to keeping the threshold value constant but attaching ‘equity weights’ 
to the QALY gains on the left hand side of Equation 2.2. This implicitly ensures the use of 
an appropriate threshold value since the equity weights may simply be regarded as the 
relative values of different QALYs. In the Dutch context the former approach is taken; i.e., 
different threshold values are used when the burden of illness is high (e.g., acute life-
threatening diseases) or low (e.g., toenail fungus). The latter approach appears to have 
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been adopted for cancer drugs in the UK, i.e., keeping the threshold fixed but weighting 
QALY gains.
To illustrate that one can either vary the threshold values or attach equity weights to QA-
LYs, we use a hypothetical example in which the QALY value is allowed to vary between 
young and old. For children the value is highest, say, 1QALY = €100,000. For people age 
90 and over, the value is lowest, say, 1QALY = €5,000. Let the reference value of a QALY 
be that of a 40-year-old, or €40,000. One way to judge a CE ratio of gains in children 
is to compare the CE ratio to the threshold line running from 5,000 to 100,000, where 
for this intervention the high endpoint is relevant. Alternatively, ‘equity weights’ can be 
used to adjust the CE ratio itself, which can be judged against the common threshold of 
40,000. In this example, the equity weight of QALYs for children relative to the 40-year-
old reference group is 2.5 (vchildren / v40 year olds = 100,000 / 40,000). Thus, in order to use 
equity weights appropriately, we (implicitly) compare the relative values of different 
QALY gains to some reference group with the standard threshold. Subsequently, such 
equity weights can be multiplied with the QALY gains in the CE ratio (i.e. ΔC/2.5*ΔE), 
which indirectly corrects the threshold value used.
The above demonstrates how using a flexible threshold is basically equal to attach-
ing appropriate equity weights to different QALYs and comparing them to a single, 
relevant threshold. In that sense, the Dutch and UK approaches are similar, albeit the 
UK approach currently seems to be used in only a few specific circumstances. A crucial 
question, however, is which equity principle should guide the derivation or evaluation 
of equity weights (research question (i)). To this end, we next discuss the well- known 
principles of fair innings and prospective health, followed by discussion of the principle 
selected in the Dutch context, proportional shortfall.
2.3. FAiR innings AnD PROsPECtiVE HEALtH
Which (combination of ) equity concept(s) is most suitable for equity weighting? Several 
have been proposed even more equity concepts are imaginable [15, 52]. A problem 
is that improved equality with one particular definition of equity may be (necessarily) 
accompanied by greater inequalities in the context of a different definition [53]. Select-
ing one (or more) principle(s) to guide the derivation or evaluation of equity weights is 
thus important and not straightforward. Two important principles are fair innings and 
prospective health. Fair innings, roughly speaking, strives for equity in lifetime health, 
while prospective health is more concerned with people’s health expectations, regard-
less of experienced health. An aspect both principles share is that their basis is found 
within the health domain, i.e. they both focus on health characteristics of beneficiaries, 
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not on aspects like gender or income. The principles differ, however, in that one strives 
to equalize lifetime health and the other prospective health.
The fair innings approach, advocated by Alan Williams (1997), is based on the assump-
tion that everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of life or health achievement. Anyone 
failing to achieve this has in some sense been disadvantaged in terms of lifetime health, 
whilst anyone getting more than this is living on ‘borrowed time’ [15]. This assumption 
implies that QALY gains in people who have had their fair innings should be valued 
lower than QALY gains in people who are expected to get less than their fair innings. 
Thus, the equity weights depend on the expected lifetime QALY total and age is a key 
element (as proxy for lifetime health achievement), resulting in higher weights for QALY 
gains in relatively young persons and lower ones for those in relatively older persons.
In contrast, the principle of prospective health bases equity weights on the expected 
QALY profile of a person in the case of no treatment. This aligns with an alternative 
definition of need, namely, expected ill health over the remaining years of life [16]. 
Prospective health considers the expected health (including death) in future years in 
the case of non-intervention and distributes QALY gains initially to those with the worst 
prognosis if left untreated [16]. The approach appears to be related to the Rule of Res-
cue, which implies that rescuing identifiable individuals facing avoidable death should 
have priority over other types of care [54, 55]. While prospective health incorporates 
non-identifiable individuals and non-life threatening conditions, both prioritize people 
with poor health prospects.
The different perspectives of fair innings and prospective health obviously result 
in different equity weights. As seen in Table 2.1, group A faces immediate death and 
group B has one remaining QALY. However, group B consists of younger persons who, 
consequently, have enjoyed fewer QALYs than persons in group A. Adhering to the 
equity principle of prospective health, group A would have priority because they face 
immediate death. The fair innings principle, on the other hand, would prioritize group B 
since it comprises younger people, or, put more precisely, it has a lower lifetime quality-
adjusted life expectancy [13, 16, 56].
table 2.1: Illustrating fair innings and prospective health
Patient group QALY consumed QALYs remaining
(prospective health)
Expected QALY total
(fair innings)
A (imm. death) 60 0 60
B (younger) 40 1 41
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A number of empirical studies have found at least some public support for both the 
principles of fair innings and prospective health [2, 14, 17], although it may depend 
on the context of the decision [57]. As mentioned, age is important to the fair innings 
principle. Both Dolan and colleagues (2005) and Schwappach (2002) have found in their 
reviews that the majority of studies reveal support for giving less weight to health gains 
in older people, but Schwappach argues that age preferences vary across countries, 
study designs and context. Additionally, both reviews note that age weighting may 
reflect underlying rationales other than the fair innings principle. For example, people 
may prefer health gains in young people because they expect them to last longer. Sepa-
ration of the different rationales places specific requirements on the design of studies, 
and they are not always met. Furthermore, Shah’s (2009) recent review indicates that 
the public prefers to prioritize individuals in poorer health rather than those in better 
health without treatment, even if it results in lower overall health gains [2, 14, 17]. Shah 
(2009), however, emphasized that the strength of the support should be estimated more 
precisely to gain a true reflection of it.
There appears to be little evidence showing that either equity principle reflects the 
distributional preferences of society completely, or that one fully lacks support. In that 
regard, we should note that people may in fact adhere to both principles: someone may 
feel that (holding other things constant, i.e., health prospects) young people should 
receive priority over older people and, at the same time, feel that (holding other things 
constant, i.e., age) people with worse health prospects should receive priority over 
those with better health prospects. In the Dutch context, therefore, the equity principle 
proposed was an intermediate principle between fair innings and prospective health, 
or “proportional shortfall”. We should note that the Dutch decision, while deliberatively 
taken and explicitly justified, should be seen as a first, pragmatic attempt to find an 
equity principle that is practically applicable and supported by the public.
2.4. tHE PRinCiPLE OF PROPORtiOnAL sHORtFALL
The concept of proportional shortfall adopts the normative viewpoint that priority 
should be given to those patients who lose the greatest proportion of their remaining 
health expectancy due to some illness if the illness remains untreated. In other words, 
measurements of inequalities in health should concentrate on the fraction of QALYs lost 
due to illness, relative to remaining life expectancy. Proportional shortfall (PS) can be 
measured on a scale from 0 (no health loss) to 1 (complete loss of remaining health) 
using the following formula:
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Eq. 2.3 PS =
Disease related QALY loss 
Remaining QALY expectation in absence of the disease
where the denominator reflects the remaining QALY expectation in normal health, 
which could for example be determined on the basis of age and gender. The numerator 
presents the QALY loss, which is determined by deducting a patient’s QALY expectancy 
given the disease without treatment from the remaining QALY expectancy in absence 
of the disease. The proportional shortfall is 1 for all patients who face a threat of im-
mediate death, irrespective of their age. Since they will lose 100% of their remaining 
life expectancy they all receive equal weight. Likewise, if a young patient with a normal 
QALY expectation of 40 loses 20 QALYs, he or she will get the same equity weight as an 
older patient with a QALY expectation of 2 who stands to lose 1 QALY: both patients lose 
50% of their remaining life expectancy. Since proportional shortfall is a relative measure, 
both younger and older individuals can experience a low or high proportional shortfall. 
For another example, a 30- year-old losing 1 of 40 remaining QALYs would receive low 
treatment priority (1/40 = 0.025) while a 70-year-old losing 1 of 5 remaining QALYs 
would receive higher priority (1/5 = 0.2).
Whereas fair innings and prospective health equalize absolute health outcomes in 
terms of total and future health, proportional shortfall proposes to equalize relative 
attainments. By doing so, the concept combines elements of both fair innings and 
prospective health. In accordance with fair innings, proportional shortfall is concerned 
with disease-related QALY loss; at the same time, in accordance with prospective health, 
it takes the remaining QALY expectation without treatment into account [18]. Therefore, 
the principle may be perceived as an intermediate position between fair innings and 
prospective health.
Obviously, this does not necessarily mean that proportional shortfall is in any sense 
‘better’ than the other two. Its use must be justified, both normatively and empirically. A 
limitation to normative justification is that unlike, say, fair innings, the concept is not de-
rived from a particular theory about distributive justice. Instead, normative arguments 
for both prospective health and fair innings are assumed to be compelling; thus, given 
that both principles result in different prioritizations, a reconciliation of or trade-off 
between the two is required. While balancing two principles that appear to have some 
normative and empirical support may intuitively make sense, whether the resulting 
combination has the same (or even a better) moral status than the individual principles 
themselves remains questionable [58].
One convincing argument for this (and thus proportional shortfall) may be if the latter 
reflects societal preferences better than either of its underlying principles. Evidence 
is thus far inconclusive, as is the only head-to-head comparison of all three concepts 
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in which Stolk and colleagues (2005) performed an experiment in a sample of Dutch 
health policy makers, researchers, and students to explore support for the individual 
systems. Observed rank orders of ten conditions were compared with rank orders based 
on the three equity principles. While both fair innings and proportional shortfall were 
highly correlated with the observed rank order, rank orderings based on prospective 
health showed only a moderate correlation coefficient with the respondents’ ranking. 
Fair innings seemed to slightly outperform proportional shortfall, but neither offered 
a fully accurate description of societal preferences: there were always cases where the 
predicted rank ordering diverged from the observed. It was therefore concluded that 
more (elaborate) research was required before firm conclusions could be drawn about 
which concept best reflects societal preferences.
Despite the limited empirical and theoretical evidence to support proportional shortfall, 
broad consensus exists in the Netherlands to use it for equity weighting. The choice was 
partly pragmatic, subject to possible adjustment according to incoming evidence and 
ongoing experience. From the outset it was obvious that the adoption of any equity 
principle would not be without problems. To avoid perfection becoming the enemy of 
the good, however, efforts were made to operationalize proportional shortfall for use in 
practice. We highlight this in the following section, while addressing the issue of how 
practically-applicable QALY weights can be derived in line with the chosen principle 
and how they can subsequently be used in decision making on the allocation of scarce 
health care resources.
2.5. tHE PRACtiCE OF PROPORtiOnAL sHORtFALL
As indicated, three criteria have been particularly important in the delineation of the 
basic benefits package in the Dutch context: necessity, effectiveness, and efficiency. 
While proposed and well received about two decades ago [48], adopting them for prac-
tical use has proven difficult and controversial. Effectiveness, which has always been a 
dominant criterion in the health care sector, was least controversial but not efficiency, 
which is nonetheless increasingly used and accepted. It has been operationalized pri-
marily through cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses, and most widely applied 
in the context of new pharmaceuticals. ‘Necessity’, while intuitively important, eluded 
definition and measurement and thus remained barely applied as a (systematic) selec-
tion criterion in practice until 2002. Attempts to exclude services based on the criterion 
of necessity commonly provoked political or societal debate. Proportional shortfall was 
introduced to provide a more systematic and quantitative definition of necessity, which 
also solved its problem of dichotomy: interventions were deemed either necessary or 
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unnecessary with no in-between. This proved virtually impossible as a proper definition 
of necessity and a clear and universal cut-off point between unnecessary and necessary 
(or, for that matter, cost-effective and cost-ineffective) care was lacking. Mostly, there 
would be (groups of ) patients for whom it would be difficult to label the intervention as 
unnecessary or cost-ineffective [59].
The introduction of proportional shortfall made it possible to quantify the necessity 
criterion and to integrate it with or relate it to results regarding (cost-) effectiveness 
in the decision-making framework. Basically, the threshold of cost per QALY (i.e., the 
value of the QALY) was allowed to vary with the necessity of the intervention, creating a 
decision framework in line with Equation 2.2. The idea was that society is willing to pay 
more for an intervention, given the underlying proportional shortfall, considered more 
necessary. Put differently, a less favourable cost-effectiveness ratio is acceptable for an 
intervention in the context of a greater proportional shortfall, i.e., when the treatment 
is deemed to be more necessary, and unacceptable when the associated proportional 
shortfall is low. This decision- making framework is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
While the framework is increasingly supported [19, 49], it is unclear how it has affected 
decisions and it is likely that it is currently used predominantly as a conceptual frame-
work. One reason may be that it is unclear how the threshold of costs per QALY gained 
varies with proportional shortfall. The equity weights placed on the different QALY gains 
(the value of gained QALYs relative to the underlying proportional shortfall) remain 
uncertain. In that sense, the threshold and margins in Figure 2.1 are largely tentative. 
Recently a maximum threshold height of some €80,000 has been suggested [49, 60], al-
though the choice lacks sound basis [61]. Furthermore, it has been suggested that social 
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willingness to pay for QALY gains in the case of a very low burden of disease (propor-
tional shortfall less than 10%) might not exist at all in the context of a collectively-funded 
health insurance scheme (which explains the dotted threshold line near the origin of 
the graph in Figure 2.1).1 The shape of the curve would ultimately be based on relative 
valuations of QALY gains in different proportional shortfall contexts, information that is 
currently lacking. A linear relationship has thus been proposed as a pragmatic starting 
point [21] but, even under this assumption, we need to be able to adequately judge the 
proportional shortfall in different circumstances to use the framework in practice.
The framework is thus currently more conceptual than prescriptive in assessing 
health care interventions. Supporting this may be the fact that the shortcomings of 
proportional shortfall have barely been discussed. As highlighted by the fair innings 
and prospective health principles, not all consequences of the proportional shortfall 
principle may be in line with common conceptions of an equitable distribution of health 
care. Perhaps the most counterintuitive implication of the principle is that anyone facing 
imminent death should receive the maximum necessity score of 1, since all remaining 
health will be lost. This seems hard to defend when comparing between patients that 
differ substantially in age. Indeed, proportional shortfall assigns a necessity score of 1 
when all remaining health is lost, regardless of the absolute number of life-years lost. 
The principle is indifferent to whether a three year-old is losing 80 years or an 80 year-
old is losing three years, but in practice many people judge intervention to be more 
necessary in the former situation [61], making it conceivable that the result conflicts 
with society’s equity principles. Likewise, since women have a higher life expectancy 
than men, an absolute QALY loss at a certain age will have more weight for men than 
women (for instance when comparing breast cancer and prostate cancer in certain age 
groups) and it is unclear whether this would be judged equitable [62-64].
Moreover, it became apparent that the operationalization of proportional shortfall 
required numerous normative choices that have important impacts on final outcomes. 
Coming to practically-applicable proportional shortfall scores that are in line with public 
preferences is therefore not straightforward [62]. For instance, the calculation of propor-
tional shortfall in preventive treatments requires clear normative choices. Considering 
that many who receive preventive treatment will never experience the negative health 
effects precluded by the intervention, which group is relevant? While the treated group 
may be relevant in a cost-utility analysis of a preventive intervention, it may not be when 
calculating the proportional shortfall of the underlying disease. Calculating proportional 
1  Asserting that a disease has a low necessity of treatment is in itself difficult. A relatively small health loss 
may be due to something severe during a small period of time or something relatively mild but chronic. 
Such profiles may be evaluated differently, as discussed later in the text.
37
Balancing equity and efficiency in the Dutch basic benefits package using the principle of proportional shortfall
2
shortfall over the entire group would result in a very low average proportional shortfall 
since only a small percentage of the treated group would actually experience a health 
loss. This in turn results in low priority for (primary) preventive action, but the very aim of 
the intervention is to avoid health loss in those who would experience it without the pre-
ventive intervention. Then, it seems reasonable to calculate the proportional shortfall in 
the subgroup only, resulting in a higher proportional shortfall and threshold value. (The 
latter position is taken in the Netherlands.) Consequently, normative choices are neces-
sary in defining the relevant group in which to determine proportional shortfall, which 
does not necessarily coincide with the population involved in the economic evaluation.
The timeframe for calculating proportional shortfall is another issue. Should the onset 
of preventive treatment be the starting point from which to calculate proportional 
shortfall? Or should it be the moment at which the negative health effects would have 
actually occurred? Obviously, the shorter timeframe will increase the proportional 
shortfall. Consider, for example, that a preventive intervention reduces a risk factor that, 
left untreated, results in death 20 years hence, reducing lifespan by 10 years. Until the 
moment of death, patients are without health loss. Calculating proportional shortfall 
starting from treatment time means that the first 20 years are in health and only the 
final 10 years are lost, resulting in a proportional shortfall of 33%. Calculating from the 
moment of illness the proportional shortfall is 100% (since then 10 of the remaining 10 
life-years are lost). In the Netherlands, it has been argued that since society is likely to 
feel quite different about acute death than about a predicted (or certain) death in 20 
years, calculating proportional shortfall from the moment of treatment would be more 
appropriate. Again, this is a normative choice, with substantial influence on results.
An additional problem exists in handling episodic diseases. An average severity of illness 
of 0.04 can result from a stable yet mild condition that causes a loss of 0.04 per day as 
well as from a disease that is primarily latent (no health loss for 350 days per year), but 
leaves the patient in agony during the episode (a loss of 1.0 during the remainder of 
the year). In the current operationalization of proportional shortfall, such episodes are 
simply averaged over the full year (as in normal QALY calculations). However, the ap-
propriateness and justification of such a simple method of transforming health profiles 
into proportional shortfall scores can be disputed. Can we really conclude on such a 
basis that a certain illness has a modest severity? It appears that the variation over time 
may be important here too; yet, how could or should this be included in the calculation 
of proportional shortfall?
The above illustrates that not just the choice of an equity principle is normative; putting 
whatever it is into practice requires additional normative choices. Whatever the chosen 
principle, it appears inevitable that counterintuitive prioritizations may result in certain 
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circumstances. Clearly, therefore, decision makers should be aware of additional and 
potentially conflicting equity considerations.
2.6. DisCussiOn
Explicit inclusion of equity weights in the decision-making framework for allocation 
decisions in the health care sector has become increasingly important. A pragmatic start 
has been made in the Netherlands with the principle of proportional shortfall, which 
adopts the normative viewpoint that when people stand to lose relatively more of their 
remaining health, a higher cost per QALY threshold is appropriate. It thus quantifies the 
criterion of necessity in the Dutch decision-making framework. The higher the propor-
tional shortfall, the more necessary the intervention.
This article highlights that the approach is not without problems. Both the normative 
basis and empirical support warrant further study. Of particular concern are situations 
where the consequences of proportional shortfall diverge from public preferences. For 
example, it seems hard to defend that avoiding a full loss of all remaining health would 
be equally important when the choice concerns either a very large or small absolute 
QALY loss, i.e., young and old people, respectively. Whether proportional shortfall ad-
equately reflects societal preferences in such cases is uncertain and information on the 
circumstances of misalignment is pivotal in refining the principle and its employment.
We also highlighted that operationalizing proportional shortfall (or of any equity prin-
ciple for that matter) involves normative choices that can have a profound effect on 
outcomes, like in the case of preventive interventions. It is crucial that these normative 
choices are as widely discussed as those embedded in cost-effectiveness analyses.
The highlighted shortcomings of proportional shortfall clearly should not be misinter-
preted as a plea to replace it with a different equity concept such as fair innings. Indeed, 
whatever principle is chosen, similar shortcomings and normative choices will arise in 
transitioning from principle to practice. Since different notions of equity – all of which 
have some support in some instances – will always conflict in certain circumstances [53], 
conflicts with societal preferences will be inevitable. At this moment, there is no con-
clusive evidence that another equity principle reflects the distributional preferences of 
society better than proportional shortfall. It seems more appropriate, given the relatively 
strong (political) support for the equity concept of proportional shortfall in the Dutch 
context, to further test, develop, and refine the principle and its operationalization. For 
example, one might consider incorporating age weights in proportional shortfall in 
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order to better reflect societal preferences.2 Obviously, this requires more and detailed 
research on relevant societal preferences as well as public debate. Improving the quan-
tification of necessity will most likely be a lengthy and difficult process.
The current situation, while perhaps far from perfect, may be seen as an important and 
perhaps essential step in the development of an appropriate set of equity weights in 
the Netherlands. The associated quantification of necessity should improve consistency 
and transparency in the decision-making process. Meanwhile, experience from the 
systematic use of proportional shortfall will potentially improve the principle and its 
practical use.
Besides proportional shortfall or health profiles of beneficiaries in general, many other 
factors may be relevant for decision making in relation to equity considerations. Re-
views by Dolan et al. (2005) and Schwappach (2002) have identified numerous factors 
besides health attainments or prospects that appear to influence the relative valuation 
of QALYs, such as prior health consumption, culpability, age, having dependents, and 
socioeconomic status. More recent studies have added to this field [17, 65], but so far 
most involve small and unrepresentative samples, the studies are quite context-specific, 
and findings are sometimes contradictory. It seems difficult at this stage to be conclu-
sive regarding the relative weights given to these considerations in an empirical sense. 
While it may be interesting and helpful to analyse such additional equity concerns in 
relation to proportional shortfall, such empirical work should coincide with normative 
debates regarding whether such additional (or alternative) concerns should be included 
in the decision-making process. For instance, even if the public (on average) considers 
culpability important in fair allocation of health care resources, wanting to institutional-
ize such sentiments is questionable if only because Dutch legislation prohibits it.
Another challenge in the Dutch context is further quantification of the decision model. 
Currently, QALY value is unclear, let alone how it varies with different proportional short-
fall percentages and which equity weights should be placed on various QALY gains. To 
use the decision-making framework in practice, the (relative) values assigned to QALY 
gains for different levels of proportional shortfall have to be elicited, for instance, from 
the public. Different methods have been used such as willingness to pay, person trade-
off, or discrete choice analysis [3]. Which technique best captures the preferences of 
society may depend on the research question and whether relative weights of various 
equity concerns will be investigated simultaneously in combined trade-offs.
2  Obviously, this also depends on whether one wishes to consider societal preferences to be a good guide 
for normative choices.
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In conclusion, although proportional shortfall provides important information for deci-
sion makers by acceptably quantifying the necessity of treatment in the Dutch context, 
it clearly does not perfectly capture societal preferences. Sufficient room should be left 
in the decision-making framework and process to judge whether the equity weights 
accurately reflect the public preferences in particular circumstances and to improve on 
principles and practice if so indicated. More generally, the Dutch experience with equity 
considerations in relation to economic evaluations has given insight into the difficulties 
related to the choice for and operationalization of an equity concept for the allocation of 
scarce health care resources. Although the Dutch experiences are based on the concept 
of proportional shortfall, similar issues are likely to occur when opting for other equity 
concepts. Therefore, the Dutch experiences can provide helpful lessons for countries 
currently struggling with the important issue of formalization of equity concerns in 
priority setting in health care.
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ABstRACt
Including societal preferences in allocation decisions is an important challenge for the 
health care sector. Here, we present results of a phased discrete choice experiment 
investigating the impact of various attributes on respondents’ preferences for distribu-
tion of health and health care. In addition to the renowned equity principles severity 
of illness (operationalized as initial health) and fair innings (operationalized as age), 
some characteristics of beneficiaries (culpability and having dependents) and the 
disease (rarity) were included in the choice experiment. We used a nested logit model 
to analyse the data. We found that all the selected attributes significantly influenced 
respondents’ choices. The phased inclusion showed that additional attributes affected 
respondents’ preferences for previously included attributes and reduced unobserved 
variance. Although not all these attributes may be considered relevant for decision mak-
ing from a normative perspective, including them in choice experiments contributes to 
our understanding of societal preferences for each single attribute.
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3.1. intRODuCtiOn
With the increasing use of economic evaluations to inform decisions regarding the 
allocation of scare resources in health care, it has become evident that allocation 
recommendations directly based on traditional economic evaluations do not (always) 
align with societal preferences. This is importantly related to the fact that traditional 
economic evaluations are based on the well-known rule that ‘a QALY is a QALY is a QALY’, 
while accumulating evidence shows that, from a societal perspective, some QALY gains 
are considered to be more valuable than others. Concerns for an equitable distribution 
of health and healthcare importantly underlie such preferences. This recognition has 
fuelled the debate regarding how to reconcile the outcomes of traditional economic 
evaluations with the existing distributional preferences in the general public [2, 3, 14].
This debate is not only academic. In actual decision making, differentiation between 
QALY gains of different types or to different beneficiaries is becoming more common 
as well. For instance, in the UK, in specific circumstances, such differentiation appears 
to be accepted as exception to the conventional rule that a QALY is a QALY [47], while in 
the Netherlands this differentiation has been put forward as the new rule for decision 
making rather than an exception [21, 49, 66]. The way in which the differentiation is ad-
dressed can differ as well. It sometimes is discussed in terms of ‘equity weights’, referring 
to a process of weighting QALY gains according to some equity principle in order to 
recognize that some gains are more important (‘weighty’) than others. Weighted incre-
mental QALY gains are subsequently related to the incremental costs of producing them 
and judged against some fixed threshold. Differentiation can also be discussed in terms 
of a flexible threshold. Then, QALY gains are not weighted, but the incremental costs 
per QALY are compared to a differentiated threshold value, that varies with the equity 
context in which specific QALYs are gained. While the latter approach makes it more 
explicit that some QALY gains carry more (social) value than others, both procedures are 
equivalent [66, 67]. The attention for both appropriate decision rules [7, 68] and equity 
weights [2, 3] is increasing.
In deriving equity weights a first important choice is the basis on which equity classes 
are differentiated, i.e. the (combination of ) equity principle(s) considered to be the 
appropriate base for weighting QALY gains. It should be emphasized that the norma-
tive question about which equity principle should justify and underlie equity weights 
(or flexible thresholds), may not necessarily be answered best (or even appropriately) 
through positive research. For example, not all characteristics the general public may 
consider relevant in the context of an ‘equitable’ distribution of health care, may be 
considered equitable (or desirable) from a normative viewpoint.
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The equity principles ‘severity of illness’ and ‘fair innings’ have been regularly proposed 
as suitable candidates to conceptualize important distributional concerns in society. The 
principle of severity of illness bases equity weights on current and future health profiles. 
This approach can take into account severity of illness at the time of intervention, but 
also expected severity – including death – in future years in case of non-intervention [56, 
69]. Proportional shortfall, the equity principle used in the Netherlands, emphasizes the 
proportion of health lost due to some disease [62] and could therefore also be seen as a 
measure of severity of illness [66]. The fair innings approach, advocated by Alan Williams 
(1997), is based on the assumption that everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of 
life or health achievement. Equity weights then depend on this expected lifetime QALY 
total, resulting in higher weights for those who fall short of this norm and lower weights 
for those who exceed the norm. Lifetime health achievement is the key element in the 
argumentation of fair innings, especially in comparison to severity of illness [15, 56]. 
Although obviously not without problems, age is often taken as a proxy for lifetime 
health achievement. So far, there is no conclusive evidence that either severity of illness 
or fair innings better reflect the distributional preferences of society. Both principles rely 
on justified normative arguments and empirical studies have shown at least some public 
support for both of them [66].
Empirical studies furthermore highlight that the public may consider other character-
istics, even some outside the health domain, to be relevant in allocation decisions on 
health and health care. People may for instance consider culpability (i.e. responsibility 
for own disease), social economic status, rarity of the disease and having dependents 
relevant characteristics of beneficiaries and their diseases in this context [2, 14]. How-
ever, the results of these studies are inconclusive as the (relative) importance of these 
variables and methodological differences hamper their comparability. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that many of these studies consider characteristics (e.g., age or sever-
ity) in isolation. This may not lead to an optimal insight in true distributional preferences, 
when people would normally consider multiple characteristics simultaneously. More-
over, there are indications that the results from empirical studies are sensitive to the 
framing of questions, inclusion of characteristics and the analysis [70]. To date, only few 
studies have considered multiple characteristics simultaneously and have attempted to 
quantify relative equity weights for QALY’s based on several characteristics [14, 70, 71].
Another important issue is how to validly quantify equity weights in empirical research. 
Obviously, such quantification is essential, if the objective is to use equity weights in 
actual allocation decisions [18, 61, 64, 70]. More information on how elicited distribu-
tional preferences are affected by the information provided in an elicitation exercise 
remains crucial. This can also reveal how people weight different equity characteristics 
of beneficiaries of health programs and their diseases relative to each other.
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This study aims to contribute to the literature in this important area. It does so by con-
sidering both policy relevant aspects (which characteristics play a role in distributional 
preferences and to what extent) as well as methodological aspects (how does including 
more equity characteristics in a preference elicitation exercise affect observed distribu-
tional preferences). We tested the hypotheses that preferences of the general public for 
allocation of health and health care are influenced by:
i. the equity principle severity of illness (hypothesis 1);
ii. the equity principle fair innings (hypothesis 2) and;
iii. culpability, rarity of the disease and having dependents (hypothesis 3).
In addition we hypothesized that the preferences for severity of illness and fair innings 
remain stable when additional information regarding the decision context (e.g., the 
beneficiaries and their health) is provided (hypothesis 4).
To test these hypotheses, as well as to allow investigation of the impact of offering 
additional information on respondents’ preferences, we used a ‘phased discrete choice 
experiment’ in which attributes were added stepwise to the choice sets. By using a 
nested logit (NL) model to analyse the data we were able to investigate how additional 
information affected the elicited preferences in previous phases of the experiment, also 
in terms of unobserved variance. In this way, this study provides insight in the relevance 
of the context of health care allocation decisions, which is essential for the understand-
ing of distributional preferences and can help to explain some of the (contradictory) 
findings in the literature. To our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically 
considers this impact of additional information of the beneficiaries or the disease on 
distributional preferences with respect to health care allocation decisions in a large 
sample from the general public.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide details of the methods 
used, including the identification of attributes and levels (section 2.1), the design of 
the questionnaire (section 2.2) and choice sets (section 2.3), and the analyses of the 
data (section 2.4). The results of these analyses are presented in section 3. Section 4 
concludes the paper with an interpretation of the results in light of previous literature 
and some comments and suggestions in terms of policy and future research.
3.2. MEtHODs
Relative weights of the different attributes were elicited from a representative sample 
from the Dutch general public using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). DCEs can be 
used to identify the effect of individual characteristics of some good on preferences 
for that good independently of all other characteristics, which makes it a useful tool 
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to investigate societal preferences for health (care) allocation [72]. DCEs are based on 
random utility theory, which assumes that a respondent, confronted with a choice 
between two scenarios, always chooses the alternative with the highest utility value for 
him or her.
Let Unsj denote the utility of alternative j perceived by respondent n in choice situation 
s. Unsj may be partitioned into two separate components, an observed component of 
utility, Vnsj and a residual unobserved (and un-modelled) component, εnsj, such that:
Eq 3.1  Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj
The observed component of utility is typically assumed to be a linear relationship of 
observed attribute levels, x, of each alternative j and their corresponding weights (pa-
rameters), β, such that:
Eq 3.2 Unsj = λj  
k
∑
k=1
βkxnjk + εnsj
where βnk represents the marginal utility or parameter weight associated with attribute 
k for respondent n and the unobserved component, εnsj, is assumed to be independently 
and identically (IID) extreme value type 1 (EV1) distributed. This implies that for all pairs 
of alternatives the unobserved component has the same influence and consequently 
the same scale parameter λ. In other words, scale is arbitrary set to 1.0 in the multinomial 
logit model [73].
3.2.1. identification of attributes and levels
An extensive review of the literature was conducted to identify potential relevant aspects 
for distributional preferences for health (care) [66]. In this process, the recent systematic 
reviews of Bobinac et al. (2012), Dolan et al. (2005) and Schwappach (2002) were impor-
tant sources of information. In order to keep the experiment feasible for respondents 
we limited the design to six attributes: fair innings, severity of illness, size of health 
gain from treatment, culpability with respect to having the disease, having dependents 
and rarity of the disease. Severity of illness can be operationalized in different ways. In 
this experiment we used a simple definition, also to reduce the cognitive burden on 
respondents, describing severity of illness as quality of life prior to treatment. This also 
assured a uniform interpretation of severity of illness. Fair innings was operationalized 
as age of the patients. Appropriate levels for the attributes were selected and both the 
attributes and levels were tested in a pilot study with 100 respondents. This resulted in 
adjustment of the level ranges of the attributes quality of life before treatment and age 
for the main study (Table 3.1).
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3.2.2. Questionnaire
To be able to test the four hypotheses, the questionnaire was divided into three blocks 
of choice sets in which attributes were added stepwise to the choice sets. Each block 
started with a detailed description of the attributes. The first hypothesis was addressed 
in the first block of the questionnaire, which purely focused on severity of illness and the 
scenarios thus consisted only of the attributes ‘initial quality of life’ and ‘health gain from 
treatment’. The fair innings principle (hypothesis 2) was considered in the second block 
of the questionnaire by adding ‘age’ to the choice sets; respondents thus had informa-
tion on ‘initial quality of life’, ‘health gain from treatment’ and ‘age’ in the second block. 
Block three addressed the third hypothesis, by exploring whether other characteristics 
of the illness and the recipients are deemed relevant for the allocation of scarce health 
care resources by the general public. Hence, in the third block ‘culpability’, ‘rarity’ and 
‘having dependents’ were added to the scenarios. The scenarios and the information 
presented to the respondents were kept constant over the three blocks.
Each choice set consisted of two scenarios describing different groups of patients both 
in need of treatment. Respondents were asked to put themselves in the position of a 
health care decision maker with a limited budget. Respondents were then asked which 
of the two groups they would prefer to treat from each choice set (Figure 3.1). They were 
informed that any other aspects not described in the experiment (including number of 
patients and costs of treatment) were identical between the two groups. The alterna-
tives were unlabelled and the choice sets were randomized within the different blocks of 
table 3.1: Overview of attributes and levels
Attributes Levels
Quality of life before treatment* (QOL)
scale 0-100
5, 30, 55, 80
Health gain from treatment for one year (HG)
scale 0-100
5, 10, 15, 20
Age* (AG)
In years
10, 40, 70, 90
Culpability (CULP) Probably not responsible
Probably partly responsible
Probably largely responsible
Probably fully responsible
Rarity of the disease (RAR) Prevalent
Rare
Have dependents (HD) Yes
No
Note:* The range of levels was expanded after the pilot study. Original levels for quality of life before treat-
ment were 25,40,55,50 and for age were 20,40,60 and 80 years. These original levels showed insignificant 
coefficients in the pilot study.
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the questionnaire to avoid order biases in the results. The questionnaire was presented 
online and we obtained a sample of 1,001 respondents through an internet panel. The 
study sample was representative for the adult (18+) population of the Netherlands with 
respect to age, gender and level of education. As an incentive for participation, upon 
completing the questionnaire, respondents could select a charity to receive a small 
monetary donation.
3.2.3. Design choice sets
The program Ngene 1.1 was used to generate efficient multinomial logit designs for the 
main study. An efficient design minimizes the predicted standard errors of the parameters 
in order to optimize the information from each choice set. The efficiency of the designs 
was determined by the D-error, which is the most widely used measure of efficiency [74]. 
The results of the pilot study were used as prior estimates for the parameters. Since the 
levels of quality of life before treatment and age were adjusted after the pilot study we 
had to interpolate prior values for the new levels. The values of these attributes were 
included as Bayesian priors. Bayesian priors are more robust to misspecification because 
they optimize on prior distributions instead of fixed parameters [74]. Interaction effects 
between quality of life, health gain and age were included and for each block of the 
experiment we used 1,000 Halton draws. Halton sequence draws are based on a set of 
values for simulation which are well spaced in the interval and therefore more effective 
than random draws [73].


  
  
  
  
  
  
  




 


 
Figure 3.1: Example of choice set (block 3)
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For the first two blocks of the questionnaire, designs with 20 pairwise choice sets were 
obtained and for the third block a design with 40 pairwise choice sets was generated. 
The choice sets were divided over 5 versions using a blocking variable. This resulted in 
5 questionnaires with each 16 choice tasks, 4 choice sets each for blocks 1 and 2 and 8 
choice sets for block 3.
3.2.4. Analyses
The basic multinomial logit (MNL) specification of choice modelling relies on the as-
sumption that the unobserved components are independently and identically distrib-
uted (IID). However, the questionnaire in this study consists of three blocks which are in 
fact three different datasets with their own designs. Hence, it would be naïve to assume 
that the variances of the unobserved components of different datasets are identical. 
Since parameter estimates are confounded with scale, different variances of unobserved 
components between datasets make it impossible to compare the parameter estimates 
directly. Any differences in coefficients could therefore either be the result of differences 
in preference or differences in the unobserved variance. To overcome this issue of scale 
heterogeneity, the different blocks of the questionnaire were estimated jointly in a two 
level NL model.
The NL model is the most common model used to date in the literature to account for 
scale heterogeneity. The NL model is typically set up with a hierarchical tree like struc-
ture linking alternatives that share common scale or error variances. Each branch or nest 
of the model, which sits above the (elemental) alternatives in the tree, also will have its 
own utility as well as scale. The NL model allows for a (partial) parameterization of scale 
at each level of the model (after some normalization). The scale parameters within the 
model are inversely related to the error (co)variances of the common set of alternatives 
linked to that branch or nest and are multiplicative with the utility of those same alterna-
tives.
Let λ(j|b) represent the scale parameter at the top branch level or nest and μ(j|b) represent 
the scale at the elemental alternative level of the tree. The utility of an alternative located 
at the lower level of the tree like structure nested within branch or nest b is given as:
Eq 3.3 Unsj = μ(j|b)  
k
∑
k=1
βkxnsjk + εnsj
where μ(j|b) =
π2
6σ2(j|b)
 and where is the variance of the error term for each alternative j 
in branch b.
From Equation 3.3, the influence of scale and error variance upon utility can clearly be 
seen. As the error variance increases, the magnitude of μ(j|b) decreases and hence the 
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observed component of utility decreases. Likewise, a decrease in error variance will 
result in an increase in μ(j|b) and an increase in the magnitude of the magnitude of the 
observed component of utility.
The utility at the upper level of the tree structure is linked to the utility of the alternatives 
contained within the ‘nest’ below such that:
Eq 3.4 λb (
1
log (∑bej exp (μ( j|b)Vnsj|b)))
μ(j|b)
where λb
π2
6σ 2b
 represents the scale at the upper branch level.
The NL model remains over-parameterized, requiring the normalization of one or more 
parameters for model identification. It is typical to normalize either μ(j|b or λb to 1.0 for 
one or more of the branches or nests. Normalizing μ(j|b=1.0 results in models that are said 
to be normalized to random utility 1 (RU1) whilst normalizing λb=1.0 produces random 
utility 2 (RU2) models [75, 76]. In either case, what is actually being estimated in the 
model is λb or 
1
μ(j|b)  rather than both μ(j|b) and λb separately. The estimated parameters 
are often referred to as IV parameters within the literature.
The link between the scales contained at each level of the tree structure can best been 
seen when examining the choice probabilities produced from the NL model. These are 
calculated using Equation 3.5:
Eq 3.5 Pnsj = Pnsj|b.Pnsb =
 
exp(μ(j|b) Vnsj|b)
.
exp(
λb
log ( ∑ b∈jb  exp(μ(j|b) Vnsj|b)))
μ(j|b)
∑i∈jb exp(μ(i|b) Vnsi|b) ∑Bb=1 exp(
λb
log ( ∑ i∈jb  exp(μ(i|b) Vnsi|b)))
μ(i|b)
where Pnjs|b is the conditional probability that respondent n will select alternative j in 
choice task s given that alternative j belongs to branch b and Pnbs is the probability of 
respondent n choosing branch b.
The three blocks of the questionnaire were nested in three groups with their corre-
sponding alternatives. The deterministic components of the elemental alternatives were 
represented by:
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Eq 3.6  Block 1. VA/λs1=  β0 + β1QOL5+ β2QOL30 + β 3QOL55 + β4 HG 5 + β5HG10 + β6HG15
  VB/λs1=  β1QOL5+ β2QOL30 + β 3QOL55 + β4 HG5 + β5HG10 + β6HG15
 Block 2. VA/λs2 =  β0 + β1QOL5+ β2QOL30 + β3QOL55 + β4HG 5 + β5HG 10 + β6HG15+ 
β7AG10 + β8AG 40 + β9AG 70
  VB/λs2=  β1QOL5+ β2QOL30 + β3QOL55 + β4HG 5 + β5 HG 10 + β6HG15+ 
β7AG10+ β8AG40 + β9AG 70
 Block 3. VA/λs3 =  β0 + β1QOL5+ β2QOL30 + β 3QOL55 + β4HG 5 + β5HG10 + β6HG15+ 
β7AG10 + β8AG40 + β9AG 70 + β10CULPpartly+ β11CULP largely + 
β12CULPfully + β13RA + β14HD
  VB/λs3 =  β1QOL5+ β2QOL30 + β 3QOL55 + β4 HG 5 + β5 HG 10 +β6HG15+ 
β7AG10 + β8AG40 + β9AG 70 + β10CULPpartly + β11CULPlargely + 
β12CULPfully + β13RA + β14HD
where V is the deterministic component of the random utility function, λs is the scale 
parameter and β are the parameters to be estimated. The coding of the corresponding 
variable is reported in Table 3.1. Alternative specific constant terms for each block of the 
questionnaire were included to account for potential left and right biases.
An important requirement to isolate scale is that at least one of the attributes has to be 
homogenous (generic) across the different blocks of the questionnaire. This implies that 
the preferences for this attribute are assumed to be homogenous. Quality of life before 
treatment and health gain from treatment were the only attributes included in each 
block of the questionnaire. Since quality of life before treatment was part of the main 
focus of this experiment, health gain was selected as the generic attribute. To justify this 
assumption we tested for possible interaction effects between health gain and the addi-
tional attributes in block 2 and 3. No significant interaction effects were found. Besides, 
we compared the Log Likelihoods of the independent MNL models with the NL Model 
holding health gain fixed. These models did not significantly differ. In order to estimate 
scale ratios for blocks 1 and 2, the scale parameter of the block 3 was normalized to 1.0.
After accounting for scale, we were able to test the fourth hypothesis. T tests were con-
ducted to test for statistical differences between the parameters estimates across the 
three phases. Since we expected nonlinearities, all attributes were entered as dummy 
variables. Furthermore, we tested for interaction effects between quality of life before 
treatment, health gain and age. The statistical analyses were performed in the program 
Nlogit 4.0 (Econometric Software Inc.).
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3.3. REsuLts
The dataset included 1,001 respondents representative of the Dutch population in 
terms of age, gender and educational level. 51.2% of the sample was female, the mean 
age was 47.9 years, 28.0% of the respondents was lower educated and 27.7% was higher 
educated. Most respondents reported to feel healthy with a mean score of 71.4 on a 
scale from 0-100 (with endpoints defined as worst conceivable health state and best 
conceivable health state) (Table 3.2). The results of the NL model are presented in Table 
3.3. The model had a good overall model fit with a McFadden’s Pseudo R2 of 0.65.
The first block of the questionnaire was used to test hypothesis 1 and aimed to elicit the 
relative values of initial quality of life (as proxy for severity of illness) and health gain 
from treatment. The results show that the respondents indeed considered initial quality 
of life relevant in their allocation decisions, as all levels had a significant influence on 
the choice outcome. Relative to an initial quality of life score before treatment of 80, 
respondents preferred to treat groups of patients with an initial quality of life of 30 or 55, 
but the highest severity of illness (i.e., an initial health state of 5) reduced the probability 
to receive treatment. As shown in Table 3.3, as expected, compared to a health gain of 
20 units, smaller health gains significantly reduced the probability to receive treatment.
In the second block of the questionnaire, the attribute age was added to the choice sets 
in order to test hypothesis 2, i.e., the influence of fair innings on distributional prefer-
ences for health care. The coefficient for age 70 was not significantly different from that 
for age 90, but the coefficients for ages 10 and 40 were. The similar magnitudes of the 
latter coefficients indicate that respondents had a relatively strong preference to treat 
younger (10 years and 40 years) patients relative to older patients (70 and 90 years), 
all else equal, but did not differentiate within these broader age groups. Notably, with 
table 3.2: Demographic variables (n=1,001)
Variable Category Fraction Mean sD Min Max
Gender Female 51.2
Age 47.9 16.3 18 88
18 – 34 24.5
35 – 49 26.2
50 – 64 28.8
>64 20.5
Education status Elementary school 28.0
High school 44.3
University 27.7
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the inclusion of age, respondents became statistically insensitive to variation in sever-
ity of illness. However, the signs and sizes of the coefficients were comparable to the 
first block of the experiment. These results lend support to the second hypothesis with 
respect to fair innings.
Block 3 of the experiment, which addressed the third hypothesis, contained the full set 
of attributes (Table 3.1). All attributes significantly influenced the probability to receive 
treatment. In order words, besides severity of illness and fair innings, respondents in-
table 3.3: Results of the NL model (n=1,001)
Attribute Level Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Beta s.e. Beta s.e. Beta s.e.
Quality of life 
before treatment
5 -0.106* 0.034 -0.020 0.034 0.107* 0.054
30 0.111** 0.028 0.119 0.073 0.526** 0.083
55 0.168** 0.034 0.102 0.062 0.446** 0.090
80 - - - - - -
Health gain from 
treatment for one 
year
5 -0.303** 0.433 -0.303** 0.433 -0.303** 0.433
10 -0.182** 0.038 -0.182** 0.038 -0.182** 0.038
15 -0.094* 0.033 -0.094* 0.033 -0.094* 0.033
20 - - - - - -
Age (in years) 10 0.601** 0.111 1.308** 0.115
40 0.564** 0.124 1.157** 0.077
70 0.076 0.069 0.330** 0.092
90 - - - -
Culpability
Probably not 
responsible
- -
Probably partly 
responsible
-0.283** 0.049
Probably largely 
responsible
-0.463** 0.062
Probably fully 
responsible
-0.612** 0.045
Rarity of the 
disease
Prevalent -0.077* 0.026
Rare - -
Have dependents Yes 0.351** 0.034
No - -
Constant -0.024 0.013 -0.091** 0.026 0.039 0.025
IV parameter 0.378** 0.064 0.567** 0.111 1.000 -
McFadden’s 
Pseudo R2
0.654
Note: **=p<0.001; *=p<0.15.
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deed considered other characteristics of beneficiaries and their disease to be relevant in 
allocation decisions. The negative coefficients of culpability levels indicate that people 
gave relatively less priority to treatment of groups of patients who could be held more 
responsible for their own illness. Rarity of the disease also significantly influenced the 
probability to receive treatment. Ceteris paribus, respondents preferred to treat rare 
diseases over more prevalent diseases. However, the size of the coefficient shows that 
rarity is the least important characteristic in this study. Having dependents also signifi-
cantly increased the probability of a group to be selected for treatment. Furthermore, 
all coefficients of initial quality of life before treatment were significant and positive. 
Relative to an initial quality of life score of 80, a score of 30 showed the largest impact on 
the probability to receive treatment, all else equal, followed by a score of 55. In line with 
block 1, the lowest initial quality of life score of 5 received lower priority than scores of 
30 and 55, but in contrast to block 1 and 2, the initial quality of life score of 5 did receive 
a higher priority than that of 80. Age showed a similar pattern as in block 2, suggest-
ing that respondents preferred to treat younger over older groups of patients, all else 
equal. However, while respondents still did not significantly differentiate between 10 
and 40 year olds (although the coefficient for the former was slightly higher), they did 
now differentiate between 70 and 90 year olds, modestly favouring the former. Given 
the magnitude of the coefficients, age seems to be a relatively important characteristic 
when choosing which group of patients to prioritize, irrespective of other attributes.
With respect to the fourth hypothesis, the results of the NL model showed that the 
scale parameters for block 1 and block 2 were statistically significantly different from 
0 and 1.0, the normalized value for block 3. This indicates that considerable scale dif-
ferences were observed between the different blocks of the questionnaire. Therefore, 
MNL coefficients of the different blocks could not be compared directly. Any differences 
in coefficients could either be the result of differences in preference or differences in 
unobserved variance. The NL model accounts for these differences in the variance of the 
unobserved effects. Interestingly, the error variances decreased when more attributes 
were included in the choice sets.
After accounting for scale, a series of t-tests was conducted to identify statistical differ-
ences in parameter estimates of the attributes quality of life before treatment and age 
across the three blocks of the questionnaire. Apart from the quality of life estimates 
between block 1 and block 2, all parameter estimates were significantly different. How-
ever, it should be noted that the quality of life estimates in block 2 were not statistically 
significant. The associated large standard errors might partly cause the insignificance 
of the difference between blocks 1 and 2. The significant differences between the three 
blocks indicate that the additional attributes indeed significantly affected the elicited 
distributional preferences. For example, a different weight is given to initial health state 
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when additional information (on age, culpability, etc.) is provided. Herewith, hypothesis 
4 is rejected.
3.4. DisCussiOn
Including societal preferences for the distribution of health and health care in allocation 
decisions has received quite some attention in the literature and increasingly appears 
to play a role in actual decision making as well. Hence, it is important to study such 
distributional preferences and to increase knowledge as to how to derive these societal 
weights of QALYs gains of different types in an appropriate way. This study aimed to 
contribute to the literature by using a phased discrete choice experiment to investigate 
the influence on these distributional preferences related to the principles severity of 
illness and fair innings as well as other potential relevant characteristics. Furthermore, 
our methodological approach provided the opportunity to investigate the impact of 
additional information on respondents’ preferences. Here, we address the implications 
of our findings, the limitations of our study as well as some areas for future research.
The first distributional concern we investigated was severity of illness, operational-
ized here as initial quality of life. We found somewhat mixed results for this variable. 
Severity of illness was a significant predictor in block 1, but in block 2, after adding age 
as characteristic, it lost its statistical significance (although the signs and coefficients 
were similar to those in block 1). One explanation for such a finding could be that the 
step from block 1 to block 2 in the experiment caused respondents to especially focus 
on the single additional variable (age). In block 3 severity of illness turned out to be a 
significant predictor of the choices again, next to age, supporting hypothesis 1. Overall, 
the coefficients indicate its influence to be non-negligible, but also show a remarkable 
pattern. The lowest initial health state (5) received less priority in block 1 (and block 2, 
albeit non-significantly) relative to the highest initial health state, while the two inter-
mediate initial health states received more priority. In block 3, the lowest initial health 
state did receive somewhat more priority compared to the highest level, but still less so 
than the intermediate levels. This result may be considered counterintuitive, as a higher 
severity may be expected to be associated with higher priority for treatment. However, 
this result could be driven by our study design. Note that the maximum health gain 
in our experiment was 20 units. This was chosen to avoid end states above 100 in the 
choice sets (since the best initial health state was 80). As a consequence, for the lowest 
initial health state, i.e., patients starting from 5, the best case scenario after treatment 
was a quality of life score of 25. This is still relatively low. Hence, the low quality of life 
after treatment may have induced a lower priority for treatment of those with high-
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est severity, leading to this counter-intuitive result. There indeed are indications that 
respondents consider the health status after treatment in their decision which group 
of patients to prioritize [70]. Therefore, this result needs to be interpreted with clear 
caution. In future research it would be interesting to combine low initial health states 
with larger health gains and thus better health states after treatment. In order to do so, a 
design should be built in which the ranges of attributes can be expanded without creat-
ing unrealistic scenarios with quality of life scores which exceed 100 (perfect health). 
Moreover, since the results for the variable severity of illness were not constant across 
blocks, more research is required to explore the influence of severity of illness in priority 
setting, especially in relation to age.
The second distributional concern we investigated was fair innings, operationalized 
simply as age. Our results show a strong preference for treating younger (10 and 40 
year-olds) over older patients (70 and 90 year-olds). In block 2, respondents did not dif-
ferentiate within these groups (e.g., did not give more priority to 10 than to 40 year olds). 
In block 3, the results showed a similar pattern. However, there a significant (although 
modest) differentiation was observed between 90 and 70 year olds in the expected 
direction. In the literature, contradictory results have been reported regarding the 
relevance of age in health care decision making. Similar to our study, Winkelhage and 
Diederich (2012) showed that age was the most important criterion for allocations of 
health care resources, followed by severity of illness, improvement of health, healthy 
lifestyle, treatment costs and type of illness. However, a recent study by Lancsar et al. 
(2011) implied that no weight should be given to age of onset of illness, while earlier 
studies reported that with an increase in age the value per QALY sharply decreased [70, 
77, 78]. Such differences in findings may be the result of framing, other information 
(e.g., age of death), as well as the levels of the attributes used [71, 79]. For instance, in 
our main study we used a wide range of levels for age, i.e., 10 to 90 years, and found 
a significant influence of age. In our pilot, we used a smaller age range, which did not 
result in significant coefficients. The absent or small differences between 10 and 40 year 
olds as well as between 70 and 90 year olds emphasize this point. We do emphasize that 
age does not fully reflect the fair innings argument, which considers the life time health 
achievement. Age was used as a (simplifying) proxy, to keep the choice task understand-
able. However, especially in relation to severity, the age variable here cannot be simply 
interpreted as representing fair innings.
In block 3, we added three more variables: rarity, culpability and having dependents. 
All three aspects proved to significantly affect the choices. We stress that such evidence 
need not imply that these aspects should also be used in actual decisions. Normative and 
positive science may conflict here. Rarity, for instance, has been frequently discussed in 
the literature, especially in the context of expensive orphan drugs, and opinions differ 
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regarding whether it would be a reason for equity weighting. Some have argued that rar-
ity is a reason to attach higher weights to QALY gains (i.e., allowing higher cost-per-QALY 
ratios), while others suggest that this would be unduly and inequitably disadvantage 
people with common diseases [80, 81]. In this experiment, rarity was simply labelled 
as either rare or prevalent. Respondents proved to be sensitive to this attribute; giving 
slightly more weight to health gains in the context of rare diseases. It needs emphasis 
that, while significant, the size of the coefficient was relatively small. For culpability, the 
distinction between positive and normative science is important as well. Indeed, even 
when the general public (on average) considers culpability important in fair allocation 
of health care resources, it is questionable whether this can be justified from a normative 
perspective.
Overall, our results showed support for the first three hypotheses, as people on average 
seemed to consider severity of illness, fair innings and additional characteristics of the 
beneficiaries and diseases simultaneously in the health (care) allocation decisions.
The methodological choices related to our stepwise design also warrant further discus-
sion. Our results demonstrate both scale and preference differences across the three 
blocks of the questionnaire. Block 1 showed the smallest scale coefficient relative to 
block 3, indicating that block 1 had the largest unobserved variance. After accounting 
for scale, respondents showed significantly different preferences for age and initial 
health state in the different phases of the experiment. One explanation might be that 
respondents require more ‘contextual’ information in order to make informed decisions. 
When respondents do not have sufficient information they may ‘fill in the blanks’ and 
create ‘plausible scenarios’ based on the limited information provided. For example, in 
block 1, which only provides information about the initial health state and potential 
health gain, respondents may assume that patients in a very poor initial health state 
are relatively old (even though they were instructed this was not the case). The problem 
is that the analyst then does not observe the implicit attributes used by individual 
respondents, which leads to more unobserved heterogeneity. Lancsar et al. (2011) 
recently also emphasized the relevance of providing sufficient information in order to 
ensure an informed response. Here, an intriguing trade-off may be observed: too many 
characteristics may result in too complex choice sets, which increases heterogeneity as 
well [82], while our results indicate that something similar happens when too little infor-
mation is provided. Complex choice sets appear to result in a greater number of errors 
in respondents’ choice process but also affects respondents decision strategy. Therefore, 
the key seems to be to provide sufficient information to respondents to be able to make 
an informed choice without making the choice sets to complex: the optimum between 
too little information and too much information. This is an important area for further 
research and such a balance could be tested in the pilot phase of future studies. This 
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finding requires the fourth hypothesis to be rejected: contextual differences do affect 
the elicited preferences.
This study has several limitations that deserve mentioning. We used the NL model in 
this study to account for scale heterogeneity. However, the NL model does not account 
for preference heterogeneity and panel data. Our data contains 16 observations per 
individual which is likely to result in correlated unobserved components. Furthermore, 
the results show preference heterogeneity across datasets but there might also be pref-
erence heterogeneity within the datasets. Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) models can 
identify and account for panel and preferences heterogeneity but these models cannot 
isolate scale, which was essential in this study.
In addition, we tested for interaction effects between initial quality of life, health gain 
and age. The interaction terms did not behave consistently and were difficult to interpret. 
This seems partly due to the design of this study. A disadvantage of an efficient design 
is that not all combinations of the dummy variables are included in the design and that, 
therefore, the two-way interaction terms might be confounded [73, 83]. However, our 
tests did reveal some patterns useful for further research. Importantly, low initial health 
status combined with only a small health gain seemed to reduce the chance to receive 
treatment. This emphasizes the relevance of quality of life after treatment. Starting 
low and ending low may be perceived as a treatment with little effect (even though its 
absolute size is not different from a similar gain high on the scale) as it does not bring 
a patient to an ‘acceptable’ health state. Also, being relatively old in combination with 
a low quality of life or a small health gain seemed to negatively influence the choice 
outcome. Future research could investigate these issues further, for instance by already 
specifying such interactions while generating the design. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the constant term in block 2 was significant. Although a constant term in 
an unlabelled experiment has no substantive meaning, it can be an indication of left 
and right bias. Apparently, respondents systematically preferred group B to A. However, 
given the modest magnitude of the constant term and the fact that the constant terms 
of blocks 1 and 3 were not significant, our results do not appear to be systematically 
biased.
Our design included certain constrains to avoid implausible scenario’s, i.e. health states 
above 100 and a maximum age of 90. Still, some combinations of attributes may be 
considered less plausible (e.g. a 10 year old who is fully responsible of her/his health 
problems). We did not observe any signs of protest answers for such scenarios. The 
complexity and plausibility of the questionnaire was tested in the pilot study with ad-
ditional questions about respondents’ experiences with the DCE questions. It appeared 
that more than half of the respondents thought it was difficult to opt for one of the 
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groups in the choice sets. However, this was mainly due to the fact that people prefer 
not to choose between groups of patients at all. Only 16.2% of all respondents thought 
that the questionnaire itself was complicated.
Despites the limitations, this study has important implications for the further investiga-
tion of distributional preferences in the context of health care decision making. First 
of all, in addition to severity of illness, age, as being a proxy operationalization of the 
fair innings argument, appeared to significantly influence public preferences for the 
distribution of health and health care and, important as well, significantly influenced 
the preferences regarding severity of illness. This may indicate that distributional prefer-
ences are indeed based on both severity of illness and fair innings. In that sense, this 
study suggests that while the fair innings and severity of illness approaches may have 
been contrasted in the literature, empirically derived distributional preferences may 
combine both principles. Past health performance (age) is important next to health 
prospects (initial health state). Such insights may feed normative debates, the develop-
ment of new normative equity principles and future studies.
Furthermore, we found that all additional characteristics included in this experiment 
significantly influenced respondents choices and, at the same time, reduced the unob-
served variance. As a result of our stepwise approach we were able to demonstrate that 
the inclusion of age, culpability, rarity and having dependents influenced the prefer-
ences for severity of illness. This suggests that describing the ‘broader context’, i.e., 
other characteristics of beneficiaries of health programs and their diseases, influences 
the elicited distributional preferences, also in relative terms. This implies that it would 
be preferable to include all relevant items in choice experiments. Omitting relevant 
information from the choice sets results in an increase of unobserved variation. Note 
that more relevant items may be identified than those included in this study and future 
research should be aimed at doing so. Then, as noted before, it is important to strike a 
balance between adding more relevant variables while not cognitively overburdening 
respondents. Providing more information does not imply that all attributes used in a 
study should also be considered by policymakers in the real life decision making. The 
normative questions of which aspects should be considered in distributing health and 
health care may not be best answered through positive research.
Finally, it should be noted that the relative (equity) weights of attributes derived in any 
study are useless without some reference case, described by its equity characteristics, 
and a corresponding cost-per-QALY threshold [67]. Relative to that reference case equity 
weights can be applied (or thresholds can be varied). Investigating the social willingness 
to pay for QALY gains in different equity contexts could be another interesting way of 
deriving equity weights.
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ABstRACt
Background: To judge whether an intervention offers value for money, the incremental 
costs per gained quality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) need to be compared with some 
relevant threshold, which ideally reflects the monetary value of health gains. Literature 
suggests that this value may depend on the equity context in which health gains are 
produced, but the value of a QALY in relation to equity considerations has remained 
largely unexplored.
Objective: The objective of this study was to estimate the social marginal willingness 
to pay (MWTP) for QALY gains in different equity subgroups, using a discrete choice 
experiment (DCE). Both severity of illness (operationalized as proportional shortfall) and 
fair innings (operationalized as age) were considered as grounds for differentiating the 
value of health gains.
Methods: We obtained a sample of 1,205 respondents, representative of the adult popu-
lation of the Netherlands. The data was analysed using panel mixed logit and latent class 
models.
Results: The mixed logit models showed counterintuitive results, with more severe health 
states reducing the probability of receiving treatment. The latent class models revealed 
distinct preference patterns in the data. MWTP per QALY was sensitive to severity of dis-
ease among a substantial proportion of the public, but not to the age of care recipients.
Conclusion: These findings emphasize the importance of accounting for preference het-
erogeneity among the public on value-laden issues such as prioritizing health care, both 
in research and decision-making. This study emphasizes the need to further explore the 
monetary value of a QALY in relation to equity considerations.
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4.1. intRODuCtiOn
Cost-utility analysis is increasingly used to inform allocation decisions about scarce 
healthcare resources. To evaluate whether an intervention yields good value for money 
the incremental costs per gained QALY (quality-adjusted life-year) must be judged 
against some monetary threshold value. The nature of this threshold is a matter of 
debate. One stream of literature considers it as the opportunity costs of spending within 
a fixed healthcare budget, while the other considers it to represent the consumption 
value of health gains [68]. Here, we take the latter view and, more precisely, consider 
the appropriate threshold to reflect the social willingness to pay for a QALY gain [84-
86]. In other words, the threshold expresses the maximum acceptable cost to society 
for a QALY gained through an intervention. Without such a threshold the results of a 
cost utility analysis are of limited value to healthcare decision makers. Somehow, they 
must judge whether a treatment with a cost-per-QALY ratio of, say €50,000, offers value 
for money and should be reimbursed [87]. It need not surprise that this threshold has 
generated much debate. Societally, the idea of using a threshold expressing the value of 
health in monetary terms to decide about funding treatments has been contested [84]. 
Scientifically, the debate is especially about how to set a threshold, and whether there 
should be a fixed threshold or one that could vary with societal preferences for QALYs.
Regarding the latter issue, it is important to acknowledge that accumulating evidence 
suggests that the public prefers some QALY gains over others (e.g., those in young 
children over those in elderly) [2, 14, 88, 89]. This suggests that the social value of a 
QALY does not exist [90] but that this value may vary with, for example, characteristics 
of the disease and the beneficiaries of treatment [91]. The use of a single threshold in 
judging the results from economic evaluations would therefore not align with societal 
preferences. The distributional preferences of society can be incorporated in the deci-
sion framework by applying a more flexible threshold or, under a fixed threshold, by 
applying equity weights to QALYs [23, 66, 87].
Although in most countries the threshold is still rather implicit, differentiation between 
QALY gains of different types or to different beneficiaries already exists in actual decision 
making. In the UK, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) recently 
formulated a decision rule explicitly giving higher value to costly life-prolonging end-
of-life drugs. Under the assumption that all QALY gains should be valued equally, these 
interventions would probably have exceeded the threshold range. The new decisions 
rule explicitly considers the “magnitude of the additional weight that would need to 
be assigned to the QALY benefits … for the cost-effectiveness of the technology to fall 
within the current threshold range” [47]. This exception may prove to represent a first 
step in defining more general rules using a flexible threshold, depending on the context 
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in which QALYs are gained [92]. The Netherlands has developed a decision-making 
framework in which the relationship between equity considerations and the value of a 
QALY has been made more explicit. The value of a QALY increases with the severity of 
illness in the target population, the latter being expressed using the concept of propor-
tional shortfall [62, 66].
A fundamental question in the development of a decision framework using a flexible 
threshold is which equity principle(s) should be the basis for differentiation. In literature, 
the equity principles ‘severity of illness’ and ‘fair innings’ have been regularly proposed 
as suitable candidates. The principle of severity of illness considers severity at the time 
of intervention and expected severity – including death – in future years in case of 
non-intervention [56, 69]. The fair innings approach, advocated by Alan Williams [15], 
is based on the assumption that everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of life or 
lifetime health achievement. As a result, a relatively high priority would be given to 
those who fall short of this norm and a relatively low priority to those who exceed 
this norm. Although obviously not without problems, age is often taken as a proxy for 
lifetime health achievement. Whether severity of illness or fair innings better reflects the 
distributional preferences of society is still a matter of debate, but both principles rely 
on justified normative arguments [66]. Proportional shortfall, the equity principle used 
in the Netherlands, is based on the proportion of remaining lifetime health lost due to 
some disease [62] and could therefore also be seen as a measure of severity of illness 
[66, 93]. Proportional shortfall measures the fraction of QALYs lost due to illness relative 
to remaining life expectancy in absence of the disease, on a scale from 0 (no loss) to 100 
(complete loss of remaining health).
Empirical studies show mixed findings with respect to the direction and strength of the 
preferences for age and severity. These variations might be caused by the framing of 
the concepts, or by context and methodological differences between studies [22, 93]. 
Moreover, often only particular aspects of potential value are investigated (e.g. only age 
or only severity) rather than, arguably more relevant, combinations. This hampers not 
only definite conclusions about support for specific decision rules, but also about the 
exact values (weights) attached to different QALY gains.
In that context, it also needs noting that the monetary value of a QALY and equity weights 
have both received quite some attention in the literature, but typically not jointly in one 
study [94]. Most WTP studies focus on the individual perspective, asking respondents to 
value changes in their own health, thus ignoring equity considerations. In the context 
of healthcare allocation decisions it seems to be more appropriate to consider the social 
value of a QALY, defined by the amount of their own consumption individuals are willing 
to forego in order to contribute to a health gain achieved in society [23]. Other studies 
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have explored public preferences for a variety of equity principles and characteristics 
of the beneficiary or the disease, but these studies have not addressed the monetary 
valuation [17, 95]. To illustrate; a recent systematic review by Whitty et al. [22] shows an 
exponential growth in choice based studies to elicit public preferences with respect to 
healthcare priority setting. However, most of these studies have not translated prefer-
ences into equity weights, let alone included the monetary valuation of QALYs for differ-
ent equity considerations [2, 14, 22, 96].
The objective of the current study is to contribute to the existing literature by estimat-
ing the social WTP for QALY gains in different equity subgroups. More precisely, we aim 
to estimate the marginal WTP for a QALY at different levels of proportional shortfall, in 
different age groups. The study was framed in such a way that it could be directly help-
ful in further shaping the (Dutch) decision-making framework and build on previous 
studies in this area [66, 67, 94]. Public preferences were elicited using a discrete choice 
experiment (DCE) which is currently the most commonly applied method to elicit public 
preferences [22]. Respondents were asked to act as social decision makers. We included 
both the equity principles ‘severity of illness’ (operationalized as proportional shortfall) 
and ‘fair innings’ (operationalized as age) in one experiment. In order to arrive at WTP 
per QALY estimates, we used the payment vehicle of increases in insurance premiums, 
which is the common financing mechanism in The Netherlands. In light of the diversity 
in the literature in terms of methods and results, we need to be modest in our aim. 
While we want to inform the (Dutch) debates regarding appropriate equity weights and 
thresholds, the current experiment was especially designed to learn how respondents 
solve the dilemmas they are confronted with, and to better understand support for dif-
ferentiating QALY values between groups.
4.2. MEtHODs
4.2.1. Discrete Choice Experiment
DCEs are based on the assumption that a good can be described by its characteristics 
and that the relative importance of these characteristics can be identified in isolation. 
This makes the DCE a valuable method to explore the preferences for healthcare al-
location in relation to equity considerations [22, 72, 97]. DCEs are modelled according 
to random utility theory, which assumes that a respondent asked to choose between 
multiple options always chooses the alternative with the highest utility for her/him. 
The utility of an alternative for respondent n, Un, can be decomposed in an observable 
component of utility, Vn, which reflects the utility effect of the characteristics of the 
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alternative, and an unobserved component, εn, which reflects the utility not captured by 
these characteristics, such that:
Eq 4.1  Un = λVn +εn
where λ is the scale parameter which presents the variance of the unobserved compo-
nent.
Identification and Presentation of Attributes and Levels
The main objective of this study was to estimate the WTP for a QALY at different levels of 
proportional shortfall, in different age groups. Therefore, the following attributes were 
included: quality of life if untreated, age of death if untreated, gain in quality of life, 
gain in life expectancy and cost of treatment. The quality of life attribute was presented 
on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing the worst imaginable health state and 
100 representing perfect health. The cost attribute was operationalized as an increase 
in the mandatory health insurance premium for all Dutch adult citizens for a period 
of 1 year. To be able to explore fair innings (or ageism), we designed three versions of 
the questionnaire considering different age groups: 10 year olds, 40 year olds and 70 
year olds. The levels of the attributes quality of life if untreated, gain in quality of life 
and costs of treatment were identical for all age groups. However, in order to present a 
comprehensible and plausible range of proportional shortfall in each of the three age 
groups to respondents, the levels of the attributes age at death if untreated and gain in 
life expectancy differed between age groups.
Next, to compensate for the smaller absolute health gains in the older age groups we 
differentiated the number of people at risk between the age groups. The number of 
affected people in the Dutch population was 2,000 people in the 10-year-old age group 
(age group 10), 4,000 people in the 40-year-old age group (age group 40) and 12,000 
table 4.1: Overview of attributes and levels
Attributes Levels
Quality of life without treatment (scale 0-100) 45, 65, 85
Age at death if untreated (scale 0-80)
- Age group 10
- Age group 40
- Age group 70
30, 50, 70
50, 62, 74
73, 76, 79
Gain in quality of life 5, 15, 25, 35
Gain in life expectancy
- Age group 10
- Age group 40
- Age group 70
5, 10, 15, 20
2, 6, 10, 14
0.5, 1, 1.5, 2
Increase of health insurance premium (euro) 6, 12, 18, 24
Note: Affected people: 2,000 in age group 10, 4,000 in age group 40 and 12,000 in age group 70.
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in the 70-year-old age group (age group 70). An overview of the attributes and levels is 
presented in Table 4.1 (Note that it has been found that people may prefer larger gains 
in fewer people over smaller gains in more people, even when the two add up to the 
same total [9]).
Following the approach adopted by Lancsar et al. [70], we used both words and dia-
grams to present the choice sets, as shown in Figure 4.1. Each scenario was represented 
by a graph with ‘quality of life’ on the vertical axis (on a scale from 0-100) and age on the 
horizontal axis (on a scale from current age until 80 years old) as shown in Figure 4.1. 
The light grey shaded area shows the health prospect without treatment, the dark grey 
shaded area combined with the middle grey shaded area shows the health loss without 
treatment (proportional shortfall). The middle grey shaded area shows the potential 
health gain from treatment.3 Below the graphs, the percentages of remaining health 
without treatment, potential health gain from treatment and the increase in monthly 
premium were presented. Given the complexity of the graphs we first showed a step-by-
step introduction of the graphs to respondents.
3  In the questionnaire the light grey shaded area was colored green, the middle grey shaded area was 
green-and-red shaded, the dark grey shaded area was colored red. 
Figure 4.1: Question 1 (Age group 10, version 1, choice set 1)
Chapter 4
68
The attributes, levels and presentation of choice sets were pilot-tested in a small sample 
of 75 respondents for each age group version. This resulted in adjustment of the level 
ranges of three attributes: age at death without treatment, gain in life expectancy and 
costs of treatment. In addition, to improve the clarity of the graphs we added the colours 
green for remaining health without treatment, red for health loss and shaded green-
and-red for potential health gain instead of the blue colours of Lancsar et al. [70].
4.2.2. Questionnaire
Respondents were instructed to imagine themselves being in the position of a decision 
maker facing allocation decisions in health care. They were then asked to imagine that 
tomorrow an illness will strike two groups of people from the Dutch population that 
would have otherwise lived in perfect health until death at 80 years of age. The demo-
graphic characteristics of the groups were the same, but the illness and the treatment 
could affect the groups differently, and the costs of treatment could also differ between 
the groups. The illness would reduce the length and quality of life of the groups of 
people. There was a treatment available for each group, which would restore some, or 
all, of the health loss due to the illness. However, the treatment was not yet included in 
the basic benefit package. Therefore, it would have to be financed through an increase 
in the mandatory health insurance premium for all Dutch adult citizens for the period of 
1 year. The respondents were asked which of the two groups of people they, as decision 
makers in the healthcare sector, would prefer to treat. An opt-out option was included 
in order to get valid WTP values [98].
The program Ngene 1.1 was used to generate efficient multinomial logit designs for the 
main study. An efficient design minimizes the predicted standard errors of the param-
eters in order to optimize the information obtained from each choice set. The efficiency 
of the designs was determined by the D-error, which is the most widely used measure 
of efficiency [99]. Since the levels of the attributes were adjusted after the pilot study 
we could not use the estimates of the pilot study as Bayesian priors for the main study, 
but only the signs of the estimates. Bayesian priors are more robust to misspecification 
because they optimize on prior distributions instead of on fixed parameters [99].
Since certain combinations of levels of attributes resulted in implausible scenarios, we 
imposed some constrains in the design (e.g., the gain in life expectancy added to the 
age at death if untreated could not exceed the maximum age of 80 years). Furthermore, 
interaction effects between quality of life if untreated and age at death if untreated were 
included to be able to consider the additional effect of proportional shortfall. For each 
age group we used 1,000 Halton sequence draws [73].
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For each age group, designs with 24 choice sets were generated. The choice sets were di-
vided over three versions using a blocking variable. This resulted in a total of nine blocks 
(and versions of the questionnaire) each with each eight choice tasks. The alternatives 
were unlabelled, meaning that the scenarios only varied by the included attributes, 
and the choice sets were randomized within blocks to avoid order biases in the results. 
Two control questions were added to each block to detect inconsistent respondents: 
one dominant choice set was presented as first choice-set in all blocks. In a dominant 
choice set, the attribute levels of one scenario (the dominant scenario) are superior to 
the levels of the other scenario (the dominated scenario) on each attribute. Therefore, 
respondents who carefully consider the choice set may be expected to opt for the domi-
nant scenario. Furthermore, the fifth choice set was repeated as the tenth choice set, 
but now left and right scenarios reversed. Respondents carefully considering the choice 
sets are expected to choose the same scenario in both questions, independent of its 
positioning left or right. Altogether, each respondent received 10 choice tasks for one 
age group. If a respondent chose the dominated scenario in the first choice (i.e. the first 
control question) and reversed preferences in the tenth choice (i.e. the second control 
question), the respondent was removed from the dataset. Furthermore, based on the 
distribution of completion times in the pilot study and a quickest possible reading and 
responding test by three researchers we determined a minimum completion time for 
the ten choice sets of 150 seconds.
In April 2013, the questionnaire was distributed by a professional Internet survey com-
pany to a representative sample of the adult population of the Netherlands in terms 
of gender, age and level of education. The DCE questions were the first part of a larger 
questionnaire that also contained three contingent valuation questions (as the second 
part) and questions about socio-demographic characteristics (as the third part). Each 
respondent was randomly assigned to one of nine versions of the questionnaire (i.e., 
three age groups times three blocks of choice sets). For an English copy of the question-
naire we refer to the electronic supplementary material.
4.2.3. Analyses
To be able to estimate the MWTP per QALY gain for different levels of proportional 
shortfall the initial model included the following parameters: total QALY gain, propor-
tional shortfall and the increase in health insurance premium. These parameters were 
calculated from the original attributes using the following equations:
Eq 4.2 Total QALY gain = (QG * (AD − AO)) + (YG * (QOL + QG))
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where QG represents the gain in quality of life, AD represents age of death without treat-
ment, AO is age of onset, YG is life years gained, QOL the quality of life before treatment. 
Proportional shortfall was calculated using the following formula:
Eq 4.3 Proportional shortfall =
((MQ – QOL) * (AD – AO) + ((MY – AD) * * 100)) 
(MY – AO)
where MQ represents the maximum quality of life (100) and MY the maximum life expec-
tancy, which was set at 80 years of age.
To determine the social WTP, the QALY gains were multiplied by the size of the risk group 
and the increase in monthly premium was multiplied by 12 monthly instalments and the 
number of health insurance payers in the Netherlands (i.e. 13,260,000). The deterministic 
components of the alternatives in a choice-set were represented by:
Eq 4.4  VA/λs = β1QALYGAIN+ β2PS + β3COST
 VB/λs = β1QALYGAIN+ β2PS + β3COST
 VC/λs = β0
where V is the observed component of the random utility function for alternative A, B or 
C (opt-out), λs is the scale parameter and β are the parameters to be estimated. The con-
stant terms represent the expected utility for no treatment over treatment. Likelihood 
ratio tests were used to test different specifications of the utility functions (categorical or 
numerical attribute levels and interaction effects between QALY gain and proportional 
shortfall).
In our attempt to find appropriate explanations for the observed patterns in the data, we 
estimated numerous models. To allow for preference heterogeneity among the popula-
tion, panel mixed logit models with correlated coefficients were used to analyse the 
data. All parameters were included as random parameters. MWTP per QALY values were 
computed as:
Eq 4.5 MWTPa=
βa
βcost
However, including the cost parameter as a random parameter in mixed logit models may 
cause problems with respect to the WTP calculations. When a normal distribution for a 
price coefficient overlaps zero it will result in undefined moments of WTP since dividing 
by zero is impossible. Furthermore, divisions by numbers arbitrarily close to zero results 
in very large WTP estimates. Different solutions have been proposed in the literature to 
tackle this issue, such as WTP space models, mixed models with a fixed parameter for 
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the cost attribute or constrained distributions like lognormal or triangular distributions 
[100-102]. All these specifications have been tested for the current models. WTP space 
models did not fit our data. Different parameter distributions were tested combined 
with large numbers of Halton draws (i.e. up to 3,000), but we were not able to find a 
model fit. Therefore, different specifications of the mixed logit model were estimated 
and compared using Log Likelihood ratio tests and examining the Akaike and Bayesian 
information criteria. The mixed logit models were estimated with 1,000 Halton draws, 
the statistical results of this process are presented in Table 4.3. As this table shows, the 
random parameters with restricted distributions for the costs parameter did not result 
in better model fits than the specification of a fixed coefficient for the cost attribute. 
Besides, it should be noted that the specification of a constrained distribution for the 
cost attribute would still complicate the calculation of the WTP estimates and related 
confidence intervals. Therefore, in our models cost was specified as a fixed parameter 
[100-102].
The mixed logit models based on the above mentioned attributes did not behave as ex-
pected. As shown later on in the results section, counterintuitive results were found with 
respect to proportional shortfall (i.e. scenarios with higher proportional shortfall were 
less likely to be chosen, c.p.). Moreover, all standard deviations of the random param-
eters were significant which implies a substantial amount of preference heterogeneity 
within the sample. To further explore these results and understand the preference struc-
ture of respondents, we searched for decision patterns within the data. For that reason, 
we relaxed our assumptions with respect to proportional shortfall and absolute QALY 
gains to explain respondents’ preferences and used the attributes as presented to the 
respondents instead. Latent class models were estimated to identify different subgroups 
in the population based on unobserved characteristics that affect their preferences. It 
is assumed that preferences are homogeneous within the classes but differ between 
classes [103]. The optimal number of classes was determined by examining the Akaike 
and Bayesian information criteria of different numbers of classes and the standard er-
rors of the corresponding parameters. The latter is a valid additional argument in this 
context, because an increasing number of classes may lead to extremely large standard 
errors of several parameters, complicating the interpretability of the model. Latent class 
models with four classes showed extremely large standard errors in age groups 10 and 
40, and insignificant coefficients -and consequently meaningless WTP estimates- in age 
group 70. Thus, in all three age groups the number of classes was limited based on the 
standard errors of the corresponding parameters, despite the fact that accepting more 
classes would have improved model fit [100, 104].
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The results of the latent class models provided additional insights in respondents’ pref-
erences compared to the mixed logit models. Therefore, the latent class models were 
chosen as a starting point for further analyses.
Overall MWTP values were estimated as the weighted average of conditional class 
MWTPs. Confidence intervals for MWTP estimates were estimated using the Delta 
method [70, 103], [100].
Analyses were performed in Nlogit 5.0 (Econometric Software Inc.).
4.3. REsuLts
The final dataset included 1,205 respondents, representative of the adult population 
of the Netherlands with respect to age (mean 45.0 years), gender (50.8 % female) and 
education level (25.5%, 42.1%, 32.4% had lower, middle, higher education, respectively). 
Demographic statistics of the sample are presented in Table 4.2. The completion time for 
the ten DCE questions was, on average, 5.2 minutes.
The results of the panel mixed logit models for the three age groups are presented in 
Table 4.3. As already briefly discussed in the method section, we strongly questioned 
whether this model accurately represents respondents’ preferences. The results with 
respect to proportional shortfall were counterintuitive and the standard deviations of 
table 4.2: Demographic statistics (n=1,205)
Variable Mean sD Min Max
Age 45.0 15.0 18 86
Gender (% female) 50.8
Partner (% yes) 67.0
Children (% yes) 58.3
Monthly income (%) - Group 1 (< €1,000) 23.5
- Group 2 (€1,000 - €1,999) 31.5
- Group 3 (€2,000 - €3,499) 32.3
- Group 4 (≥ €3,500) 12.7
Education status (%) - Elementary school 25.5
- High school 42.1
- University 32.4
Health status: -VAS scale (0-100) 80.1 15.0 15 100
Opt-out (%) 10.9
Note: Number of observations per version of the questionnaire: 411 for age group 10, 410 for age group 40, 
384 for age group 70. General population statistics: 45 years of age (18+), 50.9% female (18+) and 33.0% 
elementary school, 40.2% high school, 26.8% university (15+) http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/?LA=en.
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the random parameters were all statistically significant with relatively large coefficients, 
which suggest a substantial heterogeneity in preferences in the sample.
Table 4.4 presents the results of the mixed logit and latent class models using the at-
tributes as presented to the respondents, that is, health gain as a percentage, remaining 
health without treatment (%) and the increase in health insurance premium. The mixed 
logit models were comparable to the mixed logit models of Table 4.3 with respect to 
preference heterogeneity and counterintuitive results for health state before treatment 
(that is, an average preference was observed to treat people who already were relatively 
healthy). Although the mixed logit models had a slightly better model fit than the latent 
class models, we preferred to use the latent class models since they seem to provide 
additional insight in the heterogeneous preference structures of the respondents. The 
results for the selection of number of classes are presented in Appendix 4.1. For all three 
age groups, the most appropriate model consisted of three classes (as explained in 
method section).
Respondents belonging to the first latent class of age group 10 had a relatively strong 
preference not to choose between one of the groups of patients as indicated by the 
positive significant constant term. In case respondents were willing to treat one of the 
groups of patients, more remaining health without treatment increased the probability 
to receive treatment. Remarkably, the coefficients of health gain from treatment and 
remaining health without treatment were comparable in magnitude and sign. This indi-
cates that these respondents did not really differentiate between these two attributes. 
table 4.3: Results Mixed logit models with QALY gain and proportional shortfall
Age 10 Age 40 Age 70
MNL MMNL MNL MMNL MNL MMNL
Health gain from treatment 
(QALY)
0.092** 0.133** 0.170** 0.243** 0.735*** 1.178**
Proportional shortfall -0.016** -0.025** -0.021** -0.032** -0.016*** -0.022**
Increase in health insurance 
premium (€/month)
-0.027** -0.055** -0.036** -0.052** -0.048*** -0.075**
Constant -1.251** -3.324** -1.693** -3.875** -1.554*** -3.053**
SD random parameters
Health gain from treatment 
(QALY)
0.007 0.107** 0.810**
Proportional shortfall 0.076** 0.063** 0.066**
Constant 6.366** 5.479** 6.050**
Log-likelihood at 
convergence
-2723.392 -2244.898 -2590.386 -2193.658 -2466.932 -2054.220
Note: **=p<0.001, *=p<0.1. MNL: multinomial logit model, MMNL: mixed multinomial logit model.
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The increase in monthly health insurance premium was the least important attribute in 
this class. The significant negative constant term in class two of age group 10 indicates a 
general preference toward treating one of the groups of patients. Respondents belong-
ing to this class were more likely to treat patients with larger health gains and a more 
severe health states before treatment. Larger increases in monthly health insurance 
premium decreased the probability to be chosen. Respondents belonging to the third 
class preferred not to choose between the groups of patients. The increase in health 
insurance premium had the largest marginal effect on respondents’ choice. Probabilities 
of class membership were 47.6%, 40.7% and 11.7%, respectively.
A similar preference structure was found for age group 40, although the highest prob-
ability was to be assigned to class 2 (49.6%), implying a preference to treat patients with 
more severe health states before treatment.
Somewhat distinct preferences were observed for age group 70. The insignificant con-
stant terms in the first and third classes indicate that respondents did not have a general 
preference for either choosing between groups of patients, or not. Respondents had 
a 57% probability to be in first class in which health gain was the most important at-
tribute, followed by the increase in health insurance premium. Respondents belonging 
to this class preferred to treat patients with a relatively good health state before treat-
ment which is different from what we expected but in line with the other age groups. 
Respondents had a 30% probability to be in class 2. These respondents were willing to 
choose between groups of patients and preferred to treat patients with a more severe 
health state before treatment. Respondents in class 3 seemed to be mainly driven by 
the increase in health insurance premium in their decision. Remaining health without 
treatment did not significantly influence respondents’ preferences.
The probability weighted MWTP values ranged from € 206,408 in age group 10 to 
€296,756 in age group 40, but were not significantly different between the age groups. 
This indicates that we did not find a significant age effect in our data. Interaction ef-
fects between health state before treatment and health gain were not significant and 
therefore not included in the final models. This indicates that, statistically, the value of a 
health gain was not different for different levels of severity. However, the main effect of 
severity was significant, which indicates that severity did influence preferences between 
groups.
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4.4. DisCussiOn
It is increasingly recognized that a monetary threshold value against which health gains 
from an intervention can be evaluated should vary with distributional preferences in 
society. However, most WTP per QALY studies so far have focused on the individual 
perspective and have not incorporated such equity considerations. Studies exploring 
public preferences for QALYs, on the other hand, rarely translate these preferences into 
equity weights or subgroup-specific QALY values. Therefore, the aim of this study was 
to contribute to the existing literature by estimating the social MWTP for QALY gains 
in different equity subgroups, considering the equity principles severity of illness (op-
erationalized as proportional shortfall) and fair innings (operationalized as age). Our 
results show substantial preference heterogeneity among members of the public. As 
discussed further below, this finding may be helpful in explaining the mixed findings in 
literature with respect to the value of a QALY in relation to severity of illness and age of 
care recipients.
Before the results are discussed in more detail, our approach to the data analysis war-
rants further discussion. A variety of model specifications were tested to analyse the 
data. Given the aim of this study, levels of proportional shortfall and QALY gains were 
calculated from the original attributes and included in mixed logit models. Table 4.3 
showed substantial preference heterogeneity and counterintuitive results: we found 
that respondents were less likely to choose patients with higher levels of proportional 
shortfall. It should be noted that, although counterintuitive, this finding is consistent 
with Lancsar et al. [70], Dolan and Tsuchiya [105] and Skedgel et al. [103].
In order to better understand how respondents made their decisions, latent class mod-
els were estimated with the attributes as presented to respondents. These latent class 
models demonstrated distinct preference structures in the data, which seem plausible 
and were helpful in clarifying some of the counterintuitive results we found in the mixed 
models. It is often suggested that different views exist in society regarding the distribu-
tion of health and healthcare [91]. Exploring mean preferences may therefore not be 
most insightful in the context of such value-laden issues. We suggest that future studies 
in this area should account for these heterogeneous preferences in society by consider-
ing multiple models to explore possible decision patterns underlying the data.
The results of the latent class models (Table 4.4) showed some interesting decision 
patterns with respect to equity considerations in healthcare allocation decisions, which 
were more or less consistent across the different age groups.
The first class of each age group showed aforementioned counterintuitive preferences 
for treating persons who were already in a relatively good health state before treatment 
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(i.e. less severe diseases). In addition, in the first class of age group 40, respondents re-
ported fairly equal preferences for health state without treatment and health gain (and 
also in age groups 10 and 70 the differences were relatively small). This might indicate 
that respondents in this class were driven by the best health state after treatment, irre-
spective of whether this was a consequence of the health state before treatment or the 
health gain from treatment. Other studies also have found that respondents consider 
health state after treatment more important than health state before treatment [22]. 
However, it is also possible that this finding was (partly) induced by the presentation of 
the scenarios in our study. A closer look at the graphs of the scenarios (Figure 4.1) shows 
that the best end state after treatment automatically coincides with the smallest health 
loss, indicated by the red area in the graph. It is conceivable that some respondents just 
opted for the smallest health loss (i.e. the smallest red area). Using graphs to clarify the 
scenarios might thus be helpful in presenting complex choice problems to respondents, 
but at the same time unintentionally influence their choices. As the use of such graphs is 
relatively new in this field, this deserves further study, and future studies should be aware 
of this issue when they consider using graphs to present their attributes to respondents.
The second latent class of all age groups aligned with the principle of proportional 
shortfall, thus expressing concerns for severity of illness. These respondents were the 
only ones willing to choose between the groups of patients and, ceteris paribus, pre-
ferred to treat patients with a relatively more severe health state without treatment. The 
probabilities of membership of this class were considerable, which highlights consider-
able support for considering severity in healthcare priority setting in the general public.
Respondents assigned to class 3, the smallest class of each age group, seemed to consist 
of individuals with a general aversion to prioritizing patients based on the health char-
acteristics included in the study. The remaining health state without treatment attribute 
was not significant in age group 70, and only marginally significant in age group 40, sug-
gesting that differences in health state without treatment were not a relevant argument 
for them to prioritize between different groups of patients. Moreover, the constant term 
indicated that these respondents generally preferred not to choose between patients, 
and when they did choose, their decision was mainly driven by the change in monthly 
health insurance premium.
In other words, in each age group we found two latent classes with a general preference 
not to choose between patients, and one class that was willing to choose and displayed 
preferences that aligned with what was expected from the theory of proportional short-
fall. The first two classes represented the majority of respondents in all three age groups, 
but a substantial minority thus supports accounting for severity in priority setting.
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Interaction effects between remaining health without treatment and health gain were 
found not to be significant. This indicates that, statistically, severity did not influence 
the value of a QALY itself in our sample. Nevertheless, the significant coefficients of the 
main effects suggest that health state before treatment does influence respondents’ 
choices. However, theoretically, these two cannot be valued separately since a certain 
health gain is always accompanied by a certain health state before treatment (or pro-
portional shortfall). This suggests that at least indirectly the MWTP for a QALY depends 
on the health state without treatment. Overall, it seems worthwhile to investigate these 
preferences with respect to severity in more detail, in particular taking the preference 
heterogeneity within the general public into consideration.
No clear support was found for the fair innings argument in this study, since the MWTP 
per QALY estimates did not significantly differ between age groups - although the value 
in age group 40 appears considerably higher (Table 4.4). The confidence interval of the 
MWTP estimate of age group 40 was large, which may be due to the low significance of 
the health insurance premium attribute in the first class. The relatively small coefficient 
for health insurance premium in this class resulted in a fairly high MWTP for a QALY 
estimate (€533.015), which in turn (given the substantial probability to be part of group 
1) led to a relatively high MWTP estimate for age group 40.
Apart from the common limitations that come with DCEs and online surveys, the fol-
lowing limitations of this study need to be mentioned. First of all, as discussed here, a 
possible explanation for part of the preference heterogeneity observed in this study 
might relate to the graphical presentation of the scenarios. Such graphs, also used 
before by Lancsar et al. [70], Shah et al. [106] and Brazier et al. [107] may unintentionally 
give room to different interpretations of the scenarios by respondents, and therefore 
may not be the best way to present the attributes to respondents. How respondents 
perceive the information contained in such graphs deserves further study, for instance 
using a think-aloud procedure.
Second, finding that fair innings is of no relevance for the value of a QALY may be a result 
of framing, since age was part of the scenario description and not an attribute in the 
choice set. This implies that respondents did not trade age against other characteristics 
of the recipients, which may have given a different meaning to age in the choices made. 
In the literature there has been a growing interest in the context and framing of studies 
in order to improve the consistency and comparability between studies. Our results are 
in line with those reported by Lancsar et al. [70] and Diederich et al. [108]. It would be 
interesting for future research to investigate whether a DCE with a fixed level of severity 
in each scenario and age included as an attribute would result in opposite findings.
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Concluding, this study aimed to contribute to the existing literature by bridging the 
gap between WTP per QALY studies from an individual perspective and the growing 
literature exploring societal preferences for health and health care. A recent review of 
Whitty et al. [22] underlined the importance of multi criteria studies and the translation 
of public preferences into equity weights that can be used for policy making. In this 
study, we estimated WTP per QALY for different age groups and found no support for 
the fair innings argument, or for prioritizing based on health characteristics more gener-
ally. We did find support for considering severity of illness among a substantial minority 
of the public, but since interaction terms between health state without treatment and 
QALY gains were not significant, we cannot say that the WTP per QALY estimates differed 
statistically significantly for different levels of severity of illness.
While some of our results may be related to the design of our study, including the 
graphical presentation of the scenarios, they are insightful and, most of all, highlight the 
importance of accounting for heterogeneity in preferences among the public on value-
laden issues such as prioritizing health care, both in research and in decision making.
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APPEnDix 4.1: sELECtiOn nuMBER OF CLAssEs in tHE LCM
table A. 4.1: Selection number of classes in the LCM
number of classes Log Likelihood AiC BiC
Age group 10 1 -2723.39212 5454.8 5479.2
2 -2473.78587 4965.6 5020.5
3 -2288.50549 4605.0 4690.4
4 -2271.26754 4580.5 4696.4
5 -2225.79214 4499.6 4645.9
6 -2202.77079 4463.5 4640.4
7 -2184.51031 4437.0 4644.4
8 -2178.68425 4435.4 4673.2
9 -2178.71372 4445.4 4713.7
10 - - -
Age group 40 1 -2590.38614 5188.8 5213.2
2 -2342.04598 4702.1 4757.0
3 -2233.72689 4495.5 4580.8
4 -2186.88956 4411.8 4527.6
5 -2168.02966 4384.1 4530.4
6 -2157.85377 4373.7 4550.5
7 -2152.86299 4373.7 4581.0
8 -2131.83972 4341.7 4579.4
9 -2130.30804 4348.6 4616.8
10 -2120.76759 4339.5 4638.2
Age group 70 1 -2466.93212 4941.9 4966.0
2 -2224.51394 4467.0 4521.3
3 -2124.14160 4276.3 4360.7
4 -2080.06128 4198.1 4321.7
5 -2052.04820 4152.1 4296.8
6 - - -
7 -2017.28796 4102.6 4307.6
8 -1993.56204 4065.1 4300.3
9 -1994.84877 4077.7 4343.0
10 -2002.77934 4103.6 4399.0
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Bobinac A, van de Wetering E. J., Van Exel N.J.A. & 
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ABstRACt
Information about the relative cost-effectiveness of healthcare interventions is gener-
ally considered important for reimbursement decisions, although other considerations, 
such as equity, may also play a role. Numerous studies explored if and when it may be 
justifiable to sacrifice a part of the maximum attainable health to achieve more distribu-
tional fairness. Studies that explored which characteristics of health recipients warrant 
differential treatment suggest that age and severity of illness are the most important 
differentiators. The current study estimates the monetary value of QALY gains in pa-
tients with different illness severity and age profiles (i.e., age- and severity-dependent 
monetary value of a QALY), using the willingness to pay method (WTP) and directly test 
the social support for the concept of varying cost-effectiveness thresholds as a tool for 
evaluating the results of economic evaluations. Severity was operationalized as propor-
tional shortfall and end-of-life concerns.
Results reveal that the size of health gain, proximity to death and age of respondents 
were most influential determinants of WTP. Severity arguments, although often dis-
cussed in the context of an equitable distribution of health care, were found to be less 
influential than the size of that gain on offer, indicating that respondents may generally 
lean towards the principle of health maximization in priority-setting. The concerns for 
patient’s age appeared to dominate concerns for severity, with some preference rever-
sals between the age groups. Finally, severity-related preferences were not independent 
of the age of beneficiaries, which illustrates the complexity of the relationship between 
different equity concerns.
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5.1. intRODuCtiOn
In several healthcare systems, information about the relative cost-effectiveness of 
healthcare interventions is considered important for reimbursement decisions [109]. 
However, cost-effectiveness is usually not the only criterion used to evaluate the desir-
ability of healthcare interventions. Other considerations, such as fairness in the distribu-
tion of health and healthcare may also play a role in deciding which interventions to 
reimburse [110]. For instance, policy makers may have reasons to favour interventions 
targeted at children over those targeted at elderly, even when the latter interventions 
are the most cost-effective options. In health economic evaluations such preferential 
treatment can be operationalized by assigning more weight to health gains (typically 
expressed as Quality-Adjusted Life-Years, or QALYs) achieved in such groups [58]. Then, 
the QALY gains are directly weighted according to some scheme of relative weights. 
Alternatively, the conventionally derived cost-effectiveness ratios can be judged against 
divergent thresholds, where this threshold is higher for interventions targeting patients 
(or diseases) that are deemed a political or social priority [67]. In principle, both ap-
proaches should lead to identical outcomes.
So far, a multitude of normative and empirical studies explored if and when it may 
be justifiable to sacrifice a part of the maximum attainable health to achieve more 
distributional fairness. Studies have explored which characteristics of QALY recipients 
warrant differential treatment and what relative weight they should receive [56, 105, 
111-114]. The results of these studies suggest that age and severity of illness are the 
most important differentiators, revealing general social support for prioritizing younger 
patients and patients who are more severely ill [18, 56, 95, 115-121]. The current study 
aims to contribute to this stream of literature by estimating the monetary value of QALY 
gains in patients with different illness severity and age profiles, using the willingness to 
pay method (WTP). The main question of this study is whether WTP per QALY depends 
on severity- and age-gradients of QALY recipients, and what the nature of this relation-
ship is. To our knowledge, this is the first Contingent valuation study to systematically 
estimate equity-dependent monetary values of QALY gains.
We estimate the age- and severity-dependent monetary value of a QALY using data 
obtained from a relatively large representative sample of the general public in the 
Netherlands, and hence directly test the social support for the concept of varying 
cost-effectiveness thresholds4 as a tool for evaluating the results of economic evalu-
4  Note that the term threshold is used here to denote the social value of a QALY (v), rather than the op-
portunity costs of spending within a fixed health care budget (k). See e.g. Claxton et al.2011 for more 
background on both decision frameworks.
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ations. The ongoing debates in the policy and academic arena’s about the height of 
the threshold for judging the results of economic evaluations [122] warrants this line 
of research. While the discussion is ongoing, some countries are already attempting 
to put a specific operationalization of an equity concept in practice. Two well-known 
examples are the Dutch concept of proportional shortfall and the special treatment of 
‘end-of-life interventions’ of NICE. In the Netherlands, decision makers have suggested 
that the cost-effectiveness threshold should explicitly incorporate concerns for the more 
severely ill, based on the concept of proportional shortfall [20, 66]. NICE recommends 
to funding of life extending “end-of-life” (EoL) treatments, under specific circumstances, 
even when these would not normally be considered cost-effective [47,123]. In this study, 
we will explore the societal support for both operationalization of severity: proportional 
shortfall and “end-of-life” concerns.
The design of this study is novel in several respects. First, to align with the decision mak-
ers’ perspective and increase the relevance of our findings, we estimate WTP per QALY 
values from the social perspective. Past WTP per QALY studies have almost exclusively 
focused on individual WTP values,5 although there are concerns about the usefulness 
of such individual values in healthcare decision making [23]. We define the social value 
of a QALY as the average WTP per QALY estimate provided by the payers of healthcare 
services acting as social decision makers, and expressed as the amount of own consump-
tion they are willing to forego in order to fund a QALY gain achieved in an unknown 
member of society, through an increase in the health insurance premium.
Second, most previous studies exploring trade-offs between different distributional 
concerns have varied the attributes of interest (e.g., age or severity) while holding the 
size of the QALY gain constant [13, 126]. Some studies have allowed health gains to 
vary across choices and found that respondents preferred larger gains above all other 
attributes of interest [70, 127], apparently taking the amount of health produced as their 
maximand. In these studies, the variation in size of the gain was typically obtained by 
varying either length of life (LoL) or quality of life (QoL) [89, 128, 129]. In the current 
study, the size of QALY gains is allowed to vary both in terms of LoL and QoL, with values 
ranging from only marginal to very substantial lifetime gains, in different age groups 
and at various levels of severity. Hence, our design allows a more thorough exploration 
of equity-related preferences than previous studies.
In the next section we present the analytic framework of our study, discuss the two 
operationalization of severity in more detail, and formulate our hypotheses. In the meth-
ods section we present the study design. Finally, we will present and discuss our results.
5  With some exceptions [23, 124, 125] which, however, addressed different research questions.
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5.2. AnALYtiC FRAMEWORk AnD HYPOtHEsis
The web-based survey included diagrams to better illustrate the decision problems to re-
spondents [70, 130, 131]. The diagram in Figure 5.1 illustrates the presentation of a QALY 
profile in each scenario, with “quality of life” on the vertical axis and “life expectancy” 
on the horizontal axis. The point of origin is determined by the age of the hypothetical 
patient group considered in this study at the time the WTP and intervention decision 
is made (i.e., 10, 40 or 70 years), assuming that the years before the age at origin were 
spent in full health. Figure 5.1 is an example of a diagram for the group of 10 year olds 
(10Y). The QALY profile in the absence of illness is the sum of the different shaded areas: 
the target group would then live till 80 years old in full QoL (100, or U(h)=1). For the 10Y 
group depicted in Figure 5.1, that would be 70 years in full QoL, i.e. 70 QALYs. The light 
grey shaded area - demarcated by AgeU and QoLU - represents the number of remaining 
QALYs in case of illness, without treatment. The QALY loss if untreated is represented 
by the sum of the middle grey and dark grey shaded areas (or, in this case, 70 QALYs 
minus the light grey area). The middle grey shaded area - demarcated by AgeT and 
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Figure 5.1: Graphical presentation of analytical framework
Note: Suppose that as a result of illness the life expectancy of a 10 year old in the target group is reduced 
from 80 to 30 years (AgeU = 30) and the quality of life from 1 to 0.65 (QoLU = 65), effective immediately. If 
the 10 year old receives treatment, life expectancy increases from 30 to 50 years (AgeT = 50) and quality 
of life from 0.65 to 0.85 (QoLU = 85).The light grey shaded area then represents the remaining health after 
illness without treatment, being 13 QALYs (=20 years * 0.65 QoL). The middle grey shaded area represents 
the expected QALY gain from treatment, a combination of quality and length of life gains, being 21 QALYs 
(= (50-30) * 0.65 QoL + (50-10) * (0.85-0.65) QoL). The dark grey shaded area shows the QALY loss that re-
mains after treatment, 36 QALYs (= (80-50) * 0.85 QoL + (80-10) * (1-0.85) QoL). In this example, proportional 
shortfall is 0.81 (= (70-13) / 70). 
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QoLT - represents the QALY gain from treatment. The dark grey shaded area represents 
the remaining QALY loss after treatment. The diagrams were accompanied by textual 
explanations of the information contained in the diagrams (as will be discussed further 
in section 5.3). The note to Figure 5.1 provides a numerical example.
5.2.1. severity as Proportional shortfall
The concept of proportional shortfall (PS), endorsed by policy-makers in the Nether-
lands [20], is based on the proportion of remaining lifetime health lost due to illness and, 
therefore, can also be seen as an intermediate principle between fair innings - prioritiz-
ing those with less lifetime health - and prospective health - prioritizing those with the 
shortest remaining life expectancy [18, 58, 66, 89]. PS is represented as a number on a 
scale from 0 (no health loss) to 1 (full health loss or immediate death). Because PS is a 
relative measure, both younger and older individuals can experience a low or a high PS. 
Under the framework presented in Figure 5.1, PS can be defined as the ratio between 
the illness-related QALY loss (i.e., the sum of the middle grey and dark grey shaded areas) 
and the average number of total QALYs enjoyed in the absence of the disease (i.e., the 
full area of the diagram); see note to Figure 5.1 for numerical example. When severity is 
defined as PS, we test the following hypotheses:
 H1:  Within each age group, WTP per QALY gained at lower levels of PS will be sig-
nificantly lower than the WTP per QALY gained at higher levels of PS.
 H2:  At each level of PS, WTP per QALY gained in younger patients (e.g., 10Y) will be 
significantly higher than for QALYs gained in the older patients (40Y and 70Y).
5.2.2. severity as “End-of-life” concern
NICE has recommend that under certain circumstances it may be appropriate to fund 
“end-of-life” (EoL) treatments, even when these would not normally be considered 
cost-effective [47]. These are treatments aimed at small patient groups with short life 
expectancies, normally of 24 months or less and provide a life extension of at least three 
months [47]. In terms of our analytical framework, this pertains to patients for whom 
AgeU is close to the origin of the diagram.
When severity is defined as an EoL concern, we examine whether there is public support 
for giving higher priority to end-of-life treatments than to other types of treatments and 
test:
 H3:  WTP per QALY will be significantly higher for gains situated increasingly closer 
to the end of a patient’s life, keeping the size of the gain constant and providing 
a life extension of at least three months.6
6  Having in mind that all life extensions in our design concerned extensions of more than 3 months and 
small patient groups
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Finally, we explore whether society attaches higher value to gains in length of life than 
those in quality of life, independent of the current health state of the recipient, by test-
ing hypothesis 4:
 H4:  WTP per QALY will be significantly higher for gains in length of life than gains in 
quality of life.
5.3. MEtHODs
We conducted a survey in a sample of the adult general public in the Netherlands 
(n=1,320), representative in terms of age (18+), gender and education, recruited by a 
sampling company. The survey was pilot-tested in a small representative sample (n=100) 
to determine the clarity of the tasks, the feasibility of the questionnaire, the range of 
the payment scales, and the time required to solve the questionnaire in a thoughtful 
manner. The contingent valuation questions were part of a larger survey that also 
contained a discrete choice experiment [131], and questions about socio-demographic 
characteristics.
The survey
In the introduction of the survey, the diagram shown in Figure 5.1 was built up on screen 
in small consecutive steps, using an animated presentation, to further the understand-
ing of the concepts at hand [70]. Respondents were requested to think of themselves 
as social decision makers in the area of healthcare and to imagine an illness that would 
strike the Dutch population the next day, affecting a group of people aged either 10, 40 
or 70 years old. Respondents were told that the treatment was currently not covered 
in the basic benefits package. Hence, if to be reimbursed, it would need to be financed 
through an increase in the community-rated health insurance premium that all adults in 
the Netherlands have to pay [132]. The cost of treatment would be equal for all people 
affected by the illness. The respondents were also told that they themselves could not 
become ill (i.e., be a part of the affected group), but that other people – including their 
loved ones – could. This allowed for the standardization of the beneficiary’s age across 
scenarios and age groups and avoided the issue of inter-personal age variation. Next, 
respondents were asked to decide on an increase in the monthly health insurance 
premium that, in their opinion as social decision makers, would adequately represent 
the social value of the treatment. The premium increase was coercive (i.e., mandatory 
for all adult payers in the Netherlands, including the respondent) for the period of 1 
year. By using coercive payments respondents were (arguably) stimulated to think not 
only of sympathetic benefits achieved in unknown patients but also of the sympathetic 
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costs caused by the increase in the insurance premium to other payers, thus potentially 
reducing the problem of double-counting [133].
Contingent valuation questions
WTP was elicited in a linked two-step procedure: a payment scale followed by a bounded 
direct open ended (OE) question [23, 134]. Respondents were first presented with an 
ordered low-to-high payment scale of monthly instalments ranging from €0 to €24 (in 
steps of €1) and asked to inspect the scale from the left side to the right and indicate the 
maximum amount they would certainly agree to pay. Next, they were asked to inspect 
the scale from the right side to the left and to indicate the minimum amount they would 
certainly not agree to pay. This first step was then followed by the OE question, which 
was bounded by the minimum and maximum value range obtained from the payment 
scale. When respondents chose €0 as their maximum WTP, they were asked to indicate 
the main reason for this preference.7 When respondents choose €24 as the minimum 
amount on the scale, they were automatically directed to the OE question which was not 
bounded to any maximum amount.
5.3.1. scenario design
Each WTP question was based on a single scenario, a QALY profile comprising four main 
attributes (Table 5.1). A total of 48 scenarios, well-dispersed across severity levels, were 
designed for each age group using efficient design for DCE in Nlogit [131] (see Appendix 
5.1). Two extra scenarios were added for each age group: one scenario in which the QALY 
gain was particularly marginal in size (scenario 49; see Appendix 5.1) and one scenario 
in which the health gain equalled 1 full QALY followed by immediate death, which was 
used to test H3 (scenario 50; see Appendix 5.1). The scenarios were distributed randomly 
to respondents, respecting scenario balance.8
The at-risk groups of beneficiaries in the Dutch population varied in size (i.e., 8,000 
people in 70Y and 2,000 people in 10Y and 40Y) in order to keep the implicit minimum 
and maximum size of the lifetime QALY gains equal between the three age groups, 
and thereby the implicit maximum and minimum WTP per QALY values. The implicit 
minimum and maximum WTP per QALY estimates defined by scenario and payment 
7  Options were: 1) I am unable to pay more than €0; 2) avoiding the worse health state and remaining 
in the better health state in not worth more than €0 to me; 3) I am not willing to pay out of ethical 
considerations; 4) something else [with open text field for explanation]. Answer options 1) and 2) were 
considered as a “true” €0 WTP while option 3) as a protest answer. Option 4) was coded depending on the 
explanation given.
8  A respondent was offered the WTP questions for the three age groups in random order, and within each 
age group a randomly selected scenario from the design. The relative probability a scenario was offered 
to a respondent decreased with the number of times it had been offered to respondents before.
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scale design ranged equally in the three age groups, from €4,600 to just over €1,600,000. 
Equal (implicit) maximum and minimum WTP per QALY values facilitated adequate com-
parisons between the results.9 Every respondent solved one WTP question for each age 
group. Each of the 50 scenarios in each target age group was solved by approximately 
27 respondents.
5.3.2. Analysis
Before we analysed the data and tested the hypothesis we discounted the value of each 
element of a QALY profile (e.g., a QALY gain or loss) to its present value. A fixed discount 
rate r was used for each year throughout the time period t such that, for instance, a 
discounted QALY gain dGQ for every scenario i in age group y was:
Eq 5.1 dGQt,i= GSy x   
n
∑
t=0
Gqy,i,t
(1+r)t
9  Because the gains in 70Y were considerably smaller than in the other two groups, the number of 70-year 
olds within the risk group was increased (from 2,000 to 8,000). An alternative would have been to vary the 
range of the payment scales between the three age groups (and different average QALY gains). In light 
of potential biases caused by varying payment scale ranges, we did not opt for this. We did not opt for 
smaller ex ante probabilities in the 10 and 40 year groups either, in order to avoid small sized gains and 
cognitive problems of interpreting differences in small probabilities. The equality of group sizes between 
10Y and 40Y was a product of the design and partly a product of discounting which, over long stretches 
of time, reduced the size of the gains particularly in the 10-year olds.
table 5.1: Attribute levels
Group Attributes Main attribute levels Additional 
attribute levelsa
10Y Quality of life before treatment 45 65 85 95 0
Life expectancy before treatment 30 50 70 10 10
Quality of life gain 5 15 25 35 1 100
Life expectancy gain 5 10 15 20 2 1
40Y Quality of life before treatment 45 65 85 95 0
Life expectancy before treatment 50 62 74 76 40
Quality of life gain 5 15 25 35 1 100
Life expectancy gain 2 6 10 14 1 1
70Y Quality of life before treatment 45 65 85 95 0
Life expectancy before treatment 73 76 79 70 70
Quality of life gain 5 15 25 35 1 100
Life expectancy gain 0.5 1.5 1 2 10 1
Note: a Immediate death (left column) and marginal health gain (right column), these scenarios were not a 
part of the attributes used to generate scenarios in Nlogit.
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where t=70 in 10Y, t=40 in 40Y and t=10 in 70Y and GSy denotes the size of the at-risk 
group in y. A constant discount rate for health of 1.5% was used, as recommended in the 
Dutch pharmacoeconomic guidelines [135]. However, as a form of sensitivity analyses, 
we also tested our hypotheses using the undiscounted QALY values and a higher dis-
count rate of 3.5% (as conventional in the UK setting) [136]. In the remainder of the text, 
values are discounted with a 1.5% discount rate, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
Furthermore, the sensitivity of scope of (OE)WTP was analysed as proposed in Bobi-
nac et al. [94], by testing whether larger QALY gains receive statistically higher WTP 
values, and whether the relationship between the size of the gain and OE(WTP) was 
near-proportional. The theoretical validity of WTP estimates was tested using log-linear 
regressions, for two reasons: ease of interpretation in terms of constant elasticity and 
the correction for non-normality in the distribution. The covariates were tested for non-
linearity (using quadratic terms) and relevant interactions (excluded if insignificant). 
Statistical differences were tested using the parametric t-test on log-transformed WTP 
estimates and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney u-test. The distributional properties of 
WTP estimates were analysed using Kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk tests.
To test hypotheses H1 and H2, discounted proportional shortfall (dPS) for every scenario 
i in age group y was calculated as:
Eq 5.2 dPSy,i= 1 –
dLEy – dLq y,i
dLEy
where dLEy represents the discounted number of QALYs enjoyed by people of the same 
age and gender in the absence of disease and dLqy,i represents the discounted QALY loss 
due to illness in scenario i.
To test hypothesis H3 with respect to preferences for end-of-life treatments, we used 
two sets of scenarios: (1) the scenarios where respondents valued a QALY gain that 
prevents immediate death in all three age groups (i.e., scenario 50 in 10Y, 40Y and 70Y 
and scenario 6 in 40Y; see Appendix 5.1); and (2) the scenarios in 70Y where treatments 
offered life extension of <2 years versus >2 years (regardless of the HRQOL)[47].
To test hypothesis H4, gains in life expectancy and quality of life were included in the 
regression analysis separately, instead of the combined QALY gain.
The average social WTP per QALY in each age group y was calculated as:
Eq 5.3 WTP per QALYy =
OE(WTP)y,i,k
x 12 x 13,260,000
dGqy,i
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where OE(WTP)y,i,k represents the open-ended WTP estimate provided by respondent 
k in scenario i and age group y, and dGQy,i represents the discounted QALY gains from 
treatment. This average of ratios is multiplied by the number of 1-year monthly instal-
ments (i.e., 12) and the approximate number of health insurance payers in the Nether-
lands (i.e. 13,260,000).10
Analyses were performed in STATA13.
5.4. REsuLts
The pilot study estimated the minimal time required to carefully read and solve the 
WTP questions to be minimally 3.5 minutes. We therefore discarded the responses 
from subjects who solved the questions in less than 3.5 minutes, yielding final average 
response time of 6.6 minutes. In total, the answers of 1,320 respondents were retained 
in the sample. The average household monthly income (before tax) of €2,430 per aver-
age number of 2.5 household members adequately represented Dutch national figures 
(Table 5.2) [137].
10  Number of persons over >18y in the Netherlands, minus the number of defaulters (CBS, 2015, 2006).
table 5.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean sD Min Max
Age 46 15.5 18 95
Gender (% female) 50
Partner (% yes) 68
Children (% yes) 57
Personal before-tax income 2,430 1,619 999 10,000
Income groups (% yes) - < €1,000 25
- €1,000 - €1,999 31
- €2,000 - €3,499 29
- ≥ €3,500 15
Number of people living on household income 2.49 1.08 1 20
Education status (% yes) - Elementary school 12
- High school 54
- University 34
Health status: - EQ-5D (Dutch tariff) 0.85 0.20 -0.32 1
- EQ-VAS 79.3 16.1 10 100
Completion time of the questionnaire (seconds) 394 150 210 1340
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5.4.1. WtP estimates
Most OE (WTP) fell within the range of €0 to €15. Only 0.73% of respondents indicated 
the highest level offered on the payment scale (€24) as their maximum WTP. Few re-
spondents indicated €0 WTP (i.e., 15 in 10Y, 13 in 40Y and 35 in 70Y) and no respondents 
indicated €0 WTP in all three WTP questions. The reasons for stating zero WTP were 
uniformly distributed among the explanations (see footnote 4). No relevant relationship 
between the size of the health gain, household income and zero WTP was observed. 
Although the average size of dGQ and dPS were fairly similar between 10Y, 40Y and 
70Y, as envisaged by study design (Appendix 5.2), the OE(WTP) values significantly 
and systematically differed between the age groups, with OE(WTP)10y > OE(WTP)40y > 
OE(WTP)70y (p<0.05; Table 5.3). The same pattern was observed for the discounted WTP 
per QALY values, with QALY gains achieved in 10Y valued highest at €216,600, followed 
by €173,900 in 40Y and €118,500 in 70Y (p<0.05). 
Sensitivity of scale
Figure 5.2 depicts the relationship between the size of the QALY gains (dGQ) and 
OE(WTP). It reveals a concave relation between the value of a QALY and the size of dGQ, 
in all three age groups. If sensitivity to scale as a higher-order condition for validity 
was defined in terms of a near-proportional relationship between the size of the gain 
and WTP [94], then the sensitivity to scale was higher at smaller QALY gains. All other 
things equal, Figure 5.2 also reveals a tipping point after which the value of additional 
QALYs gained in a single patient became negative, especially in the 70Y group where the 
inverse U-shaped function exhibited a sharp decline in value. The tipping point in 10Y 
and 40Y was around 13 dGQ. Hence, although from a social perspective we found that 
table 5.3: OE(WTP) and WTP per QALY values
Discount rate Age group Average OE(WtP)a Average WtP per QALY Average WtP per QALY
in scenario 50b
r=1,5% 10Y € 13,1 € 216,600 € 819,000
40Y € 11,6 € 173,900 € 750,300
70Y € 9,0 € 118,500 € 175,700
r=3,5% 10Y € 13,1 € 628,000
40Y € 11,6 € 256,300
70Y € 9,0 € 143,700
r=0% 10Y € 13,1 € 95,700
40Y € 11,6 € 151,000
70Y € 9,0 € 115,900
Note: WTP values are rounded to hundreds. a OE(WTP) presented here are reported as monthly averages. b 
One full QALY followed by immediate death.
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the gains in younger patients are deemed more valuable throughout, as they received 
higher (OE)WTP at all levels of QALY gains, we also found that the extra value is diminish-
ing with the size of QALY gains. This suggests that restoring patients to high levels of 
post-treatment health, after a point, was not valued differently than restoring patients 
to lower levels of post-treatment health. The inverse U-shaped relationship between 
OE(WTP) and QALY gains was not the consequence of study design (nor discounting), 
since smaller and larger QALY gains were fairly normally distributed in all age groups. 
In fact, using different methods and designs, Lancsar et al. [70] , Norman et al. [72] and 
Brazier et al. [107] observed similar patterns.
5.4.2. severity as proportional shortfall – testing H1 and H2
When accounting for the level of severity at which QALYs were gained, generally we 
found no important relationship between PS and WTP per QALY (rejecting H1). First, in 
regression analyses (Model 1; Table 5.4), PS was found to be a significant predictor of 
WTP per QALY only in 70Y (p<0.05), also when the non-linearity between the OE(WTP) 
and QALYs was modelled using a quadratic term. We tested the hypothesis that the 
level of PS and the size of the gain were evaluated in combination and quantified this 
effect through an interaction term (Model 2). While the level of PS and the interaction 
term were both statistically significant in 10Y, they were insignificant in 40Y and 70Y. 
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Figure 5.2: OE(WTO) by dGQ for 10Y, 40Y and 70Y
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Importantly, income was found to be a non-significant explanatory variable, likely due 
to the small monthly OE(WTP) amounts (not limited by respondents’ ability to pay) and 
the social decision maker perspective framing.
The graphical presentation of the relationship between WTP per QALY and dPS (Figure 
5.3) reveals a weak U-shaped relationship in 10Y, and almost no relationship in 40Y 
and 70Y.11 Combined data from all age groups showed a very similar pattern. However, 
Figure 5.3 again reveals evidence of ageism similar to that presented in Table 5.3 and 
Figure 5.3: at each level of PS, WTP per QALY gained in younger patients is valued more, 
hence confirming H2.
11  When the same relationship is tested using regression analyses, we find a significant coefficient of PS 
(negative sign) and PS squared (positive sign) in 10Y, and insignificant PS coefficients in 40Y and 70Y.
table 5.4: The impact of the most relevant predictors on raw log(WTP) estimates
Age 
group
Variable Model 1a Model 2b
Beta s.e. P St
Beta
Beta s.e. P St
Beta
10Y dPS 0.03 0.12 0.83 0.06 0.33 0.18 0.07** 0.08
dGQ 0.02 0.06 0.00* 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00* 0.28
dPS*dGQ - - - - -0.07 0.03 0.03* -0.24
Higher education -0.00 0.05 0.97 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.91 -0.00
Log income 0.03 0.04 0.42 0.023 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.02
Constant term 1.77 0.34 0.00* - 1.6 0.34 0.00* -
40Y dPS 0.14 0.11 0.34 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.59 0.03
dGQ 0.03 0.00 0.00* 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.11
dPS*dGQ - - - - 0.01 0.04 0.89 0.02
Higher education -0.03 0.05 -0.56 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.59 -0.02
Log income 0.07 0.04 1.52 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.04
Constant term 1.24 0.33 0.00 - 1.27 0.36 0.00* -
70Y dPS 0.29 0.12 0.02* 0.06 -0.05 0.31 0.88 -0.01
dGQ 0.05 0.03 0.08** 0.05 -0.08 0.11 0.46 -0.8
dPS*dGQ - - - - 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.15
Higher education -0.04 0.05 0.52 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.55 -0.02
Log income 0.04 0.05 0.43 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.43 0.02
Constant term 1.25 0.35 0.00* - 1.45 0.39 0.00* -
Note: a R2 was 0.013 for 10Y, 0.019 for 40Y, and 0.005 for 70Y. b R2 was 0.012 for 10Y and 40Y, and 0.008 for 70Y. 
dPS = discounted proportional shortfall, dGQ = discounted QALY gain. *=p<0.05, *=p<0.1.
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5.4.3 severity as the end-of life concern - testing H3
The end-of-life argument received reasonable support in our data. The last column 
of Table 5.3 shows that the value of 1 QALY increased four-fold in 10Y and 40Y in the 
context of immediate death compared to other type of QALY gains, but only about 50% 
in 70Y. Table 5.5 shows the results of the effect of the end-of-life argument on the WTP 
per QALY in age group 70. The further the patient was from her death the smaller the 
WTP per QALY, thus confirming H3. However, judging from the linear regression (Table 
5.5), there seemed to be a threshold since the value of a QALY did not differ significantly 
for gains that were achieved within three years before death if untreated (not 2 years, 
as proposed in the UK). That is, if the patient will die from the illness if untreated within 
three years’ time, it makes little difference as to when within these three years death will 
occur. If the illness strikes after 3 years or later, the value of a QALY decreases substan-
tially (Table 5.5).
5.4.4. Composition of the QALY gain - testing H4
The variation in WTP per QALY was also investigated with respect to the composition of 
QALY gains. When controlling for the position of the gains in terms of the remaining QALY 
profile without treatment, we found that the gain in LE determines the value of a QALY 
strongest, while the gain in terms of QOL generally was not a significant predictor of 
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Figure 5.3: WTP per QALY estimates at different levels of proportional shortfall and age
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OE(WTP) values (models not presented here). This finding confirms H4 and is at variance 
with the conventional QALY model (based on individual rather than social preferences), 
in which the composition of the QALY gain should be irrelevant. This result suggests 
that, in social decision making, QALYs could be weighted based on their composition. 
In fact, previous studies also showed that life-extending and quality-of-life-enhancing 
QALYs are regarded differently [107, 138, 139].
5.5. DisCussiOn
The main focus of this study was to estimate the social willingness to pay for QALY gains 
at different levels of disease severity, in beneficiaries of different ages. We explored two 
well-known examples of operationalizations of severity that are already put in practice, 
the Dutch concept of proportional shortfall [20] and the special treatment of ‘end of life 
interventions’ of NICE [47]. 
The evidence in support of PS as a predictor of WTP per QALY can be characterized as 
sporadic. Most support for PS was found when gains were relatively small in size. As the 
size of QALY gains increased, the level of PS ceased explaining the variance in WTP per 
QALY. Based on the results of this study, the proposition of a strictly increasing cost-
effectiveness threshold for increasing levels of PS (CVZ, 2009) is refuted. Support for PS 
when gains are small in size is in line with Rowen et al. (2014), who found some support 
for burden of illness (absolute instead of relative severity) and equity-dependent social 
value of a QALY. Their findings (like ours) were not consistent across all situations, sug-
gesting that preferences over different equity considerations are likely tied to particular 
contexts and thus not uniform. We tested several potential explanations for the sporadic 
table 5.5 WTP variance per QALY accounting for LE without treatment in age group 70
Variable WtP per QALY in 
70Ya
Model 1 b
Beta s.e. P st Beta
LE without treatment
70y € 176,000 Omitted
71y € 147,000 0.14 0.28 0.63 0.02
73y € 141,000 -0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.09
76y € 110,000 -0.4 0.2 0.04* -0.19
79y € 90,000 -0.58 0.05 0.00* -0.24
Higher education 0.00 0.6 0.99 0.00
Log income 0.06 0.05 0.21 0.04
Constant term 11.1 0.43 0.00* -
Note: a in absolute values, rounded to hundreds. b R2=0.02, * =p<0.05.
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relationship between PS and WTP. It is conceivable that a very low QoL after treatment 
may relate negatively to WTP per QALY estimates, potentially confounding the results. 
In other words, interventions that offer extensions in life expectancy but leave patients 
in very low QoL after treatment may receive lower priority. However, even when only 
the subgroup who returned to health above 40%, 60% and 80% was analysed (hence 
the groups with the highest post-treatment QoL), the support for the differentiation 
based on the PS argument remained scarce. We found that different “types” of QALY 
gains (either life-extending or quality-of-life-enhancing QALYs) were valued differently, 
a finding that is also consistent with earlier studies [107, 138, 139].
We did find support for the end-of-life premium. QALY gains situated close to death (<3 
years) were valued the highest and gaining a QALY in a situation of immediate death 
was valued highly. Similar findings were reported by Pennington et al. [140], Rowen et al. 
[130] and Baker et al. [126]. However, many other studies report no evidence to support 
this argument [106, 141].
Overall, our results may imply that severity-related issues were less important than the 
size of that gain on offer and that respondents generally leaned towards the principle of 
health maximization in priority-setting and were reluctant to introduce severity-related 
considerations when prioritizing among beneficiaries. However, concerns for age ap-
peared to dominate concerns for severity, with some preference reversals between the 
age groups.
The findings with respect to age warrant some further discussion. It seems that the dif-
ferentiation of the social value of a QALY largely depends on the recipient’s age, justify-
ing our initial decision to separate the exploration of the preferences for the severity 
arguments by the age of the beneficiaries. Gains in younger patients were systematically 
valued higher than gains in the older population. Our finding that the value of a QALY 
decreases as the age of beneficiaries increases is also consistent with earlier studies 
[66, 78]. Next to the higher monetary values assigned to younger patients’ QALY gains, 
ceteris paribus, our results show that the impact of patients’ age on preferences is very 
profound and appears in various forms. That is, the conclusions regarding the prefer-
ences for the severity of patient’s condition seem to depend on patient’s age, just like 
the conclusions regarding the sensitivity of OE(WTP) estimates to the scale of the QALY 
gains. For instance, adding a life-saving QALY to a 70-year old patient is only about 50% 
more valuable than adding other type of QALY gains in other circumstances, while it 
is 400% more valuable in 10Y and 40Y. These results indicate that the severity-related 
preferences are not independent from the age of beneficiaries and are very complex.
Finally, the (OE)WTP values reported here were sensitive to scope, since the results 
showed that respondents assigned higher monetary value to larger QALY gains, al-
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though at a declining rate. The diminishing relationship between the OE(WTP) and QA-
LYs is not likely to be the result of the study design, since smaller and larger discounted 
QALY gains were fairly normally distributed in all age groups. In addition, using different 
methods and study designs, Lancsar et al. [70], Norman et al. [72], Brazier et al. [107] and 
Rowen et al. [130] observed similar patterns.
Although it is difficult to compare the results of stated preference methods due to differ-
ences in design, the estimates of social WTP per QALY (r=1,5%) reported here average at 
170,000 Euro per QALY, which is about 3,7 times the Dutch GDP per capita (World Bank, 
2015), in the ballpark of the values suggested by WHO CHOICE (2015). The 170,000 Euro 
per QALY is higher than values obtained in previous studies directly exploring the value 
of a QALY [67, 142]. However, a recent review of Ryen and Svensson [143] reported a 
wide spread range of WTP estimates of 1,000 to 4,800,000 Euro per QALY, depending on 
the methodology, country of study, perspective taken and sample population. Because 
valuation of QALYs and preferences for a fair distribution of healthcare are complex, it 
need not surprise that there is a lot of variation in the reported results across studies. 
According to our results, people seem to hold different preferences over the trade-off 
between severity-related arguments and the size of QALY gains, depending on the age 
group these gains are realized in. This further highlights the complexity of estimating 
equity-weights for QALYs and the complexity of the task faced by policy-makers and 
researchers. This may partially explain the non-explicit-weighting position currently 
adopted by HTA agencies and governments around the world [70], along with the 
unwillingness to define exact thresholds.
Several limitations need to be mentioned. First, it could be argued that our study 
design may have stimulated strong age-related preferences. This may be based on the 
fact that age was easier to differentiate than severity, since that is how WTP questions 
were posed (i.e., three separate questions for three age groups). However, the size of 
gain varied considerably in each age group. Hence, simply stating a lower OE(WTP) for 
older people irrespective of the size of the gain presented in a scenario, would not have 
led to such a consistent relationship between the size of the gain, raw WTP and age. 
Secondly, this was a hypothetical WTP exercise, and hence our results are only indicative 
of actual consumption behaviour and underlying preferences that may be observed 
in, for instance, real-life choices or a field experiment. An online format of the survey 
likely did not contribute to creating a real-life contingent market and payment situation. 
These are typical problems related to preference elicitation, and not unique to our study. 
Thirdly, it could be argued that our results were partly driven by the substantial amount 
of information that respondents were required to account for in their valuations, which 
some respondents may have found difficult to process, hence focusing only on a subset 
of the information when making their choices – mainly the size of the gain. The finding 
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that life expectancy after treatment was the single most relevant point on the diagram 
may support this claim, although diagrams and animations were designed to explain 
and enhance the understanding of the task. On the other hand, respondents were able 
to distinguish between the size of the gains on offer in the theoretically predictable way 
(increasing yet diminishing relationship between OE(WTP) and QALYs), indicating that 
they apparently did understand the task and were able to capture the relevance of the 
information presented. Moreover, although the size of the gain was allowed to vary in 
our study, this did not hamper respondents to express their concern for the younger 
patients over the older, again indicating that respondents understood the task. This was 
not the case for level of PS or BoI, indicating that these preferences may indeed be a 
reflection of true preferences and not an artefact of the design or misunderstanding of 
the task by respondents.
As proposed by Bobinac et al. [144], future health profiles and gains were discounted in 
order to reduce the value of an element of a QALY to its present value, reflecting the time 
preferences of society. Discounting is a much debated topic in the health economics 
literature, since it may have a considerable impact on the outcome of economic evalua-
tions [68]. Given this ongoing discussion in the literature, we also analysed undiscounted 
data (Appendix 5.3). Except for the absolute WTP per QALY values, the undiscounted 
results showed similar patterns with respect to the relative QALY values for different 
operationalizations of severity and age and thus do not change our main conclusions. 
Note that the undiscounted values show relatively smaller WTP per QALY values in 10Y 
than in 40Y and 70Y. This may be an artefact of the design, since the design was based on 
the equality of population-wide QALY gains between the three age groups, where QALYs 
were discounted at 1,5% rate. This resulted in a very large size of undiscounted life-time 
QALY gains in 10Y while the payment scale was held constant.
The way in which the societal perspective was applied in this study deserves some dis-
cussion. From the regression models, it seems that applying a societal perspective in this 
particular form (i.e., valuing a gain in an unknown member of society, using a coercive 
increase in health insurance premium as the payment vehicle) renders own income and 
personal traits insignificant. On the one hand this is reasonable, given that respondents 
were required to think as societal decision makers and make decisions on behalf of soci-
ety. Moreover, the societal perspective as defined in this study separates own monetary 
contribution from the good being valued in the sense that this good (QALY gain) cannot 
be consumed by the payer directly. We chose to define the societal perspective as not 
inclusive (which would have seen the payer as a part of the risk group). The intention 
of this study was to stay close to the perspective of social decision makers, who make 
decisions that usually do not directly concern themselves, at least not at the same point 
in time. Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature has seen a lively debate on 
Chapter 5
102
the influence of different perspectives on WTP estimates, nor about the specification 
of the “social perspective” within CV studies (e.g., which payment vehicle can be used 
in which contexts, or how best to define the health insurance premium vehicle, how to 
calculate the social WTP, etc.). We defined the social value of a QALY as the amount of 
own consumption individuals are willing to forego in order to contribute to a health gain 
achieved in society, through an increase in their health insurance premium. However, it 
is possible to think of other definitions of social value and further research in this area 
seems warranted.
Concluding, this paper has further investigated the social valuation of QALY gains in 
different patient groups. Size of health gain, proximity to death and age of respondents 
were most influential in this study. Severity arguments, although often discussed in the 
context of an equitable distribution of health care, were found to be less influential. 
Moreover, the underlying preferences for different health gains appear to be complex 
and context dependent. This warrants further investigation of this important topic.
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APPEnDix 5.1: AttRiButEs AnD LEVELs PER AgE gROuP
table A.5.1: Attributes and levels per age group
id 10Y 40Y 70Y
QoL LE QoLG LEG PS QoL LE QoLG LEG PS QoL LE QoLG LEG PS
1 85 50 15 15 51% 85 50 5 6 79% 45 73 15 0,5 86%
2 45 50 5 10 74% 65 74 25 2 45% 85 76 15 2 49%
3 45 70 25 5 61% 65 62 35 14 64% 85 76 5 0,5 49%
4 65 70 5 5 44% 65 62 35 2 64% 65 76 15 2 61%
5 65 50 25 5 63% 45 62 15 10 75% 45 73 25 2 86%
6 45 30 25 10 87% 0 40 80 2 100% 65 79 15 1 41%
7 65 30 15 20 81% 65 62 5 2 64% 45 76 5 1 73%
8 65 30 25 20 81% 95 76 5 4 14% 45 73 35 1 86%
9 65 50 5 15 63% 45 50 15 6 89% 85 79 15 1 23%
10 45 30 35 15 87% 85 50 5 2 79% 65 73 5 0,5 80%
11 85 70 5 5 27% 65 50 15 14 84% 45 79 25 0,5 59%
12 85 70 15 10 27% 65 62 5 6 64% 65 73 35 1,5 80%
13 65 50 35 20 63% 85 50 15 14 79% 85 79 5 0,5 23%
14 85 30 5 15 76% 65 62 15 14 64% 65 79 35 0,5 41%
15 45 30 15 10 87% 45 62 5 14 75% 45 76 35 1,5 73%
16 45 70 15 10 61% 85 50 5 10 79% 65 73 25 2 80%
17 45 30 35 20 87% 85 74 15 6 28% 45 71 40 1 96%
18 65 50 35 10 63% 45 74 35 6 62% 65 76 25 0,5 61%
19 45 50 5 15 74% 65 50 25 10 84% 45 76 25 1 73%
20 85 30 5 5 76% 85 74 15 2 28% 65 76 5 1,5 61%
21 45 50 25 20 74% 45 62 25 10 75% 65 73 35 1 80%
22 65 50 15 5 63% 45 50 35 2 89% 45 76 15 1,5 73%
23 45 70 35 10 61% 45 74 25 2 62% 85 73 5 2 74%
24 85 30 15 5 76% 45 50 5 10 89% 45 73 5 1,5 86%
25 65 30 5 5 81% 65 62 15 10 64% 45 79 35 1 59%
26 85 70 15 5 27% 85 62 15 6 53% 45 79 5 0,5 59%
27 85 50 5 10 51% 45 74 15 6 62% 45 79 25 1 59%
28 45 50 25 15 74% 85 74 5 6 28% 45 73 35 0,5 86%
29 45 30 5 20 87% 65 50 25 6 84% 85 73 15 1,5 74%
30 65 50 35 15 63% 45 50 5 2 89% 85 73 5 1,5 74%
31 85 70 5 10 27% 95 76 5 4 14% 65 73 25 1,5 80%
32 45 50 35 5 74% 65 74 35 2 45% 65 76 25 1,5 61%
33 45 70 35 5 61% 85 62 5 14 53% 65 76 5 0,5 61%
34 85 50 15 20 51% 45 50 25 14 89% 45 76 35 2 73%
35 85 30 15 10 76% 85 74 5 2 28% 65 76 5 1 61%
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table A.5.1: Attributes and levels per age group (continued)
id 10Y 40Y 70Y
QoL LE QoLG LEG PS QoL LE QoLG LEG PS QoL LE QoLG LEG PS
36 65 30 35 20 81% 85 50 15 10 79% 85 79 5 1 23%
37 45 30 15 15 87% 65 62 5 10 64% 65 76 15 1 61%
38 45 50 15 20 74% 45 50 35 10 89% 85 73 5 1 74%
39 65 50 25 15 63% 65 50 35 10 84% 65 73 15 2 80%
40 45 30 25 5 87% 45 50 15 2 89% 95 76 5 0,5 43%
41 65 50 25 10 63% 45 74 5 2 62% 65 76 35 2 61%
42 45 70 5 5 61% 85 62 15 2 53% 45 73 15 2 86%
43 65 30 35 10 81% 45 62 35 14 75% 65 79 35 0,5 41%
44 65 70 25 10 44% 45 62 25 6 75% 85 73 15 0,5 74%
45 65 30 15 15 81% 65 50 5 14 84% 45 76 25 2 73%
46 85 30 5 20 76% 65 74 15 6 45% 85 79 5 1 23%
47 95 78 5 2 8% 65 50 35 6 84% 45 73 25 1 86%
48 65 70 5 10 44% 65 62 25 2 64% 85 76 15 0,5 49%
49 95 79 5 1 6% 95 79 5 1 7% 95 79 5 1 14%
50 0 10 100 1 100% 0 40 100 1 100% 0 70 100 1 100%
Note: QoL = quality of life before treatment; LE = life expectancy before treatment; QoLG = quality of life 
gain from treatment; LEG = life expectancy gain from treatment; PS = proportional shortfall.
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APPEnDix 5.2: tHE EQuALitY OF tHE MAin PARAMEtERs tO BE EstiMAtED, 
FOR EACH AgE gROuP
table A.5.2: The equality of the main parameters to be estimated, for each age group
Age group Variable (average values) Mean sD Min Max
10Y OE(WTP) 13,1 39,5 0 1000
dGQ 7,5 4,2 1 17
Risk group 2000
GQ 15,6 7,5 1 34
dPS (in %) 0,6 0,2 0 1
40Y OE(WTP) 11,6 39,3 0 999
dGQ 7,3 3,8 1 17
Risk group 2000
GQ 8,9 4,6 1 22
dPS (in %) 0,6 0,2 0 1
70Y OE(WTP) 9,0 28,2 0 999
dGQ 1,9 0,9 0 4
Risk group 8000
GQ 2,0 1,0 1 4
dPS (in %) 0,6 0,2 0 1
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APPEnDix 5.3: unDisCOuntED REsuLt
table A.5.3.1: The impact of the most relevant predictors on raw log(WTP) estimates
Age 
group
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Beta s.e. P St Beta Beta s.e. P St Beta
10Y R2=0.0100 R2=0.0116
PS 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.41 0.22 0.06 0.10
GQ 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.23
PS*GQ - - - - -0.02 0.02 0.15 -0.17
Higher education -0.01 0.05 0.88 -0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.84 -0.01
Log income 0.04 0.04 0.42 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.44 0.02
Constant term 1.67 0.34 0.00 - 1.52 0.35 0.00 -
40Y R2=0.0190 R2=0.0193
PS 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.80 0.01
GQ 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.63 0.06
PS*GQ - - - - 0.02 0.03 0.54 0.08
Higher education -0.03 0.05 0.58 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.61 -0.01
Log income 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.04
Constant term 1.23 0.34 0.00 - 1.31 0.36 0.00 -
70Y R2=0.0072 R2=0.0085
PS 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.31 0.85 -0.01
GQ 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.11 0.42 -0.09
PS*GQ - - - - 0.22 0.17 0.20 0.16
Higher education -0.04 0.05 0.52 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.54 -0.02
Log income 0.04 0.05 0.43 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.43 0.02
Constant term 1.24 0.36 0.00 - 1.47 0.40 0.00 -
table A.5.3.2: Explaining the variance in WTP per QALY values by accounting for the level of LE without 
treatment (i.e., end-of-life argument) in age group 70Y
Variable Beta s.e. P st.Beta Descriptive analysis
Log(WTP per QALY) R2=0.03
WTP per QALY in 70Y, in absolute values, 
by LE without treatmenta
70y Omitted €200,500
71y -0.09 0.27 0.73 -0.01 €181,500
73y -0.29 0.20 0.14 -0.14 €220,500
76y -0.48 0.20 0.02* -0.19 €162,000
79y -0.69 0.20 0.00* -0.23 €124,500
Higher education 0.04 0.06 0.54 0.02
Log income 0.06 0.05 0.27 0.03
Constant term 11.66 0.42 0.00* -
Note: * p<0.05. a values rounded to hundreds.
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ABstRACt
Conditional reimbursement of new health technologies is increasingly considered 
as a useful policy instrument. It allows gathering more robust evidence regarding ef-
fectiveness and cost-effectiveness without delaying market access. However, literature 
suggests that ending reimbursement and provision of a technology when it proves not 
to be (cost-) effective in practice, may be difficult.
The aim of this study was to investigate how policy makers and the general public in the 
Netherlands value removing a previously reimbursed treatment from the basic benefits 
package relative to not including a new treatment. To investigate this issue, we used 
discrete choice experiments. MMNL models were used to analyse the data. Compen-
sating variations values and changes in probability of acceptance were calculated for 
withdrawal of reimbursement.
The results show that, ceteris paribus, both the general public (n=1,169) and policy mak-
ers (n=90) prefer a treatment that is currently reimbursed over one that is currently not 
yet reimbursed.
Apparently, ending reimbursement is more difficult than not starting reimbursement in 
the first place, both for policy makers and the public. Loss aversion is one of the possible 
explanations for this result. Policy makers in health care need to be aware of this effect 
when engaging in conditional reimbursement schemes.
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6.1. intRODuCtiOn
The growing pressure on health care budgets increases the need for a more explicit 
decision making process regarding the allocation of scarce resources. In this context, 
health care policy makers seek scientific evidence to inform these complex allocation 
decisions. Economic evaluation of new health technologies have become an important 
source of evidence for policy makers to guide these allocation decisions [145, 25]. How-
ever, the information on (cost-) effectiveness of new technologies is often imperfect at 
the time that the reimbursement decision needs to be made. For instance, first evidence 
about cost-effectiveness is typically generated in controlled trials and primarily aimed at 
meeting the regulators’ requirements about efficacy and safety of the new technology, 
but it is usually inconclusive about effectiveness in real life use and the cost-effectiveness 
compared to existing technologies. As a result, many allocation decisions have to be 
made under considerable uncertainty, which makes it difficult for health care policy 
makers to make a well-considered long term reimbursement decision [146, 147, 24].
This leads to the question how to deal with this uncertainty in the decision making 
process. One option could be to postpone reimbursement in order to generate more 
evidence, but this may delay patients’ access to new promising technologies [146]. 
Therefore, conditional reimbursement has been proposed as an alternative option to 
deal with uncertainty regarding health care allocation decisions, without delaying mar-
ket access [24, 25, 147]. With conditional reimbursement, a new technology is included 
in the basic benefits package (in a health insurance system) or paid by government (in 
a National Health Services system) for a given period of time, under specified condi-
tions. One of the common conditions is the collection of real-world data on costs and 
effectiveness of the technology. Hence, the policy instrument has also been labelled as 
coverage with evidence development (CED), funding with evidence development (FED) 
or access with evidence development (AED). Based on the additional evidence a better 
informed long term reimbursement decision can be made at the end of the conditional 
reimbursement period. In other words, using this policy instrument, policy makers can 
make new promising technologies available to patients at an early stage, while the long 
term reimbursement decision can be postponed until more robust evidence of the 
performance of the technology in daily practice has become available [146, 147].
Some countries have already implemented some form of conditional reimbursement as 
a policy instrument for health care allocation decisions, as for example US, Canada, UK, 
Australia, France, Sweden and Belgium [24, 148, 149, 150, 149, 150]. In the Netherlands, 
conditional reimbursement was implemented in 2006 to ensure early access to new 
expensive inpatient drugs, with a budget impact of at least €2.5 million. In 2013, this 
policy was extended to a selected groups of outpatient drugs that met the criteria for 
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temporary reimbursement. If a drug is conditionally reimbursed, hospitals receive an ad-
ditional ear-marked budget to cover the expenses. This is combined with the obligation 
to gather data on appropriate use and cost-effectiveness in real-world clinical practice. 
After four years an evaluation is carried out to inform the final reimbursement decision 
[148, 151].
First experiences of countries using conditional reimbursement in practice showed that 
the re-assessment process appears to be a complex and politically sensitive procedure 
[152]. Therefore, researches and policy makers primarily aim to determine the conditions 
under which conditional reimbursement can be considered a feasible or optimal strat-
egy and the type of evidence that needs to be gathered during the period of conditional 
coverage [153, 154]. Nevertheless, withdrawing funding for a technology that has been 
implemented and reimbursed –even if this was labelled as ‘conditional’– appears to be 
far from straightforward.
A traditional reimbursement decision is typically related to allowing a new technology 
to either enter or not enter the health (insurance) system. Given that the technology was 
not yet funded this implies the status quo (not entering) or a gain (entering). Under con-
ditional reimbursement, the second (‘final’) decision is either to continue funding (status 
quo) or to end –temporary- funding, which may be considered a loss. This difference is 
by no means trivial. Once a technology like a pharmaceutical is used in practice, ending 
reimbursement may be less feasible than deciding not to reimburse in the first place, 
in particular when the technology was proven to be effective in practice, but not cost-
effective. This relates to the general tendency to value equally sized gains and losses 
differently, with losses looming larger than gains. This phenomenon of loss aversion is a 
well-known aspect of prospect theory [26, 155].
In the context of allocation decisions loss aversion may imply that policy makers may 
be willing to accept higher cost-per-QALY ratios for technologies already reimbursed 
(under conditional reimbursement) than they would accept for technologies not yet 
reimbursed (in the conventional decision making context). So far, this asymmetry in 
removing something from the package versus allowing something in the package has 
remained largely unexplored. The aim of this study was to investigate how policy makers 
and the general public in the Netherlands value removing an existing treatment from 
the basic benefits package relative to not including a new treatment in the first place, 
in the context of health care allocation decisions. That is, we investigate the value of re-
moving an existing treatment from the basic benefits package relative to not including 
a new treatment in the first place. In other words, is stopping indeed more difficult than 
not starting? A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was designed to investigate prefer-
ences for different technologies, with a set of relevant criteria for health care allocation 
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decisions obtained from the literature and information on the current reimbursement 
status of the treatment as choice attributes. Data was collected both from health care 
policy makers and the general public.
6.2. MEtHODs
6.2.1. Discrete choice experiments
DCEs have proven to be a useful method to elicit individuals’ preferences in health care 
decision making [70, 97]. DCEs are based on random utility theory, which assumes that 
a respondent, confronted with a choice between different scenarios, always chooses the 
alternative that gives the highest utility. The utility of alternative j in a choice situation 
for respondent n is given by:
Eq 6.1  Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj
Unsj can be separated into two components, Vnsj, the observed component of utility, and 
εnsj, the residual unobserved component. The observed component of utility is assumed 
to be a linear relationship of attribute levels, x, of each alternative j and their correspond-
ing parameter weights, β, such that:
Eq 6.2  Unsj = λj   
k
∑
k=1
+ βkxnjk + εnsj
where βnk denotes the marginal utility associated with attribute k for respondent n. In 
the basic multinomial logit model the unobserved component, εnsj, is assumed to be 
independently and identically (IID) extreme value type 1 (EV1) distributed [73, 97].
6.2.2. identification and presentation of attributes and levels
The focus of this study was to explore how policy makers and the general public value 
removing an existing treatment from the basic benefits package relative to not includ-
ing a new treatment in the first place. Therefore, the main attribute of this study was 
the current reimbursement status of a treatment. To emphasize the fact that a certain 
treatment was not only reimbursed but also used by patients, the levels of the attribute 
were defined as ‘existing treatment, currently reimbursed and used in practice’, and ‘new 
treatment, currently not reimbursed and not used in practice’.
Besides this main attribute of the study, additional criteria potentially relevant in health 
care allocations decisions were identified from the literature. Recent related studies 
by Koopmanschap et al. [156] and Van de Wetering et al. [97] were used as primary 
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sources of information for potentially relevant choice attributes in the Dutch policy 
context. Based on the literature, the following additional attributes were selected: age 
of patients, quality of life before treatment, health gain from treatment, cost per QALY, 
budget impact and probability that the cost per QALY would double. The attributes 
and corresponding levels were identical for policy makers and the general public. An 
overview of the attributes and the corresponding levels can be found in Table 6.1.
Since the general public is less familiar with the terminology and the common interpre-
tation of absolute levels of cost effectiveness and budget impact in the policy context, 
we gave them an indication whether a certain level could be considered favourable or 
not (Table 6.1).
The attributes, levels and presentation of choice sets were pilot-tested in a sample 
of 156 respondents of the general public. To be able to evaluate the attributes and 
construction of the design, a number of questions concerning the complexity, plausi-
bility and comprehensibility of the choice options were added to the pilot study (see 
Appendix 6.1). The pilot study revealed that 39.7% of the respondents thought it was 
difficult to opt for one of the groups in the choice sets. However, from respondents’ 
explanations to this question it appeared that this was mainly due to the fact that 
table 6.1 Attributes and levels
Attributes Levels*
Age of patients (AGE)
in years
15, 40, 65, 90
Quality of life before treatment (QOL)
scale 0-100
5, 30, 55, 80
Health gain from treatment for one year 
(GAIN)
scale 0-100
5, 10, 15, 20
Reimbursement status of treatment 
(STATUS)
Existing treatment, currently reimbursed and used in practice
New treatment, currently not reimbursed and not used in practice
Cost per QALY (ICER)
€ 10.000 (very favourable)
€ 50.000 (favourable)
€ 90.000 (unfavourable)
€ 130.000 (very unfavourable)
Budget impact (BUDGET)
€ 5 million (very low)
€ 30 million (low)
€ 55 million (high)
€ 80 million (very high)
The probability that the cost per QALY 
will double (UNCERTAINTY)
10%
15%
20%
25%
Note: * Labels between brackets were only shown to the general public.
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people preferred not to choose between groups of patients at all. The results showed 
that 65.4% of the respondents took all attributes in consideration while making their 
decision. The attribute which was most often considered important was health gain as 
a result of treatment, followed by quality of life before treatment and age. Only 44% of 
the respondents considered the probability that the cost per QALY would double to 
be an important argument for their choice between groups of patients. Finally, people 
were asked whether they had sufficient information to make a well-considered decision; 
17.9% of the respondents answered that they needed additional information, predomi-
nantly on the personal circumstances of the patients, the success rate of treatment and 
the life expectancy after treatment. Given that more than 80% of respondents indicated 
that the scenarios provided sufficient information and the large variety in proposed ad-
ditional attributes for the experiment, with limited support for each, the design of the 
study was left unchanged.
6.2.3. Questionnaire
The questionnaire started with a short introduction and a detailed description of all at-
tributes included in the study. Respondents were asked to imagine themselves being a 
policy maker facing allocation decisions in health care. They were then asked to imagine 
that there were two comparable treatments in consideration for reimbursement. The 
two treatments only differed in terms of the attributes in the choice sets. Due to a lim-
ited budget, only one of the treatments could be included in the basic benefits package. 
The respondents were asked which of the two treatments they, as policy makers in the 
health care sector, would prefer to include in the basic benefits package. They could also 
opt for neither (see Figure 6.1 for an example of a choice scenario).
The program Ngene 1.1 was used to generate an efficient multinomial logit design for 
the main study. An efficient design attempts to optimize the information obtained from 
each choice set by minimizing the predicted standard errors of the parameters. The 
D-error, which is the most widely used measure of efficiency, was used to determine 
the efficiency of the design [74]. The estimates of the pilot study were used as Bayesian 
priors for the main study. Bayesian priors optimize on prior distributions instead of on 
fixed parameters which makes them more robust to misspecification [74]. Furthermore, 
we used 1,000 Halton sequence draws and included all interaction effects between at-
tributes. Halton draws are more effective than random draws because they are based on 
a set of values which are well spaced over the distribution [73].
A design with 24 choice sets was generated. For the general public the choice sets were 
divided over 3 versions with 8 choice tasks using a blocking variable. The questionnaire 
for policy makers consisted of 2 versions with 12 choice tasks each. Respondents were 
randomly assigned to one of the versions of the questionnaire. The alternatives were 
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unlabelled and the choice sets were randomized within blocks to avoid order biases 
in the results. The questionnaire for the general public also included two control ques-
tions to detect inconsistent respondents: one dominant choice set was presented as 
first choice set in all versions, also to introduce and familiarise respondents with the 
type of questions. In addition, the fourth choice set was repeated as the last choice set, 
but with left and right placed scenarios reversed. If a respondent chose the dominated 
scenario in the first choice and reversed preferences in the last choice, the respondent 
was removed from the dataset. Furthermore, based on the pilot study we set a minimum 
meaningful completion time for the ten choice sets in the general public sample of 
150 seconds. Finally, policy makers were presented three follow-up questions to verify 
and better understand their responses to the DCE (see Appendix 6.1), which were also 
included in the pilot study.
6.2.4. Data collection
The questionnaire was distributed by a professional Internet survey company to a rep-
resentative sample of the Dutch adult population in terms of gender, age and level of 
education. In addition, a convenience sample of (future) policy makers in health care in 
the Netherlands was invited to participate in this study to get insight into their prefer-
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



 


 

 

 
Figure 6.1: Example of choice scenario
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ences. Policy makers were invited personally by email, using the professional networks 
of the researchers conducting this study. Participants included policy makers from the 
National Health Care Institute and other policy makers and (academic) HTA experts 
involved directly or indirectly in the process of health care allocation decisions in the 
Netherlands. In addition, a sample of PhD and master students with a background in 
health economics and health policy were invited to participate, as potential future 
policy makers or advisors. The student sample received an incentive of for participation 
(i.e., a €10 gift card).
Prior to the start of the questionnaire, respondents were informed about the purpose of 
the study, told that participation was voluntary and anonymous, and requested to give 
informed consent.
6.2.5. Analyses
The deterministic components of the elemental alternatives for each age group were 
represented by:
Eq 6.3  VA/λ =   β1AGE+ β2QOL + β3GAIN + β4STATUS + β5ICER+ β 6BUDGET+ 
β7UNCERTAINTY
 VB/λ=  β1AGE+ β2QOL + β3GAIN + β4STATUS + β5ICER+ β 6BUDGET+ 
β7UNCERTAINTY
 VC/λ= β0
where V is the deterministic component of the random utility function, λ is the scale 
parameter and βi are the parameters to be estimated. The coding of the corresponding 
variable is reported in Table 6.1. The constant terms represent the expected utility for no 
treatment over treatment.
To analyse the data we estimated MNL models as well as panel Mixed MNL models 
(MMNL), which allow for preference heterogeneity among the population by using ran-
dom parameters. Likelihood ratio tests were used to test different specifications of the 
utility functions (e.g. categorical or numerical attribute levels and interaction effects) on 
the dataset of the general public. Dummy variables of quality of life before treatment 
and age were included in the model since they significantly improved the model fit. All 
variables were included as random variables with a normal distribution except for the 
ICER variable. The ICER variable was held fixed to avoid implausible welfare values [101, 
157]. The MMNL models were estimated with 1,000 Halton draws.
To assist interpretation of the model results we defined three scenarios and calculated 
for each scenario the compensation variation value (CV) and the difference in the prob-
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ability of acceptance between new and existing treatments. We defined an ‘average 
scenario’ where all attributes were set at the second level of the four level attributes, 
a worst case scenario, where all attributes were set at the least preferable level, and a 
best case scenario, where all attributes were set at the most preferable level, all from the 
perspective of the general public. The CV value reflects the welfare effect of a change 
in the attributes while taking into account the uncertainty regarding which alternative 
will be chosen in a DCE. The CV was calculated according to the Small and Rosen (1981) 
formula:
Eq 6.4 CV =
1
[In  
j
∑
j=1
ev
o
j – In  
j
∑
j=1
ev
1
j ]
λ
where λ is the marginal utility of income, V0 and V1 are the utilities of each alternative 
before and after the change, respectively, and j is the number of alternatives in each 
choice set [158]. Instead of income, the marginal utility of the ICER attribute was used 
in this study to express the effect of conditional reimbursement. We took 10,000 Halton 
draws from the estimated distributions of the random parameters to simulate the CV 
using the above formula. The reported CV values are the means over these 10,000 rep-
lications [159, 160]. The probabilities of acceptances were simulated over the data with 
the simulation feature in Nlogit 5.0 [161, 162].
The calculations of CV and probabilities of acceptance eliminate the scale between dif-
ferent datasets which makes is possible to directly compare the results between the 
general public and policy makers.
6.3. REsuLts
Demographic characteristics of the general public and policy makers are provided in 
Table 6.2. The sample of the general public (n=1,169) was representative for the Dutch 
population in terms of age, gender and level of education. A total of 90 of the 156 invited 
(future) policy makers completed the questionnaire (57.7% completion rate). Among 
these respondents, 22.2% identified as policy makers, employed at the National Health 
Care Institute of the Netherlands and 36.6% identified as policy makers or HTA experts 
indirectly involved in process of health care allocation decisions. 41.1 % of the sample 
consisted of PhD and master students in health economics and health policy.
The results of the MNL and the MMNL models for the general public and the policy mak-
ers are presented in Table 6.3. The MMNL models performed significantly better than 
the corresponding MNL models. The standard deviations of almost all parameters were 
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statistically significant, which reflects heterogeneity in preferences and thus supports 
the use of panel MMNL models.
6.3.1. general public
In the general public sample, all random parameters were statistically significant. This 
indicates that all attributes included in the design had a significant effect on respon-
dents’ choices. The coefficients of the attributes represent their relative importance for 
respondents, while the statistically significant positive constant term shows that respon-
dents preferred choosing one of two treatments over neither of both. All attributes in 
the model performed as expected with respect to the signs of the coefficients.
The results show that the general public preferred reimbursement of an existing treat-
ment that is currently reimbursed and used in practice over reimbursement of a new 
treatment, currently not reimbursed or used in practice. Furthermore, respondents 
preferred treatments for relatively younger patients over treatments for older patients 
and treatments with relatively larger health gains. A higher cost per QALY, a higher bud-
get impact or a higher probability that the cost per QALY will double, all significantly 
reduced the probability of selection of a treatment for reimbursement. Furthermore, 
respondents preferred treatments targeting patients with relatively lower initial health 
states except for a health state of 5 units of quality of life before treatment. The negative 
coefficient for the initial health state of 5 units of quality of life indicates that respon-
dents have a negative preference to treat this particular groups of patients compared to 
patients with an initial quality of life of 80 units. All standard deviations were significant, 
which shows considerable preference heterogeneity in the sample over all attributes.
6.3.2. Policy makers
The results in the policy makers sample were very similar to those in the general public, 
with the lowest level of the quality of life before treatment attribute as only exception. All 
random parameters were statistically significant, indicating that all attributes included 
table 6.2: Demographic variables
Variable Category general public
(n=1,169)
Policy makers
(n=90)
Gender Female 49.0% 55.6%
Male 51.0% 42.2%
Prefer not to say - 2.2%
Age Mean (SD; min-max) 48.8 (15.5; 18-75) 37.0 (11.5; 22-62)
Education status Low 31.6% -
Middle 43.5% -
High 24.9% 100%
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in the design significantly influenced the reimbursement decisions of policy makers. 
Also for policy makers, removing an existing treatment from the basics benefits package 
significantly reduced utility as compared to not including a new treatment in the first 
place. There was significant preference heterogeneity in the sample with respect to all 
attributes included in the model.
The results of the questions presented to policy makers after the DCE (see appendix 6.1) 
are shown in Table 6.4. Only 38.9% of the policy makers considered all attributes in their 
table 6.3: Results MNL and Mixed MNL
Variable general Public Policy makers
MnL MMnL MnL MMnL
Age of patientsa 40 -0.357*** -0.611*** -0.478*** -1.122***
65 -0.455*** -0.903*** -0.915*** -1.829***
90 -1.661*** -3.108*** -2.488*** -6.685***
Quality of life before treatmentb 55 0.190*** 0.369*** 1.115*** 2.446***
30 0.122*** 0.193*** 1.548*** 3.561***
5 -0.186*** -0.392*** 1.472*** 3.567***
Health gain from treatment 0.025*** 0.051*** 0.075*** 0.179***
New treatment -0.085*** -0.108** -0.340*** -0.489*
Cost per QALY (euro/QALY) -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.016*** -0.034***
Budget impact (euro) -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.035***
Probability that the cost per QALY will double (%) -0.008*** -0.008* -0.006 -0.045*
Constant 2.464*** 4.850*** 2.511*** 5.368***
SD random parameters
Age of patientsa 40 1.132*** 1.119***
65 1.717*** 1.514***
90 2.948*** 3.678***
Quality of life before treatmentb 55 0.881*** 1.519***
30 1.408*** 2.711***
5 1.826*** 4.226***
Health gain from treatment 0.054*** 0.160***
Include new treatment 0.536*** 1.637***
Budget impact (euro) 0.011*** 0.026***
Probability that the cost per QALY will double (%) 0.031** 0.163***
Constant 3.557*** 4.621***
Log-likelihood at zero -10274.222 -1186.501
Log-likelihood at convergence -8166.054 -7100.122 -780.272 -677.164
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.309 0.429
Note: a reference level: 15. b reference level: 80. ***, **, *: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level; MNL: multinomial 
logit model. MMNL: mixed multinomial logit model. SD: standard deviations.
121
The risk of conditional reimbursement: stopping reimbursement can be more difficult than not starting in the first place!
6
decision. Policy makers rated quality of life before treatment and health gain as a result 
of treatment as the most important characteristics for their decision to include a treat-
ment in de basic benefits package. Remarkably, the current status of treatment in the 
basic benefits package was most frequently valued as unimportant; 60% considered this 
attribute unimportant and only 18.9% thought it was important for their decisions. This 
seems to contradict the results of the DCE, since it showed a significant coefficient in 
the MMNL model. The probability that the cost will double was insignificant in the MNL 
model, while the answers on the statements show that about half of the respondents 
considered this important.
Half of the policy makers indicated that they needed more information than the at-
tributes included in the design to be able to make a well-considered decision about 
reimbursement of treatments. The additional information they desired included: more 
detailed information about the disease (e.g. symptoms and life expectancy) and the 
treatment (e.g. prevalence), duration and side effects of the treatment, and the available 
scientific evidence.
6.3.3. Compensating variation and probability of acceptance
Table 6.5 shows the results of the CV and the differences in probability of acceptance 
between new and existing treatments, both for the general public and policy makers. 
The CV values reflect the acceptable increase in ICER for an existing treatment compared 
to a new treatment. This means that for the average scenario with an ICER of €50.000 the 
general public would accept an €7.360 higher ICER for an existing treatment compared 
to a new treatment. For both the general public and policy makers, CV is the lowest for 
the least preferred scenarios which seems reasonable since these scenarios will not be 
chosen by most respondents. The CV of the most preferred scenarios are the highest. 
Policy makers are willing to accept higher ICER ratios for existing treatments compared 
to new treatments than the general public, except for the least preferred scenario.
table 6.4: Statements policy makers (n=90)
Variable
(very)
important neutral
(very)
unimportant
Age of patients 86.7 5.5 7.8
Quality of life 92.3 3.3 4.5
Health gain 92.2 4.4 3.3
Reimbursement status of treatment 18.9 21.1 60.0
Cost per QALY 76.7 8.9 14.4
Budget impact 52.2 28.9 18.9
Probability that the cost per QALY will double 17.8 35.5 46.7
Chapter 6
122
As shown by the positive values of the change in probability of acceptance between 
new and existing treatments, existing treatments have a higher chance of acceptance 
compared to new treatments. For the average scenario, an existing treatment had a 1.1% 
higher probability of acceptance compared to a new treatment in the sample of the 
general public, a 2.8% higher probability in the sample of policy makers. The magnitude 
of change in probability of acceptance was not large. Both for the general public and 
policy makers the difference was lowest in the least preferred scenario and highest in 
the most preferred scenario.
Overall, policy makers appear to be more sensitive to the current status of treatment 
than the general public.
6.4. DisCussiOn
Conditional reimbursement is increasingly recognized as a useful policy instrument 
for health care allocation decisions. However, conditional reimbursement changes the 
decision making process, since the decision to end reimbursement of a technology 
after a period of time, in which additional evidence was gathered on effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness in daily practice, differs from the decision not to reimburse a technol-
ogy in the first place. The main objective of this study was to explore how the Dutch 
general public and policy makers in health care value existing treatments relative to 
table 6.5: Changes in predicted probability of acceptance and the compensation variation value if the 
intervention already exist (compared to new intervention)
Average
scenario
Least preferred 
scenario (gP)
Most preferred 
scenario (gP)
Attributes
Age of patients 40 90 15
Quality of life before treatment 30 5 55
Health gain from treatment 10 5 20
Include new treatment New -> existing New -> existing New -> existing
ICER € 50.000 € 130.000 € 10.000
Budget impact € 30 million € 80 million € 5 million
Probability that the cost per QALY will double 15% 25% 10%
Differences between an existing treatment compared to a new treatment within each scenario
Change in predicted probability (general public) + 1.1% +0.86% + 1.3%
Change in predicted probability (policy makers) + 2.8 % + 1.7% + 4.2 %
CV general public ICER (euro) € 7.360 € 4.146 €7.414
CV policy makers € 7.959 € 60 € 7.971
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new treatments. The results of the discrete choice experiment showed that both the 
general public and policy makers preferred to reimburse an existing technology, which 
is already reimbursed and used in practice, over reimbursing a new technology, which 
is currently not reimbursed or used. This finding may have important implications for 
the consideration to use conditional reimbursement as policy instrument for allocation 
decisions.
The result of the MMNL models showed the relative importance of the different attri-
butes in the choice sets. The magnitude of the coefficients are not directly comparable 
between the samples of the general public and the policy makers due to differences in 
scale. However, the signs and the significance of the attributes were very comparable 
between the two data sets, with the exception of patients in a very poor health state be-
fore treatment. The results of the general public showed a negative preference to treat 
patients in a very poor health state. Although this may seem counterintuitive, previous 
studies showed similar results and hypothesized that people may consider the health 
state after treatment rather than before treatment in their decisions which treatment to 
prioritize. If patients remain in a poor health state after treatment, this reduces the prob-
ability for a treatment to be reimbursed [14, 70, 163]. Since the maximum health gain in 
this study was 20 Qol units, the reluctance to allocate resources to patients with very low 
health state before treatment (i.e., QoL 5), who would remain in a poor health state after 
treatment (i.e., in the best case improve to QoL 25), may be a reasonable explanation 
for this finding. In the policy makers sample the sign of the coefficient of quality of life 
before treatment was in the anticipated direction, indicating that policy makers give 
lower priority to treatments for relatively healthy patients (i.e. QoL 80).
The compensating variation values and the changes of probability of acceptance 
provided the opportunity to directly compare the effect of conditional reimbursement 
between the general public and policy makers. Both preferred to reimburse an existing 
treatment over a new treatment, ceteris paribus. Although differences were small, policy 
makers appeared to be more sensitive to the current status of the treatment than the 
general public. For instance, in the average scenario, the general public was willing to 
accept a €7.360 higher ICER for an existing treatment as compared to a new treatment. 
While it might be expected that policy makers are not sensitive to the process of the 
allocation decision, they were willing to accept a €7.959 higher ICER for an existing treat-
ment as compared to a new treatment. Apparently, policy makers are more aware of the 
political consequences of ending reimbursement than expected.
After completing the DCE, policy makers were presented with a number of statements 
related to the attributes of the choice experiment. The responses to these statements 
were not completely consistent with the choices made in the DCE. For example, the 
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attribute ‘status of treatment’ was significant in the DCE but the response to the corre-
sponding statement showed that only 18% of the policy makers thought this character-
istic was important for their decisions, and 60% even thought it was unimportant. These 
differences may of course stem from the different methods used to elicit preferences. 
The DCE elicits relative preferences of the different attributes while the statements focus 
on one attribute at the time. Previous studies have already highlighted that different 
methods and different study contexts tend to produce different results [163]. Therefore, 
our results should be interpreted with caution and more research is required to confirm 
these findings.
Apart from the general limitations of online surveys and discrete choice experiments, 
some limitations deserve explicit mentioning here. The significant standard deviations 
of the coefficients indicated that there was considerable heterogeneity in preferences in 
both samples. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Some standard 
deviations were larger than the relevant coefficient which implies that preferences 
switch sign within the sample. For example, in both samples the status of the treatment 
attribute had a negative coefficient, indicating a negative preference for removing a 
treatment from the basic benefits package. However, the size of the standard deviation 
showed that a considerable proportion of the respondents had a positive preference for 
this attribute, indicating a preference for new treatments over existing ones. In addition, 
although the sample of the general public was representative for the Dutch population 
and therefore has some external validity, the policy makers concerned a convenience 
sample and therefore the external validity of these results is questionable. Obtaining a 
sizeable and representative sample of policy makers proved very challenging, as many 
different people in different roles and organizations are involved in the process; it is 
therefore difficult to define clear sampling criteria, let alone get access to this sample. 
We have attempted to collect a relevant dataset for the purposes of this study, by purpo-
sively recruiting a considerable number of representatives from important stakeholder 
settings in the decision making process in the Netherlands, complemented with PhD 
and master students in training as health economists and policy makers. Although this 
sample was small and possibly selective, we think that the sample provided interesting 
information for the aim of this study. Finally, the pilot study showed that about 40% of 
respondents found it was difficult to choose between groups of patients in the scenarios. 
This was not because the choice options were not clear or too difficult, but because they 
preferred not to choose at all. Some recent studies into societal preferences for resource 
allocation [164, 165] observed similar preferences, related to an egalitarian view on 
resource allocation –giving everyone equal access to care - and an apparent denial of 
the scarcity of health care budgets – giving everyone access to all the care they need. 
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To circumvent that respondents with such a preference were forced choosing between 
groups of patients an opt-out option was offered.
Overall, this study showed that the impact of excluding a treatment from the basic ben-
efits package on the utility both the general public and policy makers in the Netherlands 
is higher than including that same treatment. In other words, stopping reimbursement 
seems more difficult than not starting reimbursement in the first place. We may conclude 
from these results that conditional reimbursement evokes loss aversion, suggesting that 
higher cost-effectiveness ratios are considered acceptable for existing treatments than 
for new treatments. This has important implications for allocation decisions in health 
care, in particular because this suggests that the decision making process directly influ-
ences the outcome of a reimbursement decision. Policy makers should be aware of this 
potential risk when they consider conditional reimbursement as a policy instrument.
More research is required to further investigate the possible consequences of conditional 
reimbursement for the allocation of scarce resources in health care. It would be interest-
ing to replicate this study in other countries considering or already using conditional 
reimbursement as a policy instrument for health care allocation decisions.
APPEnDix 6.1: ADDitiOnAL QuEstiOns FOR PiLOt stuDY AnD POLiCY 
MAkERs
 
 
 
 

   
  
       
       
       
       
       
       


      

 

 

 
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ABstRACt
Economic evaluations typically value the effects of an intervention in terms of Quality-
Adjusted Life-Years, which combine length and health-related quality of life. It has 
been suggested that economic evaluations should incorporate broader outcomes than 
health-related quality of life. Broader well-being, for instance measured as happiness, 
could be a better measure of the overall welfare effects in patients due to treatment.
An underexplored question is whether and how people trade-off information on health 
and broader outcomes from treatment in rationing decisions. This paper presents the 
results of a first experiment aimed to explore such trade-offs between health and hap-
piness.
We used a web-based questionnaire in a representative sample of the public from the 
Netherlands (n=1,015). People made choices between two groups of patients differing 
in terms of their health and happiness levels before treatment and gains from treatment.
The results show that about half of the respondents were willing to discriminate 
between patient groups based on their health and happiness levels before and after 
treatment. In this trader group, health gains were considered somewhat more important 
than happiness gains. However, our findings suggest that both health and happiness 
levels of patients may play a role in priority-setting.
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7.1. intRODuCtiOn
Economic evaluations can support informed decision making regarding the optimal 
allocation of scarce resources. An important issue is to decide what it is that should be 
optimized through these decisions. In health care the answer to that question has often 
been ‘health’, measured and valued in some acceptable way [5]. In the field of health care 
this focus on the value of health as outcome measure may be considered a logical one, 
as many interventions will aim to improve the health of beneficiaries. Health benefits of 
interventions can be measured using clinical outcome measures, but in the context of 
economic evaluations, Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs), capturing length and health-
related quality of life, are often recommended as measure of outcome [1, 6, 28].
Nonetheless, there is increasing debate on whether other, broader outcome measures 
may be more appropriate for use in economic evaluations [10]. An important reason for 
this is that the narrow focus on the value of health (or health-related quality of life in QA-
LYs) may not always align well with the goals of interventions in the health care sector. 
For instance, in long-term care, the aim of interventions may not be to improve ‘health’ 
(alone), but to contribute to overall wellbeing, including elements such as autonomy 
and security. In such cases, outcome measures capable of capturing wellbeing may be 
better suited to capture the full benefits of interventions [10]. Alternative measures that 
aim to capture wellbeing outcomes have been proposed, such as the multi-attribute in-
struments ICEpop CAPability measure for Older people (ICECAP-O) [166, 167], and Adult 
Social Care Outcomes Toolkit (ASCOT) [168], but also subjective wellbeing measured 
as happiness [10, 28, 169]. In the rest of this paper, we will use the terms (subjective) 
wellbeing and happiness interchangeably, as happiness could be seen as a representa-
tion of overall wellbeing [32], of which health is one (important) element.
Subjective wellbeing has also been advocated as an alternative outcome measure be-
cause it would better reflect experienced utility from health changes, as appreciated in 
real life, while QALY calculations are commonly based on expected utility, as anticipated 
when making decisions [170, 171]. Due to mechanisms such as adaptation and coping, 
experienced utility may be higher than expected utility [12, 172]. One may therefore 
claim that using QALYs in allocation decisions protects patients against the consequenc-
es of adaptation, since adaptation reduces the utility gain from treatment. However, at 
the same time, QALY scores do not represent the full wellbeing gains of patients, and 
therefore may discriminate against those diseases in which adaptation is more difficult 
(e.g. mental illness) [173, 174].
This debate highlights important differences of opinion about the content of what 
should be optimized (health or wellbeing) and how these concepts should be opera-
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tionalized and valued. The discussions on appropriate outcome measures in (economic 
evaluations of ) health care will likely continue, including whether such alternative 
outcome measures should replace or complement health (or health-related quality of 
life) outcomes. While more theoretical debates about this issue remain crucial, empirical 
studies can highlight how trade-offs between different outcome measures are made.
An important question for instance is how allocation decisions in health care would be 
affected when information is provided on changes in both health and subjective wellbe-
ing of patients. This could indicate whether people focus on either of the two outcomes 
in allocating scarce health care resources, or trade them off. In the latter case, their 
relative importance in allocation decisions obviously becomes interesting. This note 
presents a first, explorative study to investigate this. We asked members of the public 
from the Netherlands to choose between treatment of two groups of patients, differing 
in terms of health and happiness levels before treatment and gains from treatment.
In the experiment, we focus on the question whether respondents in prioritising pa-
tients in health care focus on health or happiness levels and gains, or use both types 
of information. We chose happiness as outcome measure next to health, since it is 
intuitively understandable for respondents. In the experiment, we focus purely on the 
issue of outcome measure (health or happiness), and, by using health and happiness 
ratings, not on experienced or expected utility. Our results therefore provide first insight 
in the intriguing and largely unexplored question of whether and how people trade-off 
information on health and happiness gains from treatments in the context of health 
care.
7.2. stuDY DEsign AnD HYPOtHEsEs
A web-based questionnaire was designed in which respondents were asked to imagine 
being a healthcare decision maker facing priority-setting decisions between two groups 
of patients that only differed in the amount of health and happiness they had and could 
gain from treatment.
First, respondents were asked to rate their own health and happiness on a VAS scale, to 
familiarize them with the outcome measures and measurement scale used in the experi-
ment. Then, they were asked to make treatment choices between groups of patients, us-
ing three distinct scenarios. In all three scenarios, both patient groups were described 
as being healthy and happy, with levels of 9 on scales from ‘worst conceivable health’ [0] 
to ‘best conceivable health’ [10] and ‘completely unhappy’ [0] to ‘completely happy’ [10] 
before the onset of illness. Next, respondents were informed that each group would be 
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affected by a different (unspecified) illness, with diverging effects on their health and 
happiness levels. It was specified that happiness could be affected differently due to 
health changes, for instance because of the impairing effects of illness on daily activities 
and the possibility of adaptation to illness. Finally, respondents were informed that the 
group receiving treatment would return to their original levels of health and happiness 
(i.e., 9 on a scale from 0 to 10), whereas the group not receiving treatment would remain 
at the lower levels of health and happiness indefinitely. Groups were said to be of the 
same size, and costs of treatment identical (see Appendix 7.1 for an example question). 
The three scenarios only differed in terms of the size of the effect of illness on health and 
happiness.
In scenario 1 respondents were asked to choose between two groups of patients experi-
encing the same effect of illness on their health, but different effects on their happiness, 
with Group A suffering less in terms of happiness than Group B. Hence, if respondents 
Health 7 
Happiness 6 
Group B Group A 
Which group would 
you, as policy maker, 
provide treatment? 
Which group would 
you, as policy maker, 
provide treatment? 
Are you sure? 
Yes No 
Health 7 
Happiness 8 
I can’t choose between 
the two groups, for me 
both are equally 
important to receive 
treatment 
Health 8 
Happiness 6 
Group B Group A 
Health 7 
Happiness 8 
I can’t choose between 
the two groups, for me 
both are equally 
important to receive 
treatment 
Please explain 
(multiple choice) 
Which group would 
you, as policy maker, 
provide treatment? 
Health 7.5 
Happiness  6   
Group B Group A 
Health 7 
Happiness 8 
Which group would 
you, as policy maker, 
provide treatment? 
Health 8.5 
Happiness  6   
Group B Group A 
Health 7 
Happiness 8 
I can’t choose between 
the two groups, for me 
both are equally 
important to receive 
treatment 
Please indicate for 
which level of health 
(between 7 and 7.5) 
both groups are 
equally important to 
receive treatment. 
Please indicate for 
which level of health 
(between 7.5 and 8) 
both groups are 
equally important to 
receive treatment. 
Please indicate for 
which level of health 
(between 8 and 8.5) 
both groups are 
equally important to 
receive treatment. 
Please indicate for 
which level of health 
(between 8.5 and 9) 
both groups are 
equally important to 
receive treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 Always prefer 
group B 
Are you sure? 
Yes No 
Please explain 
(open field) 
Note: Example concerns scenario 1, version 1: Group A and happiness Group B were fixed, health Group B varied to look for 
indifference. Multiple choice options in case indifferent between Groups A and B: (1) Everyone is equally important to treat, 
irrespective of differences in happiness; (2) The effect of treatment on happiness should not be taken into account; (3) The 
difference in happiness is not large enough to prioritize the one group over the other; (4) Other, namely … [open field]. 
Figure 7.1: Example of the iteration process
Chapter 7
134
considered only health to be relevant, they would be indifferent between treating A or 
B. If they considered only happiness or both health and happiness to be relevant, they 
would prefer to treat Group B. In choice 1, Group A is a dominated choice and therefore 
considered as an inconsistent response; respondents selecting this group were asked 
to explain (see Figure 7.1) and were further disregarded for this scenario. In order to 
determine the point of indifference for treating either group, the status of Group A 
was held constant in following treatment choices and the health effect in Group B was 
adjusted up- or downwards based on the previous treatment choice of the respondent 
(see Figure 7.1 for an example of the iteration process). After a maximum of three choices 
(i.e., ➊ to ➌ in Figure 7.1) respondents were asked to indicate the health effect in Group 
B that, given the difference in happiness effect, would make them indifferent between 
providing treatment to group A or group B (i.e., ➍ in Figure 7.1). In case respondents 
chose Group A in choice 1 they were asked to explain their choice (open field). When 
respondents indicated to be indifferent between the groups at any stage in the scenario, 
they were asked to clarify their choice (multiple choice; see note to Figure 7.1).
Scenario 2 was very similar to scenario 1, except that now the two groups of patients 
experienced the same effect on their happiness levels but different effects on their 
health levels. Subsequently, the effect of illness on the happiness level of group B was 
varied to determine the respondent’s indifference point. In scenario 3 the starting levels 
of both health and happiness were varied in order to offer respondents a wider range 
to trade-off outcomes. The results of Scenario 3 are not presented in any detail here. 
From the many inconsistent choices (and explanations of them in relation to follow-up 
statements), we concluded that this last scenario had been too complex (at least in the 
presented online format) for respondents and was therefore excluded from the analysis.
The questionnaire consisted of four versions with different starting levels for health and 
happiness (see Table 7.2 for scenario 1 & Table 7.3 for scenario 2). The units of change 
in health or happiness were constant over the versions (Figure 7.1) except for version 4. 
Given the low starting levels before treatment in version 4, the units of change in health/
happiness were doubled in order to cover the entire evaluation space within three ques-
tions. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four versions and completed 
the scenarios in a fixed order. Next, respondents were presented with six statements 
related to the choice experiments (Table 7.1) which were included to verify and better 
understand the choices respondents made. Finally, some socio-demographic data were 
collected.
Two hypotheses were formulated for this experiment:
(A) People consider both the effects on health and happiness in health care decision 
making.
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(B) People consider health to be more important than happiness for health care priority-
setting.
For the analysis, respondents were divided into ‘traders’ and ‘non-traders’ subgroups. 
Respondents expressing indifference between the groups of patients throughout the 
experiment, apparently unwilling to trade-off health and happiness in priority setting, 
were assigned to the ‘non-traders’ subgroup. Differences between the subgroups in 
background characteristics and response to the six follow-up statements were explored. 
For respondents in the ‘traders’ subgroup, relative weights of health and happiness gains 
were calculated for each scenario by dividing the level differences at the indifference 
point. In case respondents indicated to ‘always prefer group B’ (see Figure 7.1, bottom 
right), the point of indifference for health or happiness was set to the original level 
before illness (i.e., 9), potentially leading to a ceiling effect in the results.
table 7.1: Summary statistics (n=1,015)
Variable traders (n=495) non-traders (n=520) P value
% Mean (SD) % Mean (SD)
Gender (female) 43.8 55.0 0.000
Age 39.1 (13.1) 42.3 (12.4) 0.000
Level of education*
- Low 11.7 14.2
- Middle 50.9 53.5
- High 37.4 32.3 0.005
Health Status 78.6 (17.7) 78.4 (17.5) 0.900
Happiness 71.1 (18.6) 74.0 (19.1) 0.014
Statements
-  All patients are equally entitled to 
health care, irrespective of the effect of 
the illness on their happiness†
5.5 (1.6) 6.2 (1.5) 0.000
-  The ultimate goal of the health care 
system is to promote health†
5.6 (1.6) 5.8 (1.5) 0.004
-  The ultimate goal of the health care 
system is to promote happiness†
4.3 (1.6) 4.2 (1.7) 0.133
-  Happiness is more important than 
health†
3.6 (1.7) 3.3 (1.5) 0.016
-  Health is more important than 
happiness†
4.7 (1.7) 4.6 (1.6) 0.626
-  A person that is unhealthy cannot be 
happy†
3.0 (1.8) 2.7 (1.7) 0.003
Note: * Low = lower vocational or primary school. Middle = middle vocational or secondary school. High = 
higher vocational or academic. †scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).
Chapter 7
136
table 7.2: Choices in scenario 1; underlined number varied with choices made (n=495)
Ver.
Baseline
health / 
happiness
n
initial choice
Always
prefer Ba
Weightsb sD Median
Health > 
happinessc
Happiness 
> healthdA B Dif.
1 7/8–7/6 135 17.8% 68.1% 14.1% 25.0% 0.61H = 1WB 0.32 0.5 0.285** -0.185
2 6/7–6/5 115 21.7% 48.7% 29.6% 23.0% 0.68H = 1WB 0.51 0.5 0.461** -0.317*
3 5/6–5/4 108 19.4% 47.2% 33.3% 15.7% 0.78H = 1WB 0.63 0.5 0.143 -0.206
4 4/5–4/3 137 28.5% 46.0% 25.5% 15.9% 0.88H = 1WB 0.80 0.5 0.339** -0.208
Note: *p<.05;**p<.01. a Percentage of those with initial choice ‘Group B’. b H=health, WB=wellbeing (happi-
ness). c Correlation coefficient between relative weight and agreement with statement ‘Health is more im-
portant than happiness’. d Correlation coefficient between relative weight and agreement with statement 
‘Happiness is more important than health’.
7.3. REsuLts
7.3.1. sample
The questionnaire was administered online to an internet panel and we obtained a 
sample of 1,015 respondents, representative of the population of the Netherlands in 
terms of age, gender and education level. About half of the sample (n= 520; 51.2%) was 
identified as non-trader. The other 495 respondents did trade off health and happiness 
in at least one of the scenarios and were assigned to the ‘traders’ subgroup. Non-traders 
were significantly older and more often female (Table 7.1). As explanation for not 
trading-off, 63.5% consistently answered that everyone is equally important to treat, 
irrespective of differences in happiness (scenario 1) or health (scenario 2).
Non-traders agreed more often with the statements “All patients are equally entitled to 
health care, irrespective of the effect of the illness on their happiness” and “The ultimate 
goal of the health care system is to promote health”, but less often with “Happiness is 
more important than health” and “A person that is unhealthy cannot be happy” (Table 
7.1).
Given their explanation to the choices in the scenario’s and their response to the state-
ments it seems that this subgroup largely consists of genuine non-traders, unwilling to 
differentiate between patient groups according to health or happiness levels in priority-
setting.
7.3.2. Health versus happiness trade-offs
Table 7.2 shows the choices of the traders in scenario 1. Respondents considered the 
effect on happiness (i.e., choose Group B) more often when the start level of health was 
higher. Overall health effects received more weight than happiness effects, but relative 
weights came closer to one when starting levels were lower. This may relate to a ceiling 
effect in the experiment, which is more likely when starting levels are higher.
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The sign of the correlation coefficients between relative weights and response to the 
statements ‘health is more important than happiness’ and ‘happiness is more important 
than health’ (see last column of Table 7.2) indicates a consistent preference for health 
over happiness.
Table 7.3 shows the choices in scenario 2. The distribution of initial choices was com-
parable to scenario 1, although respondents more often ‘always preferred group B’, 
the group with the lowest health level, irrespective of happiness level. This effect was 
stronger when the start level of health was lower. The relative weights of health and 
happiness were also comparable to those found in scenario 1, except in version 1. This 
is probably the result of a ceiling effect, as the relative weight in this version by design 
was lower than one. The correlation coefficients between weights and statements show 
that respondents still found health more important than happiness (see last column of 
Table 7.3).
7.4. DisCussiOn AnD COnCLusiOns
The aim of this explorative study was to gain more insight in the relative importance of 
health and happiness in health care priority setting by the members of the public. This 
experiment was performed against the background of the debate on broader outcome 
measures and experienced wellbeing in (economic evaluations of ) health care.
Before discussing the main implications of our findings, we stress that our experiment 
had some noteworthy limitations. First, the range in which respondents were able to 
trade-off happiness and health effects was relatively limited. Therefore, especially in the 
scenarios with higher starting levels respondents could not always indicate their indif-
ference point precisely. Secondly, the health attribute was always presented first (i.e. 
above) the happiness attribute in the choice sets and we varied only health in scenario 
1 and only happiness in scenario 2. This may have drawn respondents’ attention more 
table 7.3: Choices in scenario 2; underlined number varied with choices made (n=495)
Ver.
Baseline
health / 
happiness
n
initial choice Always
prefer 
Ba
Weightsb sD Median
Health > 
happinessc
Happiness 
> healthdA B Dif.
1 8/7–6/7 108 14.8% 68.5% 16.7% 29.0% 1H = 0.78 WB 0.27 1.0 -0.183 0 .271*
2 7/6–5/6 137 21.9% 65.5% 13.1% 32.0% 1H = 1.00 WB 0.46 1.0 -0.217* 0.323**
3 6/5–4/5 135 14.8% 57.8% 27.4% 42.0% 1H = 1.12 WB 0.70 0.95 -0.276* 0.203
4 5/4–3/4 115 14.8% 61.7% 23.5% 36.0% 1H = 1.35 WB 0.88 1.0 -0.242* -0.066
Note: *p<.05;**p<.01. a Percentage of those with initial choice ‘Group B’. b H=health, WB=wellbeing (happi-
ness). c Correlation coefficient between relative weight and agreement with statement ‘Health is more im-
portant than happiness’. d Correlation coefficient between relative weight and agreement with statement 
‘Happiness is more important than health’.
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to one attribute than to the order, possibly resulting in order or focus bias. In order to 
overcome these first two limitations, we designed scenario 3, in which health and hap-
piness levels were varied simultaneously. However, this proved to be too complex for 
respondents resulting in many inconsistent answers. Future studies may use simpler de-
signs or a different study setting (e.g. face-to-face). Thirdly, in order to keep the exercise 
as simple as possible, we asked respondents to trade-off health scores with happiness 
scores, without further definition. However, as warm-up question to familiarize respon-
dents with the outcome measures and measurement scale used in the experiment, they 
were asked about their own health and happiness levels. Nonetheless, respondents may 
have given own interpretations to the content of health and happiness ratings. Given 
our main aim, this may not be problematic. Still, future research could make the con-
cepts more precise when presenting them to the respondents. Fourthly, we chose not 
to focus on the issue of experienced versus expected utility as we felt this would make 
the exercise even more complex. Yet, even within the health and happiness domains, it 
remains interesting to see how people would trade off these outcomes. Fifthly, in the 
design of the experiment we presented two groups of patients affected by two distinct 
diseases, with different effects of the diseases and respective treatment on health and 
happiness. This allowed us to vary the levels of health and happiness before and after 
treatment. However, this may also have caused respondents to base their choices on 
other elements than the benefit of improvements in health and happiness, such as 
equity considerations or expectations regarding the type of disease involved. Future 
studies may ask respondents to make a choice between treatments for the same group 
of patients, to increase their focus on the trade-off between health and happiness. 
Finally, the choice task presented to respondents may have been difficult. While these 
limitations warrant caution in interpreting the relative value of health and happiness for 
decision making in health care, some interesting general findings can be highlighted.
First, about half of the respondents were unwilling to discriminate between patient 
groups on the basis of their health and happiness levels. This may reflect concerns for 
equity. Recent studies have shown that a considerable portion of the public may have 
fundamental difficulties with making choices between patient groups based on patient, 
disease or treatment characteristics as well as on health and broader effects of treat-
ment (e.g., [91]).
Second, hypothesis A was that individuals would consider both health and happiness 
levels in priority-setting decisions. Our results indicate that, within the trader group, this 
was largely confirmed. Hence, when provided information on subjective wellbeing (here 
expressed as happiness), health care decisions are not based solely on health maximiza-
tion considerations, but also on levels of and gains in happiness. Still, traders in general 
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attached more weight to health (gains) than to happiness (gains) in making trade-offs, 
thus confirming hypothesis B.
It is also important to stress that our results indicate that people appear more willing to 
discriminate between groups of patients when health and happiness levels before treat-
ment are higher. Especially when people were asked to discriminate based on different 
happiness levels respondents were more willing to do so when health and happiness 
levels before treatment were higher. This may reflect a general interest in the distribu-
tion of health and happiness, next to the size of gains.
This experiment was a first, explorative step in investigating the relevance and relative 
weight of the outcome measures health and happiness for allocation decisions in health 
care. While we stress the limitations of this study, in light of current debates on the 
appropriate (mix of ) outcome measures to guide allocation decisions in health care, it 
nonetheless revealed some interesting results. Importantly, they suggest that from the 
perspective of the public both health and happiness could play a role in priority setting. 
While the debates so far have focused on a ‘either or’ choice between these outcomes, in 
part perhaps because of the interdependency between them, our results indicate that 
both receive weight in choices between interventions. A full welfare economic assess-
ment of interventions therefore may require a broader set of outcome measures than 
currently the case [29]. “Health or happiness?” may thus not be the right question, as 
both seem to matter!
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APPEnDix 7.1: ExAMPLE QuEstiOn (VERsiOn 1, sCEnARiO 1, CHOiCE ➊)







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ABstRACt
Happiness is increasingly recognized as a proxy for utility and therefore a valuable 
maximand for policy decisions. As a result many studies have investigated happiness 
and the associated determinants in both overall and specific life domains. Adolescent 
happiness, however, remains largely unexplored. The aim of this study is to explore the 
relative importance of happiness of young Dutch adolescents at home, school, and 
leisure, and their associations with a broad array of personal and context characteristics 
within each of these domains.
We used data from a study which investigated adolescents’ health behaviour in rela-
tion to their attitudes regarding health and lifestyle as well as their considerations and 
expectations regarding the future consequences of their behaviour (n=1,436). Variables 
were selected on the basis of findings in the literature or significant univariate Pearson 
correlations between the variable and domain-specific or overall happiness. The data 
was analysed using multiple hierarchical stepwise regressions.
In line with international findings, most adolescents reported high levels of overall 
happiness with a mean score of 7.69 (SD= 1.23) on a scale from 0 to 10. Personal and 
context characteristics were associated with adolescent overall happiness either directly 
or indirectly, via domain specific happiness. Happiness at home, at school, and during 
leisure hours contributed approximately equally to overall happiness but were associ-
ated with different characteristics. Finally, the results demonstrate that adolescents 
differentiate their happiness levels between life domains, which support the relevance 
of a multidimensional approach in happiness studies.
This study provides additional insight over single dimensional studies of happiness and 
a more comprehensive explanation of previously published findings.
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8.1. intRODuCtiOn
Happiness is typically conceived as a subjective measure of the overall enjoyment of 
life, generally defined as ‘the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of 
his life favourably’ [31] and is frequently designated as an important life goal [175]. In 
disciplines like psychology, biology, and sociology, happiness has been widely accepted 
as a significant concept [176, 177].
The concept of happiness has a long standing, yet controversial, tradition in economics. 
It can be traced back to the work of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1789), 
who used the pursuit of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ as a central 
argument in his reasoning [178]. Whether ‘happiness’ can be equated with ‘utility’ or 
‘welfare’, however, has been long-disputed. The use of happiness became controversial 
when economists started to question whether subjective well-being as a measure of 
welfare could be a good and stable indicator – or even synonym – for ‘utility’, especially 
since it cannot be measured objectively and interpersonal comparisons may thus be 
considered ‘unscientific’, also because of differences in reference point, coping etcetera. 
At the time, economics therefore moved away from using (self-reported) well-being 
[179-183]. More recently, however, the study of happiness has regained popularity in 
economics and studies are increasingly using it as a proxy for utility [184-186]. In this 
genre, happiness is considered to be a (partial) index of welfare, or as Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Frijters (2004) describe it, ‘a positive monotonic transformation of an underlying 
metaphysical concept called welfare’ [5].
Many studies have been conducted to better understand what constitutes happiness, 
showing that determinants of happiness may differ across individuals, life stages, and 
life domains [33]. The happiness of adolescents (ages 12 to 18), however, remains largely 
unexplored. At present, our knowledge of what constitutes adolescent happiness can 
best be seen as a large, unsolved jigsaw puzzle. Some studies have explored the de-
terminants of overall adolescent happiness or happiness within a specific life domain 
[35, 187]; others have focused on the relations between domain-specific and overall 
adolescent happiness [188]. What is lacking, however, are studies investigating the rela-
tions between overall and domain-specific happiness alongside a broad array of pos-
sible determinants. In other words, many, but certainly not all, pieces of the adolescent 
happiness jigsaw puzzle have been identified and we are only at the very early stages of 
piecing it together.
This article aims to contribute to the completion of this puzzle by exploring the relative 
importance of happiness of young Dutch adolescents at home, at school, and during 
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leisure hours to their overall happiness, in association with a broad array of personal and 
context characteristics.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we present an overview of the relevant 
recent literature on adolescent happiness. We then describe the dataset and statistical 
analyses, followed by the results of the study. Last, we discuss our findings.
8.2. BACkgROunD
A number of studies have focused on overall happiness of adolescents. Although dif-
ferent measurement instruments have been used, it appears that most adolescents 
rate their overall happiness levels positively [189]. UNICEF (2007) initiated a study on 
the overall well-being of adolescents in 21 industrialized countries. Well-being was 
assessed in six different dimensions: material well-being, health and safety, education, 
peer and family relationship, behaviours and risks, and peoples’ own subjective sense 
of well-being. Within this study young adolescents were asked to rate their overall life 
satisfaction on a ‘life satisfaction ladder’ (0 =worst possible life, 10 = best possible life; 
scores above the midpoint, i.e., scores of 6 or more were treated as positive). A great ma-
jority of young adolescents scored their life satisfaction positively, ranging from 77.4% 
(15-year-old girls) to 88.1% (11-year-old boys). The Netherlands reported the highest 
overall well-being of young adolescents: more than 90% of adolescents between the 
ages of 11 and 15 rated life satisfaction positively.
The studies investigating determinants of adolescent happiness have largely focused on 
the influence of personal characteristics. Some studies have reported that adolescents 
differentiate their happiness levels across life domains (e.g. UNICEF 2007), indicating 
that differentiation of the analysis to specific life domains may provide incremental 
information in relation to overall happiness [190]. We will first discuss the influence of 
personal characteristics on adolescent happiness, followed by domain-specific variables 
that may influence (domain-specific) happiness.
Beginning with personal characteristics, age was shown to be an important determi-
nant of adolescent happiness. Happiness scores tend to decrease through the teenage 
years with the lowest level at age 16, followed by a small recovery up to age 18 [191]. 
Contradictory results have been reported regarding the association between gender 
and adolescent happiness. A number of studies have reported significant differences in 
happiness scores between boys and girls, with girls generally being happier [192, 193], 
while a few others have found no significant association between gender and adoles-
cent happiness [187, 191].
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In 2005 Mahon, Yarcheski et al. studied the relation between adolescent happiness and 
health. The results show significant and positive correlations between adolescent hap-
piness and three aspects of health: perceived health status, wellness, and clinical health, 
with correlation coefficients of 0.61, 0.55, and 0.14, respectively. Given the strength of 
the correlations it seems that subjective perceptions of health are more strongly related 
to happiness than objective measures. This was consistent with earlier findings [187].
No clear evidence has been found regarding the relation between social class and 
adolescent happiness. Some studies have reported no significant differences between 
social classes, while others have noted small differences in favour of higher social classes 
[190]. One study reported large differences in happiness between social classes, but the 
relation was arbitrary: Young people living in working class communities on average 
reported the highest level of happiness, followed by middle class, poor, and upper class, 
and the lowest level of adolescent happiness was found in the upper middle class [191].
Whereas Robbins and Francis (1996) reported a positive association between religious 
beliefs and happiness, Lewis and colleagues (1997) found no clear relationship in their 
study. These differences could however be explained by the use of different measure-
ment techniques or definitions of happiness and religiosity [194].
Many studies have reported the importance of personality traits. The majority of these 
studies indicated that extraversion is positively associated with adolescent happiness 
whereas neuroticism shows a negative association to adolescent happiness [35]. Loun-
sbury, Saudargas et al. (2005) moreover observed that the importance of personality 
traits differed between general and domain-specific life satisfaction in a sample of col-
lege students.
Adolescent happiness has been shown to be related to domain-specific variables as 
well. In this study we address three central life domains: home, school, and leisure time 
(for reasons explained later). Evidence from studies that have focused on the relation-
ship between home-related variables and adolescent happiness demonstrated that 
satisfaction with family relationships is strongly associated with adolescent happiness 
[195]. Suldo and Huebner (2004) concluded that an authoritative parenting style was 
positively associated with happiness among youth. Social support appeared to be most 
strongly associated, but ‘strictness’ and ‘psychological autonomy granting’ were also 
significantly related to adolescent happiness. In addition, the more parents’ and youths’ 
beliefs, views, and attitudes were in agreement, the higher the happiness level reported 
by the youth. Therefore, communication between parents and their children seems to 
be very important [195, 196]. No significant differences in happiness levels were found 
between children with and without siblings [197].
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Several studies have explored the associations between school-related variables and 
adolescent happiness. Self-evaluated school performance, rather than actual grades, 
was found to be positively associated with adolescent happiness [198]. In addition, Csik-
szentmihalyi and Hunter (2003) observed lower than average happiness levels during 
time spent on certain school-related activities such as listening to lectures. Finally, Park 
(2004) reported that perceived safety at school was significantly related to overall hap-
piness. Youths who felt unsafe or had been victims of psychologically violent behaviour 
tended to report lower happiness levels.
Csikszentmihalyi and Hunter (2003) included several leisure time variables in their study 
of adolescent happiness. Their results showed that doing homework or reading a book, 
even for pleasure, lowers happiness. Several studies have shown an association between 
the number of friends and happiness. Young people that socialize more with peers were 
found to be happier, and young people who spent more time alone were generally less 
happy [191]. Cheng and Furnham (2002) have also found that peer friendship is a direct 
predictor of adolescent happiness. Demir, Ozdemir, and Weitekamp (2007), however, 
have concluded that while many studies suggest that an individual benefits from hav-
ing a large number of friends, it is actually only ‘having a best friend’ that contributes 
to happiness. Finally, involvement in sports appeared to be positively associated with 
leisure time satisfaction as well as with overall happiness [35].
While a growing number of studies addressed the importance of domain variables 
and domain-specific happiness, the majority of studies have nonetheless focused on 
the association of determinants with overall happiness and have not considered the 
relevance of happiness in different life domains [190]. Other studies have investigated 
domain specific happiness and overall happiness, but have focused on happiness in 
only one specific life domain or included only very few underlying determinants [34, 35, 
193]. Besides, a variety of methods and happiness measures have been used, making it 
difficult to compare results between studies.
To summarize, past studies have identified a range of determinants of adolescent 
happiness, but the findings have been ambiguous and have varied across studies. In 
particular the personal characteristics ‘health’ and ‘personality traits’ have been reported 
as important determinants of adolescent happiness.
The current study aims to clarify how a variety of determinants used in past studies fit 
in the overall jigsaw puzzle of adolescent domain specific and overall happiness and to 
identify additional determinants which to date have remained undetected.
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8.3. MEtHODs
8.3.1. Participants
We used secondary data from a study which investigated adolescents’ health behaviour 
in relation to their attitudes regarding health lifestyle and their expectations and con-
sideration of the future consequences of their health behaviour [165, 199]. The original 
dataset was collected in May 2005 by means of an extensive questionnaire (the “Health 
& Future” questionnaire; see Van Exel, Koolman et al. (2006)) and included 2,006 adoles-
cents from 12- to 14-year-old (53% girls, M=13.2, SD=0.68) in the first and second grade 
of pre-vocational and general secondary education, from ten variously-sized schools 
in variously-urbanized areas throughout the Netherlands. Female gender, general sec-
ondary education level and Dutch ethnicity were slightly overrepresented, so that the 
sample was not entirely representative for the reference population. For more details 
see Van Exel, Koolman, et al. (2006).
8.3.2. Materials
The participants completed the questionnaire in class and under teacher supervision. It 
contained multiple-choice items and closed-end scales addressing a wide range of vari-
ables, many of them potentially associated with happiness. Of the eight sections of the 
questionnaire, happiness was measured in the following: ‘about you’ (overall happiness), 
‘about home’, ‘about school’, and ‘about your leisure time’ (domain-specific happiness 
measures). Our study uses the data that resulted from these four sections.
Since happiness is a subjective measure, there has been much discussion in the literature 
about its measurability. Research has shown that the validity of happiness measured by 
self-report is good [32]. In this study, participants assessed their happiness by using a 
rating scale that ranged from 0 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy). The exact happiness 
question for overall happiness was posed as follows:
     
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Figure 8.1: Happiness rating scale
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The domain specific happiness questions were posed identically, with the following 
additions: (i) the first sentence was phrased ‘Please grade your happiness at home’ (or 
‘at school’, ‘in leisure time’); (ii) the final part of the second sentence included the same 
reference, i.e. ‘…how happy you feel at home, in general’ (or, again, ‘at school’, ‘in leisure 
time’).
To assess personality, the questionnaire contained a 30-item short version of the Gold-
berg’s adjective 100 list for the Big-Five personality dimensions: openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism [200]. This short version 
was used and validated in similar Dutch populations [201, 202].
8.3.3. Procedure
Selection of the variables and the sample
A database containing the full list of variables from the four sections of the question-
naire mentioned above was scanned for potentially relevant variables for our analysis. 
Variables were selected on the basis of the literature discussed in the previous section 
(henceforth called the ‘core variables’) and on univariate Pearson correlations between 
the variable and happiness (henceforth called the ‘additional variables’). The latter vari-
ables were retained in case of a statistically significant (p<0.05) association with either 
overall or domain-specific happiness. The final selection of variables for analysis is pre-
Core variables 
 Gender 
 Ethnicity 
 Education 
 Social class 
 Personality traits      
     - neuroticism 
     - extraversion 
     - openness to experience 
     - conscientiousness 
     - agreeableness 
 Health status 
Additional variables 
 Religious upbringing 
 Chronic condition 
 Body image 
 Overweight 
 Obesity  
 Smoking 
 Life expectancy 
 Meaning of future life in 2 years 
 Meaning of future life in 5 years 
 Meaning of future life in 25 years 
Home variables 
 Family composition 
 Employment status 
 Family relationship 
 Parenting style 
 Diner at family table 
 Parents not home 
School variables 
 Teased at school 
 School performance 
Leisure variables 
 Destination after school 
 Number of friends 
 Time alone 
 Time bored 
 Member of sport club 
 Team sport 
 Proportion time spent on 
     - Serious activities 
     - Homework 
     - Social activities 
     - Computer/TV/Video 
HAPPINESS 
 SCHOOL 
HAPPINESS 
LEISURE 
HAPPINESS HOME 
HAPPINESS  OVERALL 
Figure 8.2: Variables selected for analysis
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sented in Figure 8.2, which also provides a general conceptual model for our analyses. 
Within this model a distinction was made between personal characteristics based on the 
literature and those selected as a result of their univariate associations with happiness.
Observations with a missing value on any of the selected variables were excluded from 
further analysis. An independent-samples t test showed there were no systematic dif-
ferences in age, gender, health, or happiness levels between included and excluded 
respondents. Educational level, however, significantly differed: the included observa-
tions showed a relatively higher percentage of general secondary education (p<0.001).
Statistical Analysis
Previous happiness studies have demonstrated that assumptions about a cardinal or 
ordinal interpretation of happiness are relatively unimportant to the study results [32, 
186, 203, 204]. Therefore, we primarily applied a cardinal interpretation of the happi-
ness data and used ordinary least square (OLS) regression techniques in the analyses. In 
order to check the implications of the cardinality assumption for the results, ordinal logit 
analyses were conducted as well (using the same explanatory variables). The results of 
this additional analysis are presented in appendix 8.1.
First, the percentage of respondents with identical levels of general and domain-specific 
happiness was calculated to verify whether respondents differentiated their happiness 
scores between general and domains. Next, the associations between overall and 
domain-specific happiness were explored. Paired-sample t tests were performed to test 
whether the average happiness levels statistically differed between overall happiness, 
happiness at school, happiness at home, and happiness during leisure time. Addition-
ally, Pearson’s correlations and multivariate regression analysis were conducted to 
explore associations between overall and domain-specific happiness and the relative 
impact and explanatory power of domain-specific happiness on overall happiness.
Subsequently, a series of multiple hierarchical stepwise regressions were conducted to 
explore the associations of the explanatory variables with adolescents’ domain-specific 
happiness. The ordering of variables was based on Figure 8.2. The first step included 
the core individual variables, which originated from the overview of the literature, 
and were entered all at once. In step two, the additional individual variables and the 
domain-specific variables were added using the stepwise regression method to make 
a statistical selection from these variables [205]. Variables were entered (and removed 
again) depending on the statistical significance of their coefficients (α=0.10 for entry and 
α=0.15 for removal). This procedure was repeated for the three life domains and overall 
happiness. Robustness checks, varying the threshold values of the stepwise regressions, 
did not notable influence the results.
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To determine possible differences in explanatory power of the personal characteristics 
(core individual variables) and domain variables in relation to domain-specific happi-
ness, we assessed the adjusted R square. Furthermore, in order to explore direct and in-
direct effects of the variables on overall happiness, we conducted additional regression 
on overall happiness following the same procedure but including the domain-specific 
happiness measures as control variables (forced into the model, between steps 1 and 2).
Statistical analyses were conducted using the statistical package SPSS version 17.0.
8.4. REsuLts
8.4.1. Characteristics of the study Population
The final study population included 1,436 adolescents, of which 54.7% were female and 
91.2% were Dutch. The mean age of the study sample was 13.2 years. Most adolescents 
reported high levels of overall happiness, with a mean score of 7.96 (SD=1.23) (Figure 
8.3). The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8.1.
8.4.2. Happiness scores
The domain-specific and overall happiness levels are presented in Figure 8.3. Mean 
happiness levels ranged from 7.68 to 8.59 on a scale of 0 to 10. On average, young ado-
lescents were happiest during their leisure time, less happy at home, and least happy 
at school. Most respondents had variations in domain-specific happiness; only 7.2% of 
the sample rated their domain-specific and overall happiness levels all the same. Paired 
sample t tests showed that mean happiness scores differed statistically significantly be-
tween the specific life domains and overall happiness (p<0.001). Furthermore, although 
the domain-specific and overall happiness scores were positively and significantly 
correlated, each life domain represented substantial unique variance not accounted 
for by the other life domains, as indicated by moderate correlation coefficients, ranging 
between 0.275 and 0.430 (see Figure 8.3).
The standardized multiple regression (Beta) coefficients indicate the relative importance 
of happiness between the three domains. Although the differences were small, happiness 
at school and at home received the highest weights. Together, the three domain-specific 
happiness measures explained 31.8% of the variance in overall happiness (Figure 8.3).
8.4.3. Domain-specific Happiness
Happiness at Home
The core individual variables accounted for 13.1% of the variance in happiness at home 
(Table 8.2). The second step of the regression added 10 extra explanatory variables to 
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the model and raised explained variance to 26.0%. The results indicate that girls were 
less happy than boys. Adolescents who rated their family as less wealthy than others 
reported lower scores for happiness at home. Better health had a significant positive 
effect on happiness. A higher life expectancy was associated with marginally higher 
happiness scores.
Several factors within the home category were significantly associated with happiness. 
Adolescents who receive compliments from their parents and those experiencing sup-
portive behaviour from parents reported higher happiness scores, while adolescents 
from a single-parent family or with strict parents reported lower levels of happiness. 
Furthermore, from the leisure time variables, adolescents going directly home from 
school reported higher happiness levels. Adolescents that often felt alone or bored 
showed significantly lower happiness levels. Having three or more friends significantly 
increased reported happiness levels. Finally, better self-reported performance at school 
was associated with being happier at home.
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 









Happiness Home    0.316** 0.334** 0.430** 0.268** 
Happiness School   0.275** 0.419** 0.271** 
Happiness Leisure 
time 
   0.394** 0.229** 
Happiness Overall      
Adjusted R     0.318 
Note:  ** p < 0.001 
Figure 8.3: Average happiness scores, correlations and regression results (n=1,436) 
  
M = 8.52
SD = 1.39
M = 7.68
SD = 1.36
M = 8.59
SD = 1.17
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SD = 1.23
0
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4
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Figure 8.3: Average happiness scores, correlations and regression results (n=1,436)
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table 8.1: Descriptive statistics (n = 1,436)
Variable Category share* Mean sD
Core variables
Gender Female 54.7
Ethnicity Dutch† 91.2
Education level General Secondary 62.5
Social class Less wealthy than other Dutch families 7.6
Health Status 0-10 Scale (0/10 best/worst conceivable) 7.72 1.24
Additional variables
Religious upbringing Yes 74.4
Chronic condition Yes, at least one chronic condition 14.8
Body image~ Too thick 32.9
Overweight^ Yes 7.8
Obesity^ Yes 0.6
Smoking Yes 6.5
Total monthly allowance (€) 45.6 64.5
Life expectancy Years of age 85.13 10.79
Meaning of future life in 2 years º (very) important 89.8
Meaning of future life in 5 years º (very) important 93
Meaning of future life in 25 years º (very) important 89.1
Home variables
Family composition
Single parent Yes 10
Only child Yes 6
Employment status of parents Both unemployed 1.3
Satisfied with relationship mother 1. (Totally) Disagree 7.2
2. Agree 57.1
3. Totally agree 35.7
Satisfied with relationship father 1. (Totally) Disagree 9.6
2. Agree 55.7
3. Totally agree 34.7
Parenting style
Parents are strict Yes 26.7
Parents are interested Yes 95.1
Parents give compliments Yes 93.7
Having dinner at family table Daily 87.5
At least one parent at home after 
school
Yes 89.1
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Happiness at School
The core individual variables were responsible for 17.2 % of the variance, while the total 
regression accounted for 23.9% of the variances in happiness at school. The regression 
results show that girls were significantly happier at school than boys. Both being less 
wealthy and being healthier were positively associated with happiness at school. The 
personality trait agreeableness was also positively associated with happiness at school, 
whereas extraversion and neuroticism were negatively associated with it. Adolescents 
who placed relatively more importance on their situation five years in the future (i.e., 
about the end of secondary school) and those with a religious upbringing were hap-
table 8.1: Descriptive statistics (n = 1,436) (continued)
Variable Category share* Mean sD
school variables
Teased at school Never 84
School performance 1. Very good 14.2
2. Good 48.6
3. Satisfactory 27.8
4. (Very) Unsatisfactory 9.4
Leisure time variables
Destination after school Going home after school 90.5
Number of good friends Three or more 87.5
Time Alone 1. (Very) Often 11
2. Sometimes 39.5
3. Rarely 39
4. Never 10.5
Time Bored 1. (Very) Often 4.9
2. Sometimes 32
3. Rarely 42.5
4. Never 20.6
Member of sports club Yes 57.7
Team sport Yes 27.7
Proportion time spent on…#
Homework 0.13 0.09
Serious/ hobbies 0.26 0.14
Social activities 0.26 0.12
Computer/video 0.34 0.17
*Note: Total equals 100%; † Both parent are born in the Netherlands; ~ Subjective evaluation of their own 
body; ^ Based on international cut-off points for overweight and obesity in adolescents by gender and 
age [203]; º Respondents were asked how important it is to them what their life will be like in 2,5,25 years; # 
Proportions of weekly time spent on hobbies.
Chapter 8
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pier at school. The same was true for those who were overweight. Smokers, however, 
reported lower happiness at school.
Both school performance and being teased at school showed a significant effect on 
happiness at school, with plausible signs. Of the home-specific variables, parental in-
volvement with the child was significantly associated with higher levels of happiness at 
school. Adolescents with more friends (a leisure time variable) showed higher school-
related happiness scores, whereas being alone more often and, surprisingly, being a 
member of a sports club were associated with lower levels of happiness at school.
Happiness in Leisure Time
The core variables explained 11.8% of the variance, the lowest of the life domains, while 
the overall set of explanatory variables accounted for 24.7% of the variance in happiness 
during leisure time. Boys and adolescents with Dutch ethnicity tended to be happier 
during their leisure time in comparison to girls and non-Dutch adolescents. The same 
holds for those who were healthier and those who were more agreeable. Adolescents 
with higher scores on the personality trait extraversion, those with a religious upbring-
ing or those who attached relatively low weight to their situation in five years reported 
lower happiness levels during leisure time.
With respect to the leisure time variables, adolescents who spent a higher proportion of 
their time on homework and those who were more lonesome or bored reported lower 
happiness scores. School variables did not contribute to explaining leisure time hap-
piness. The home variable ‘parents give compliments’ was significantly and positively 
associated with happiness.
8.4.4. Overall Happiness
The core individual variables accounted for 29.0% of the variance in overall happiness, 
which was considerably higher than in the domain-specific models, whereas the do-
main-specific explanatory variables contributed far less. Many of the same core and ad-
ditional individual characteristics as in the previous models were associated with overall 
happiness, with the exception of body image (i.e., adolescents with a bulky body image 
reported lower overall happiness) and monthly budget (i.e., having more to spend was 
associated with higher overall happiness). The variables ‘only child’ and ‘proportion time 
spent on computer/video’ entered the model for the first time and showed substantial 
positive associations with overall happiness.
In order to explore the direct and indirect effects of the explanatory variables on overall 
happiness, we estimated a model that included the domain-specific happiness scores 
as control variables. The last two columns of Table 8.2 show the results. They generally 
confirm the equivalent relations between overall and domain-specific happiness pre-
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sented in Figure 8.3, after controlling for personal characteristics and domain variables. 
A number of variables dropped from the model and most of the coefficients declined in 
magnitude, suggesting that variables clearly differ in terms of their direct and indirect 
relation to overall happiness, but the overall model remained fairly robust and the ex-
plained variance rose considerably to 42.5%. In order to better understand the indirect 
effect of the variables we performed three additional regressions, each controlling for 
happiness in a single life domain, and in each case inspected which variables dropped 
from the model presented in Table 8.2.
Considering variables related to the home situation, both ‘parents are strict’ and ‘parents 
give compliments’ dropped from the model after controlling for the happiness scores in 
all three domains. The regressions controlling for happiness in one life domain at a time, 
showed that these two variables also drop from the model when controlling only for 
happiness at home. Controlling for happiness at school had no statistical effect on the 
two variables ‘parents are strict’ and ‘parents give compliments’. In the regression which 
controlled for happiness during leisure time only the variable ‘parents are strict’ dropped 
from the model.
Of the two school variables, ‘teased at school’ dropped from the model in both the re-
gression which controlled for happiness in all three life domains and the one which only 
controlled for happiness at school. Controlling for happiness at home and happiness 
during leisure time had no effect on the school variable ‘teased at school’.
Furthermore, after controlling for happiness in all three life domains simultaneously, 
the leisure time variables having friend, being alone and being bored dropped from 
the model. This was also true when controlling only for happiness during leisure time. 
Having friends dropped from the models when controlling for the other life domains 
separately as well, while being alone and being bored did not. The variables ‘going home 
after school’ and being ‘member of a sports club’ entered the model when controlling for 
the happiness scores in all life domains simultaneously and when controlling for happi-
ness at home and at school separately (results not shown).
The standardized coefficients of the regression of overall happiness after controlling 
for all life domains at once indicate that health is a major variable associated with the 
overall happiness of adolescents, followed by three of the ‘Big-Five’ personality traits. A 
range of other variables have comparable but lower standardized coefficients, among 
them ethnicity, smoking, body image, monthly budget, school performance, strict up-
bringing, and proportion of time spent on computer/video.
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8.5. DisCussiOn
The main purpose of this study was to explore the associations between domain-
specific happiness and overall happiness within the context of a broad array of potential 
underlying determinants. The results show that adolescents were able to differentiate 
their happiness levels among the specific life domains from overall happiness. This 
finding is in line with previous studies. Gilman and Huebner (2003) and UNICEF (2007) 
already demonstrated that adolescents were able to distinguish their happiness levels 
to specific life domains. By including multiple life domains in our model we found that 
the adolescents in our study weigh their happiness in the three life domains approxi-
mately equally with respect to overall happiness. At this point, we can only speculate 
about possible explanations. In part, this may relate to the fact that home, school and 
leisure time are not isolated domains within space, time, and social relations and that 
we may thus expect some overflow of happiness between domains, blunting explicable 
differences in happiness between domains as well as their relative importance to overall 
happiness.
The average happiness levels in this study ranged from 7.68 to 8.59 on a scale of 0 to 10. 
Such high levels of happiness are consistent with other studies, both involving adoles-
cents and adults [190, 206, 207].
Consistent with many previous studies, gender did not show a significant effect on 
overall happiness [191]. However, here we found that girls were happier at school while 
boys tended to be happier at home and during their leisure time. On the level of overall 
happiness, this effect appears to cancel out. The same seems to hold for the variable 
‘less wealthy’.
The importance of health in predicting happiness has regularly been reported in the 
literature as well [34, 187]. In accordance with these findings ‘health status’ showed a 
positive significant effect on happiness in all life domains and on overall happiness. 
This indicates that health is indeed strongly associated with overall happiness, directly 
and indirectly (i.e., through domain-specific happiness). The domain-specific effects of 
health, however, differed substantially. Differences in health appear to have a stronger 
effect on happiness at school than on happiness at home.
The domain variables were, as expected, most strongly associated with happiness in 
their respective life domains. However, some domain variables, like ‘school performance’, 
‘parents are interested’, ‘friends’, and ‘alone’ showed significant relations with more than 
one domain. The importance of the relationship with parents and loneliness for overall 
happiness has been demonstrated in previous studies [195, 196], as has the positive 
association between the number of friends and happiness [208]. Interestingly, the num-
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ber of friends does not relate to overall happiness (controlled for domain happiness) or 
happiness during leisure time. One explanation may be that it is important to have at 
least one friend, which is possibly captured in the variables ‘alone’ and ‘bored’, and that 
the marginal utility of additional friends diminishes sharply.
Some limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First of all, female gender, 
general secondary education and Dutch ethnicity were slightly over-represented in the 
sample. As a result, the average happiness levels of this study are not entirely repre-
sentative for adolescents in the Netherlands, and we should be cautious with general-
izing our results, although we found only low correlations of gender and ethnicity with 
happiness. Female gender was associated with slightly lower happiness at home and 
in leisure time, slightly higher happiness at school, but no difference in terms of overall 
happiness. Adolescents with Dutch ethnicity showed slightly higher happiness overall, 
but no difference between domains. All in all, this indicates that overall happiness pos-
sibly is slightly lower in the reference population than reported here. However, given the 
explorative nature of our analysis, we expect these minor deviations pose no significant 
limitations. The purpose of this study was to explore determinants of happiness and 
the relative importance of domain specific happiness to overall happiness, not to draw 
generalized conclusions about happiness of Dutch adolescents.
Furthermore, our analysis relies on secondary data, using a database with many interest-
ing background variables for the purpose of our study. Given that only a few studies have 
focused on adolescent and/or multidimensional happiness, a completely theoretically 
driven selection of variables would have limited the explorative character of our study 
considerably. Therefore, we have extended the selection of variables based on earlier 
studies with a stepwise procedure based on a statistical selection of variables. However, 
the scope of this study was limited to the available life domains and explanatory variables 
included in the original database. Although the study included an extensive amount of 
potentially interesting and relevant determinants, other than the available variables will 
undoubtedly contribute to the jigsaw puzzle pieces of adolescent happiness.
It needs noting that we cannot fully rule out problems with endogeneity. Subjective 
measures of happiness and health or factors like body image may have all been influ-
enced by unobserved factors. The results from the regression analyses could be biased 
by such influences to some extent. Moreover, given the cross sectional nature of the 
current dataset we cannot investigate causality of the reported relationships. E.g., while 
increased health may result in higher happiness, increased happiness may also result in 
more health. The reported relationships should therefore be interpreted as associations.
Finally, it has been suggested that happiness questions should be placed at the begin-
ning of surveys to minimize order bias [209]. In the Health & Future questionnaire, how-
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ever, the domain-specific happiness questions were placed at the end of each domain 
section so that adolescents would include all their responses to domain variables in 
their assessment of domain happiness. Arguably, the happiness scores may be ‘biased’ 
by the prior questions in the specific section.
8.6. COnCLusiOn
Happiness is increasingly measured and analysed in economics. Especially when happi-
ness is seen as a maximand for policy decisions, the determinants of happiness need to 
be studied.
This study has made some important steps forward in studying adolescent happiness. 
The results demonstrate that adolescents’ happiness levels vary with life-specific do-
mains, which supports the relevance of a multidimensional approach in happiness stud-
ies. Consequently, this study provides additional insight over single-dimensional studies 
of happiness and a more comprehensive explanation of previously published findings. 
Variables associated with adolescent happiness differ between life domains, but the life 
domains appear to contribute approximately equally to overall happiness. Furthermore, 
broad arrays of determinants are either directly associated with adolescent overall hap-
piness or indirectly by passing through a specific domain happiness. Finally, this study 
once again shows that results are robust to both cardinal and ordinal interpretations of 
the happiness measure.
Future studies can contribute further to understanding adolescent happiness by explor-
ing additional determinants, the interaction of happiness between the different life 
domains, and potential alternative domain definitions. Another interesting research 
objective may be to determine the stability of adolescents’ domain-specific and overall 
happiness over time. In any case, it will be a happy puzzle ☺.
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APPEnDix 8.1: AnALYsis BAsED On ORDinALitY AssuMPtiOn
table A. 8.1: Wilcoxon signed rank test (n=1,436)
Variables Z sign
Happiness- Happiness home -15.306a 0.000
Happiness- Happiness school -7.558b 0.000
Happiness- Happiness leisure time -16.956a 0.000
Note: a based on negative ranks. b based on positive ranks.
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ABstRACt
Health care policy makers increasingly recognize the additional value of happiness, or 
wellbeing, as a broader outcome measure to inform health care allocation decisions, 
since health may not capture all effects of an intervention. However, the relationship 
between health and happiness is complex. Literature shows that health and happiness 
are strongly correlated, especially when they are both assessed by subjective measures. 
As a result, unobserved factors that are omitted from the model or reverse causality 
may bias the estimated effect of health on happiness. This study explores the causal 
effect of health on happiness in more detail using the SHARE database. OLS regressions 
and instrumental variable analyses were conducted to consider the possible impact of 
endogeneity. The results showed a causal effect of health on happiness and confirmed 
the additional value of instrumental variable analysis. Researches and policy makers 
should be aware of endogeneity bias in the relationship between health and happiness, 
since otherwise they might underestimate the effect of health on overall wellbeing.
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9.1. intRODuCtiOn
It is generally recognized that happiness, or wellbeing, can be viewed as an ultimate 
goal in life [203]. Therefore, happiness is emerging as an important societal aspiration. 
It is increasingly argued that happiness can be considered as proxy for utility or a 
(partial) index of wellbeing and thus that social policy making may (partly) be guided 
and evaluated by happiness measures [210]. Happiness is a subjective measure of the 
overall enjoyment of life, commonly defined as ‘the degree to which an individual 
judges the overall quality of his life favourably’ [31]. The concept of happiness extends 
back to the work of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham. The essential argument 
is his reasoning was the pursuit of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ 
[178]. However, happiness has a controversial tradition in economics due to the subjec-
tive nature of its content and its measurability. For a long period of time, economists 
therefore avoided the use of happiness as an objective outcome measure and proxy of 
wellbeing. In recent years, following disciplines like sociology and psychology, econo-
mists appear to have (re)discovered happiness as a significant concept [12, 37, 173, 177, 
211]. Happiness questions are now included in large national and international surveys 
and countries like Canada, France and the UK are seriously considering happiness as an 
outcome measure for public policy [37].
Also health care policy makers increasingly embrace the idea that happiness measures 
may provide relevant information to inform and evaluate health care policy decisions. 
While health care is still primary aimed to optimize health, it is increasingly recognized 
that the narrow focus on health (or health-related quality of life) as the main outcome 
measure may not always capture the full benefits of health care interventions. For 
example in elderly care, interventions may not be primary aimed to improve health, 
but (also) to contribute to other aspects of wellbeing, such as autonomy. In these 
cases, broader outcome measures such as happiness may be more in accordance with 
the goals of the intervention [10, 28]. One may even claim that from a wider societal 
perspective, using only health as an outcome measure to inform allocation decisions 
may result in suboptimal allocation decisions because it does not capture all benefits 
of an intervention [10]. In other words, an outcome measure for health care in terms 
of overall wellbeing improves the transparency about the contribution of health care 
to societal progress. Especially in times of ageing populations and growing health care 
expenditures, framing the benefits of health care in a more comprehensive way, such 
as happiness allegedly does, clearly shows to what extent health contributes to overall 
wellbeing and thus underlines the relevance of health care [27].
Given the increasing interest in happiness as an outcome measure in health care it is 
important to improve the understanding of the relationship between health and hap-
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piness. It should be noted that any exploration of the relationship between health and 
happiness needs to consider the alternative approaches to measuring health. Health 
status can be measured in objective terms, as assessed by medical personnel or in terms 
of use of medical services, or in subjective terms, as an evaluation by the individuals 
themselves [212]. Most studies so far have used subjective measures of health to explore 
the association between health and happiness, but such self-reported measures of 
health have been shown to deviate from objective measures [37, 212]. Considering the 
subjective nature of both health and happiness, this complicates the identification of a 
causal effect of health on happiness. It is likely that endogeneity arises when happiness 
also has a causal impact on health (i.e. reverse causality) or when health and happiness 
are both correlated with important unobserved factors that are omitted from the data, 
such as personality [36, 37]. An individual with a relatively low overall wellbeing may, for 
instance, experience her health worse than her true health status. This type of under-
reporting of the ‘true’ health status leads to biased results and biased estimations of the 
relationship between health status and happiness.
A substantial body of empirical research has examined the association between health 
and happiness. Since happiness is generally considered to be a broader concept than 
health, the majority of studies have focused on the direction from health to happiness 
and found that individuals with better subjective health also report higher levels of hap-
piness [36, 37, 210]. While these studies clearly show a statistical association between 
health and happiness, they do no inform us about cause and effects. The association can 
be caused by the effect of health on happiness, but also by a simultaneous relationship 
between health and happiness or a spurious relationship with a third factor influencing 
both health and happiness [36].
A recent study of Garrido et al. [37] showed a simultaneous relationship between sub-
jective health and happiness, in which unobserved variables that determine health and 
happiness were significantly related. They argued that a unidirectional approach using 
standard OLS measures may therefore underestimate the relation between health and 
happiness. However, their study was based on national data and limited to single mea-
sures for health (i.e., SF-6D) and happiness (i.e., Life satisfaction scale) [37]. Therefore, 
the aim of this study was to contribute to the existing literature by further exploring the 
causal effect of health on happiness and considering the impact of possible endogene-
ity. To achieve this aim, we used a large international data set including several health 
and happiness measures and a broad set of potential instrumental variables, performed 
thorough statistical analysis, and conducted sensitivity analysis to address the uncer-
tainty and test the robustness of the instrumental variables.
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9.2. MEtHODs
9.2.1. Data
This study uses data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE), a large database of individuals over the age of 50 years from 19 European 
countries. For this cross-sectional study, we used data from the fourth wave, collected 
in 2010, which contained data of 58.000 respondents [213]. The dataset includes a large 
variety of variables potentially relevant for this study.
9.2.2. specification of the models
Happiness data can be interpreted to be cardinal, which makes OLS an acceptable 
method for the analysis [214]. Based on an OLS regression, the relationship between 
health and happiness can be expressed by the following equation:
Eq 9.1 Y = α + β1X1 + βiπi + ε
where Y is the dependent variable happiness, α is the intercept, X1 is the variable health, 
πi represent other exogenous variables and ε is the error term. However, OLS regressions 
only estimate the correlation between health and happiness and may suffer from the 
endogeneity problem. Therefore, the relationship between health and happiness was 
also explored by instrumental variable analysis, estimated with two stage least square 
(2SLS). Instrumental variable analysis is aimed to find variables that can be used to cor-
rect for possible bias caused by the endogeneity of the health variable. In the first stage 
of 2SLS the endogenous variable health (X ̂) is predicted by its instrumental variable (Zi):
Eq 9.2  X ̂ = a + bZi + bπi + u
where a represents the intercept and u the error term. In the second stage the initial 
Equation 9.1 is estimated with the predicted variable of health as a proxy for the original 
health variable:
Eq 9.3  Y = a + β1X ̂1 + βiπi + ε
Finding a credible instrumental variable for 2SLS regressions, i.e. one fulfilling the re-
quirements of validity and relevance, is considered the most important and difficult step 
in instrumental variable analysis [215, 216].
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9.2.3. selection of instrumental variables
Validity
The most important requirement for an instrumental variable is to be valid. This implies 
that the instrumental variable should only be related to the dependent variable through 
the endogenous variable, health in this case, and should not be correlated with the 
error-term [215]. A literature search was conducted to gather theoretical evidence from 
preceding studies to judge whether the candidate instruments fulfil this requirement; 
Garrido et al. [37] and Böckerman et al. [217] were important sources of information. 
In addition, definitions of the potential instruments in combination with keywords of 
health and happiness were used as a search strategy. Based on the theoretical evidence, 
the candidate instrumental variables were categorized as ‘valid’, ‘questionable’ or ‘not 
valid’.
Relevance
Relevance is the second important requirement for an instrumental variable. This require-
ment implies that, after controlling for confounders, to be informative the instrumental 
variable should account for a significant variation of its endogenous variable [215, 216]. 
The stronger the association between the instrumental variable and the endogenous 
variable, the stronger the identification of the model [215]. Three statistical tests were 
performed to evaluate the relation between the candidate instruments and health. 
First, Stock and Yogo tests for ‘weak’ instruments were performed to test possible bias of 
the 2SLS estimates relative to the bias of the OLS estimates due to a weakly correlated 
instrumental variable. Since there is no consensus on which test statistic is most ap-
propriate in this context, both the F-statistic and the minimum eigenvalue statistic were 
evaluated against the critical value of 16.38 [215]. This value was determined based on 
Stock and Yogo’s guidance [218]. Secondly, Pearson’s correlations between the potential 
instrumental variables and health were estimated. Thirdly, the partial R2 indicating the 
marginal contribution of the instrument in explaining the endogenous variable after 
controlling for confounders, was examined. First stage regression results were reported 
to examine the statistical significance of the correlation. It should be noted that there is 
no consensus in the literature on the minimum value of Pearson’s correlation and partial 
R2. In this study, Pearson’s correlations below 0.10 and partial R2 of less than 0.01 were 
considered as too low. Pearson correlations below 0.10 may indicate efficiency loss when 
using 2SLS analysis opposed to OLS. A partial R2 of less 0.01 indicates a relatively small 
contribution of the instrument in explaining health, after controlling for confounders 
[215]. Overall, a candidate instrument was considered ‘strong’ when the results of all 
statistical test exceeded their critical value. Preceding studies have shown that instru-
ments that are categorized as ‘questionable’ in terms of their validity imply only small 
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biases when the instrument’s relevance is strong [219]. Therefore, all instruments that 
were ‘valid’ or ‘questionable’ were tested on their relevance.
9.2.4. Additional tests
Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity were performed to statistically confirm the addi-
tional value of 2SLS compared to OLS. A non-significant difference between the health 
coefficients of the IV analysis and OLS may indicate that the endogenous variable is 
exogenous in reality or that the instruments are problematic [215].
Sensitivity analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the results with respect 
to the selected outcome variable for happiness in the main analysis, i.e. CASP-100 (see 
below). The OLS and 2SLS regression analyses were remodelled with the LS-100 variable 
(see below) as outcome variable for happiness.
All analyses were conducted using Stata version SE 13.0.
9.2.5. Measures of interest
Happiness
The SHARE data includes two subjective measures of happiness, the life satisfaction 
scale and the CASP-12. The life satisfaction scale (LS) is widely used as a valid measure 
for happiness [37, 177, 180, 220]. This measure quantifies happiness by simply asking: 
‘on a scale from 0 to 10 how satisfied are you with your life?’ where 0 means completely 
dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied.
The CASP-12 is a validated measure of happiness in older people, and a reduced form 
of the CASP-19 [221]. The CASP-12 captures four dimensions of well-being: control, 
autonomy, self-realization and pleasure. Each dimension is measured by three items on 
which respondents have to indicate the extent to which the item applies to them on a 
four point scale with response categories ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely, ‘never’ [222].
It can be argued that the CASP is methodologically more objective than the LS scale. The 
CASP-12 has a clear structure of four dimensions and uses a four point scale to value the 
outcome, thus defining the concept of ‘happiness’ quite specifically. The LS scale uses 
a single overall score for satisfaction with life in general, without specifying what the 
respondent should take into consideration when answering the question. The CASP-12 
thus give less room to different (subjective) interpretations of happiness than LS-100. 
For that reason, the CASP-12 was selected for the main analysis.
In this study the CASP-12 and the LS were linearly rescaled to a range of 0 to 100 (from 
worst to best) and labelled as CASP-100 and LS-100, respectively.
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Health
SHARE contains two subjective health measures: the health thermometer and the EQ-5D. 
The health thermometer measures how the current health state is perceived on a Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) from 0 (the worst imaginable health state) to 100 (best imaginable 
health state) by asking: ‘We would like you to indicate on this scale how good or bad 
your health is today, in your opinion’.
The EQ-5D is a widely accepted measure of health-related quality of life and captures the 
domains mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression on 
three levels, corresponding with no, some or severe problems on that domain [223, 224]. 
A sum score or ‘misery index’ can be computed by assigning values of 0 to 2 to each level 
and summing these scores across domains, generating an overall sum score ranging 
from 0 (full health) to 10 (worst health). This sum score of the EQ-5D was included for the 
main analysis since it is a widely accepted measure of health and, for the same reasons 
as CASP-12 was preferred to LS for happiness, assumed to be more objective than the 
health thermometer [224]. The EQ-5D was linearly rescaled to a range of 0 to 100 (from 
worst to best) and labelled as EQ5D-MI-100.
Candidate instrumental variables for health
Besides these two health measures the SHARE dataset includes an extensive list of self-
reported medical conditions that respondents can select in response to the question 
‘Has a doctor ever told you that you had any of the conditions on this card?’ Previous 
studies have shown that self-reports of conditions that require laboratory or medical di-
agnostic procedures prove to be reliable observations [225]. Therefore, these conditions 
were used as candidate instruments for health. Medical conditions with a prevalence 
rate of at least 5% in the SHARE dataset were selected for this study. This minimum 
prevalence rate was set to ensure sufficient observations for the instrumental analysis. 
Further analyses should prove the validity and relevance of these selected variables as 
credible instruments for the main analysis.
Covariates
To control for personal characteristics the following variables were included in this 
study. First, age of the respondents, since the association between age and happiness 
is well documented. Most studies find measures of happiness to be U-shaped related 
to age, where both younger and older persons report being happier than middle-aged 
persons [203, 226]. Therefore, age squared divided by 100 was included to allow for 
non-linearity of age. Secondly, as proxy for socio-economic status we use both level of 
education and income. Education is found to be positively correlated with happiness 
[226]. SHARE contains the International Standard Classification of Educational Degrees 
(ISCED) variable which was recoded for this study into dummy variables indicating low 
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(ISCED 0 to 2), middle (ISCED 3 and 4) or high education (ISCED 5 and 6). For income, 
SHARE contains a variable that measures the extent to which a household is able to 
make ends meet. Various studies have argued that being able to provide in basic neces-
sities is more important to health and happiness than the absolute level of income [29, 
173, 227]. Finally, place of residence is considered to influence happiness [37]. In this 
study, a dummy variable was included indicating rural place of residence (rural area or 
village) or urban place of residence (big city, suburbs or town).
9.3. REsuLts
9.3.1. Descriptive statistics of the sample
Descriptive statistics of the study sample and the complete SHARE 2010 wave are re-
ported in Table 9.1. Respondents with missing values for one of the outcome variables 
were excluded from the original dataset. This resulted in a study sample of 41,936 
respondents with a mean age 68.6 years. Except for the level of education, all mean 
values of the descriptive variables differed significantly from the original SHARE dataset.
table 9.1: Study Sample (n=41,936) and SHARE (n=58,000) characteristics
study sample
Mean (sD)
sHARE
Mean (sD)
Happiness CASP100 70.6 (17.6)* 69.5 (17.9)
LS100 77.2 (17.6)* 75.6 (18.7)
Health
EQ5D-MI-100
HT-100
13.9 (17.1)*
71.5 (20.0)*
14.1 (17.2)
70.7 (20.7)
Age 68.6 (9.9)* 68.9 (10.1)
Educational levela Low 38.6 38.4
Middle 40.9 41.2
High 20.5 20.4
Making ends meeta Great problems 11.3* 12.0
Some problems 28.2* 29.3
Fairly easy 32.3 32.5
Easy 28.3* 26.2
Place of residencea Urban 64.4* 65.9
Rural 35.6* 34.1
Note: To improve the comparability between the different instruments in this study the happiness and 
health variables are rescaled and linearly distributed in a range of 0 – 100, and labelled as LS-100, CASP-100, 
and HT-100, EQ5D-MI-100. a Dummy variable (%) * Statistical significance difference (P<0.05) between the 
study sample and SHARE.
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9.3.2. instrumental variable analysis
Candidate instruments
Table 9.2 provides an overview of the health conditions in the SHARE dataset that were 
selected as candidate instruments for health. Of the original 17 variables under consid-
eration, Alzheimer’s disease dementia or senility, asthma, benign tumour, hip or femoral 
fracture, osteoporosis, Parkinson, stomach or duodenal or peptic ulcer, stroke and other 
fractures were excluded because their prevalence rate was less than 5%.
Validity
The results of the validity test for the candidate instruments are reported in the last 
column of Table 9.2. First, the definition of the variable cancer was considered as too 
non-specific to judge its validity and was therefore categorized as ‘not valid’. Secondly, a 
number of medical conditions was categorized as ‘not valid’ because they lead to func-
tional impairment, and therewith can be expected to affect wellbeing directly. Cataract 
directly influences the routines of daily life and places constraints on social contact and 
participation, which are important domains of overall wellbeing [210, 228, 229]. Previ-
ous studies reported significant effects of arthritis and chronic lung disease on social 
relationships, employment and independency [210, 230]. According to literature, an 
acute life threatening event like a heart attack has permanent negative consequences: 
physical limitations such as angina and shortness of breath not only place restrictions on 
daily activities but also have psychological consequences as anxiety and distress [231].
Finally, diabetes or high blood sugar, high blood pressure or hypertension and high 
blood cholesterol, without complications, are all silent medical conditions that are 
less likely to directly influence functional status. No additional significant effects of the 
variables diabetes or high blood sugar [217] and high blood cholesterol diabetes [37] 
on wellbeing were found when corrected for health. Therefore, these variables were 
categorized as ‘valid’. The causal relationship between hypertension and wellbeing is 
table 9.2: Validity of the candidate instrumental variables
Candidate instruments Prevalence rate (%) Validity
Cancer 5.1 Not valid
Cataracts 8.0 Not valid
Arthritis 23.8 Not valid
Chronic lung disease 6.2 Not valid
Heart attack 12.0 Not valid
Diabetes or high blood sugar 12.3 Valid
High blood cholesterol 23.5 Valid
High blood pressure or hypertension 38.2 Questionable
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somewhat controversial since psychosocial factors may play a role in hypertension. Many 
mixed findings are reported in the literature but the exact association is still unclear [37, 
217, 232, 233]. Therefore, we categorized the validity of this variable as ‘questionable’.
Relevance
The results of the statistical tests for the relevance are presented in Table 9.3. For all 
candidates, the null hypothesis of ‘weak instruments’ was rejected since the results of 
the Stock & Yogo tests exceeded the critical value of 16.38. Diabetes or high blood sugar, 
high blood pressure or hypertension and high blood cholesterol were all sufficiently 
correlated with health, showing Pearson correlations above the critical value of 0.10. 
The partial R2 scores indicate a considerable contribution of the instruments to explain-
ing health, after controlling for confounders. Furthermore, the coefficients of all three 
candidate instruments were significant in the first stage regression analysis. Overall, the 
relevance of the three candidate instruments can thus be considered as ‘strong’.
9.3.3. Regression results
Diabetes or high blood sugar, high blood pressure or hypertension and high blood 
cholesterol proved to be credible instruments for health. Therefore, these instruments 
were included in the OLS and 2SLS regressions with CASP-100 as measure for happiness. 
The results of these analyses are presented in the first four columns of Table 9.4. The 
Wu-Hausman tests showed statistical significant differences between OLS and 2SLS esti-
mates for all instruments which confirms the additional value of 2SLS compared to OLS.
The OLS estimates show a significant positive association between health and happi-
ness. This indicates that healthier people are also happier. For age, a reversed U-shaped 
relationship with happiness was found. Happiness increased with age from 50 years 
until the maximum at 63 years of age and then decreased. Furthermore, middle and 
higher educated respondents reported to be significantly happier than lower educated 
respondents. Living in a rural area and being able to make ends meet were also signifi-
cantly and positively related to happiness.
table 9.3: Relevance of the valid candidate instruments
instrument
Overall
relevance
stock &
 Yogo
F-statistic
Pearson
Correlation
β first 
stage
Partial 
R2
High blood pressure or 
hypertension
Strong 265.322 244.951 0.18 4.22*** 0.0157
High blood cholesterol Strong 178.797 162.943 0.11 3.89*** 0.0106
Diabetes or high blood sugar Strong 278.765 192.153 0.18 6.29*** 0.0165
Note: ***statistically significant at the 1% level.
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The magnitude of the health coefficients of all three instruments was larger in 2SLS than 
in OLS regressions. This suggests stronger positive associations between health and 
happiness than indicated by the OLS regression. The high blood pressure or hyperten-
sion model showed an increase of nearly 30%. The strongest association between health 
and happiness was found in the model based on the instrument high blood cholesterol. 
Age and happiness were not significantly related in the 2SLS regressions except for the 
positive effect of age square in the high blood cholesterol model. The changes in coef-
ficients of the other confounders were small.
9.3.4. sensitivity analysis
The last four columns of Table 9.4 show the results of the sensitivity analysis with the life 
satisfaction scale (LS-100) as measure for happiness. No noteworthy differences were 
found with respect to the relationship between health and happiness. Also in these 
models, the association between health and happiness appeared to be stronger using 
2SLS instead of OLS and the strongest association was found in the high blood choles-
terol model. However, the associations between age and happiness reversed: happiness 
initially decreased with age up to 53 or 54 years of age, depending on the model, and 
then increased.
9.4. DisCussiOn
The increasing interest among researchers and policy makers in the health care sector for 
the use of broader outcome measures, such as happiness, to inform allocation decisions, 
raise the importance to improve our understanding of the relationship between health 
and happiness. The aim of this study was to explore the causal effect of health on hap-
piness in more detail. The instrumental variable (IV) approach was used to disentangle 
the effect of possible endogeneity of the subjective health variable. The results showed 
that conventional OLS regressions, which ignore endogeneity, may underestimate the 
effect of health on happiness.
In explaining happiness, high blood pressure or hypertension, high blood cholesterol 
and diabetes or high blood sugar turned out to be credible instruments for health. High 
blood cholesterol and diabetes or high blood sugar were both valid and relevant, 
whereas the validity of high blood pressure or hypertension was considered question-
able given the discussion in the literature with respect to reverse causality. However, 
previous studies have shown that instruments that are relevant and of questionable 
validity imply only small biases for instrumental variables [219]. The same seems to 
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apply in this study, since the results of the OLS and 2SLS for high blood pressure or 
hypertension were comparable to the other instruments.
The 2SLS regressions of all three instruments independently showed significantly stron-
ger positive associations between health and happiness than the OLS regressions. The 
strongest association was found in the high blood cholesterol model. These findings in-
dicate that subjective health is endogenous and may bias the results of OLS regressions. 
The fact that all instruments showed consistent results, also in the sensitivity analyses, 
was encouraging. The causal effect of health on happiness was somewhat smaller when 
using the more subjective measure LS for happiness instead of the more objective 
measure CASP. It might be that LS encompasses a broader scope of aspects influencing 
happiness, therewith reducing the effect of health.
With respect to the covariates, the relationship between age and happiness warrants 
some further discussion. The OLS regression with CASP as measure for happiness showed 
a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between age and happiness. Given the age 
group of the sample, it seems that we have observed the increasing slope after the low-
est point of the parabola [37]. However, this association was not significant in the cor-
responding 2SLS models. An explanation might be that the instruments were correlated 
with age and thus picked up a part of the effect of age. Remarkably, the OLS and 2SLS 
regressions with LS as measure for happiness showed the more frequently observed 
U-shaped association between age and happiness, where happiness decreased from 50 
until 53 or 54 years of age, depending on the model, and then increased. Apparently, 
while the more objective measure of happiness (CASP), capturing the domains control, 
autonomy, self-realization and pleasure, identified lower levels of happiness after a 
certain age, the more subjective measure (LS) indicates that these people themselves 
experienced higher levels of overall happiness.
While empirical studies frequently demonstrate that the association between objective 
health and happiness is weaker than the association between subjective health and hap-
piness [210, 234], this study seems to find the opposite. However, the results of our study 
are consistent with those of Garrido et al. [37], which also explored the simultaneous 
relationship between health and happiness. That study found that OLS - not accounting 
for endogeneity bias - may underestimate the effect of health on happiness. Further 
research is required to understand this effect, using different instruments for health and 
measures of happiness, in different respondent samples and contexts. Our study con-
tributes to this literature by using a large, rich, and international dataset including two 
measures of happiness and a broad set of candidate instruments for the endogenous 
variable health. In this study different outcome measures for health and happiness were 
used for the main analysis, sensitivity analysis and robustness checks. It should be noted 
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that the identification of credible instrumental variables is not straightforward and has 
been topic of methodological debate [235]. Therefore, the robustness of the results was 
an important aspect of our methodological approach. We performed a literature search 
to assess the validity of the candidate instruments, and conducted a larger variety of 
statistical tests to test their relevance. Furthermore, to test the robustness of the selec-
tion process, the whole analysis was replicated with the health thermometer VAS as the 
endogenous variable for health. This resulted in a similar selection of instruments, with 
the exception that the partial R2 of the high blood cholesterol model was just below the 
critical value of 0.01. This test increased the confidence in the credibility of the selected 
instruments for the regression analyses, and the robustness of the results. Still, develop-
ment of more standardized guidance to test potentially relevant instruments on their 
validity and relevance is required.
This study has several limitations that need to be discussed. First, the SHARE data is 
representative for the European population aged over 50 years. However, due to many 
missing observations on important variables for this study, the final study sample used 
for analysis was no longer representative for the intended population, and the findings 
presented here thus lack external validity. However, given the purpose of this study, 
which was to explore the relationship between health and happiness, this is not consid-
ered problematic. Secondly, the study was based on secondary data, which potentially 
limits the availability of candidate instruments. Although we found strong correlations 
between the selected instruments and the endogenous variable health, it could be 
argued that a part of objective health was not captured by these instruments and, 
consequently, their effect on happiness is not represented in our analyses. Therefore, 
despite the robustness of our findings, we may not have fully eliminated the endoge-
neity bias. More objective measures of overall health are necessary in future research, 
and preferably health indicators that are not self-reported. Finally, this study is based 
on cross-sectional data, which was sufficient for the exploration of possible endogene-
ity bias in the relationship between health and happiness. Still, the interpretation of 
causality dictates extreme caution. For future research, a longitudinal panel approach is 
recommended to correct for unobserved time invariant factors and further investigate 
the causality between health and happiness [32, 37].
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of this study showed a causal effect of 
health on happiness while considering the impact of endogeneity. These results are 
relevant for health care policy makers but also for policy making more generally. Policy 
makers are increasingly aware of the relevance of happiness as maximand for social 
policy. Taking well-being rather than health (or health-related quality of life) as measure 
of outcome brings the effects of interventions aimed at cure and those aimed at care un-
der a common denominator, which may help to improve decisions about the allocation 
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of available resources within the health care sector between cure and care. But it can 
also improve a more efficient allocation of resources between sectors of the economy, 
based on their relative contributions to societal wellbeing. While most studies exploring 
the relationship between health and happiness use subjective measures of health, this 
study showed there is a causal relationship between health and happiness, and that this 
relation may be underestimated when not accounting for endogeneity bias.
10 
Discussion
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Economic evaluations are increasingly used to inform health care allocation decisions. 
However, there appears to be a discrepancy between the outcomes of economic 
evaluations and the socially desired allocation of health care resources. To reconcile this 
discrepancy and to make economic evaluations more useful for health care allocation 
decisions, there are still some important methodological challenges to address. This the-
sis investigated two of these methodological issues, related to measuring and valuing 
benefits of interventions. Part A investigated distributional concerns regarding health 
and health care. Applying equity weights to QALY gains might better align economic 
evaluations with societal preferences for a fair distribution of health and health care. 
Part B focused on happiness as a broader outcome measure for economic evaluations 
with the aim of capturing benefits of interventions beyond those captured in the QALY.
This final chapter discusses the main findings of Part A and Part B, including the limita-
tions and research implications of this thesis, and addresses the overall conclusions and 
policy implications.
10.1. PARt A: DistRiButiOnAL COnCERns in sOCiEtY
To investigate the distributional concerns in society and their potential role in economic 
evaluations, the following research questions were formulated:
a) How is the equity efficiency trade-off operationalized in the decision making frame-
work in the Netherlands?
b) What is the effect of providing information about severity of illness and fair innings 
on allocation decisions?
c) What is the social WTP for a QALY gain at different levels of proportional shortfall and 
in different age groups?
d) Does the social WTP per QALY depend on severity of illness and age characteristics 
of beneficiaries?
e) How does the current reimbursement status of an intervention affect the relative 
social value of a QALY?
Chapter 2 addressed research question a and evaluated how efficiency and equity 
considerations are combined in the Dutch decision making framework for health care al-
location decisions. The Netherlands has made a first attempt to operationalize equity by 
using the concept of proportional shortfall. Although this provides important informa-
tion to decision makers by quantifying the necessity of treatment, proportional shortfall 
does not always adequately capture societal distributional preferences. For example, 
the fact that avoiding a full loss of all remaining health would be equally important 
when it concerns either a very large or small absolute QALY loss seems hard to defend. 
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However, this and other shortcomings of proportional shortfall (highlighted in chapter 
2) should not be misinterpreted as a plea to replace it with a different equity concept. 
It seems likely that whatever principle is chosen, similar problems will arise. The Dutch 
experiences with the operationalization of necessity provide important lessons for other 
countries and emphasize the need to further refine the operationalization of equity and 
its use in practice. In that context, more insight into the distributional preferences in 
society is important.
The empirical results of chapters 3 to 5 (answering research questions b to d) showed 
distinct preferences for different operationalizations of severity of illness as an equity 
concern for the allocation of health care resources. In chapter 3, support was found 
for both severity of illness (operationalized as proportional shortfall) and fair innings 
(operationalized as age). The results indicated that, while the severity of illness and fair 
innings approaches may have been contrasted in the literature [18], the general public 
showed some support for both principles. Providing more information to the choice 
scenarios affected the allocation decisions as well as the relative preferences for the two 
equity principles. Chapters 4 and 5 took the approach one step further by investigat-
ing the monetary valuation of a QALY in relation to these equity principles. Chapter 4 
presented the estimated WTP per QALY in different age groups and found no support for 
the fair innings argument. We did find support for considering severity of illness among a 
substantial minority of the public. However, since the interaction terms between health 
state without treatment and QALY gains were not significant, we could not conclude 
that the value of a QALY significantly differed for different levels of severity of illness 
(operationalized as proportional shortfall). In chapter 5, a contingent valuation (CV) 
approach was used to estimate the WTP per QALY at different levels of severity, here op-
erationalized as proportional shortfall and end-of-life concerns, in different age groups. 
Support was found for the end-of-life premium but no strong evidence was found for 
differentiating QALY gains according to proportional shortfall. Stronger preferences 
were found for the size of the QALY gain, indicating support for efficiency arguments, 
and for ageism, supporting the fair innings principle.
The diverse results between the chapters need not surprise since they are consistent 
with previous findings in the literature. Differences across studies seem to be the result 
of the framing of the decision, the operationalization of the equity concerns and the 
different methods used [22]. Notably, the inclusion of a cost component in chapters 4 
and 5 might be problematic since it has been argued that respondents are not used to 
direct payment or monetary valuation of health care resources [236]. For that reason, in 
this thesis increases in monthly health insurance premiums were used to frame the cost 
component. We cannot conclude that the inclusion of a cost component caused the 
differences in preferences for severity of illness and fair innings between chapter 3 and 
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the subsequent two chapters, since there were more differences between these studies. 
For instance, in chapter 3, severity was defined in terms of losses in quality of life, while 
chapters 4 and 5 included QALY losses as a combination of length and quality of life.
It is interesting to note that the results of all empirical studies showed indications that 
the public considered the ‘end point after treatment’ in their decisions about which pa-
tient group to prioritize. This suggests that respondents attach weight to the desirability 
of the health state after treatment, with interventions which do not bring people back to 
desirable end states receiving less weight. These preferences are irrespective of whether 
this was a consequence of the health state before treatment or the health gain from 
treatment. The findings are consistent with previous studies [22, 237, 238].
In chapter 4, WTP per QALY values ranged from €206,408 for patients aged 10 years 
old to €296,756 in patients aged 40 years old. In the CV study presented in chapter 5, 
undiscounted WTP values were somewhat lower, ranging from €94,700 per QALY for 
10 years old to €151,000 for 40 years old. A recent review by Ryen and Svensson [143] 
reported a wide range of WTP estimates of less than €1,000 to €4,800,000 euro per QALY, 
depending on the methodology, country, perspective taken and sample population of 
the study. The WTP per QALY values reported in this thesis should be interpreted within 
the explorative context of the presented studies; they were primarily designed to enable 
a better understanding of how the general public differentiates QALY values for different 
groups of patients.
With respect to research question e, the results of the DCE described in chapter 6 showed 
that the current reimbursement status of an intervention affects the allocation decision. 
Loss aversion may be a logical explanation of this finding: ending reimbursement is 
perceived differently from not starting reimbursement in the first place. Given an aver-
age scenario with an ICER of €50,000, the general public was willing to accept a €7,360 
higher ICER for existing treatments. For policy makers this figure was €7,959. The latter 
finding could be explained in two ways: (i) as a genuine own preference for existing over 
new treatments or (ii) a strong awareness of the preferences among the public these 
policymakers need to represent. Withdrawing reimbursement of an intervention may 
lead to more protests than not reimbursing the same intervention in the first place, and 
policymakers may be aware of this fact.
10.1.1. Methodological considerations
Besides these main findings, the methodological approaches used in the first part of 
this thesis provided some interesting additional insights. In chapters 3 to 6, DCE’s and 
a CV study, were reported deriving respondents’ stated distributional preferences. The 
results from each study were used to further refine the subsequent stated preference 
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experiments. While this stepwise approach may hamper the comparability of the dif-
ferent studies, it contributed to the refinement of stated preference methods to derive 
distributional preferences and the social (monetary) value of QALY gains. In addition, it 
underlines the impact different methodologies, designs and assumptions can have on 
the relative distributional preferences found in empirical studies.
Furthermore, the design of the DCE presented in chapter 3 was built in three phases to 
investigate the effect of providing additional information to the choice scenarios on the 
relative weights attached to different attributes. To do so, the attributes of culpability, 
rarity and having dependents were added in the third phase of the DCE. As a result, 
the unobserved variance decreased compared to the previous two phases, which only 
included information on severity of illness and age. Furthermore, the inclusion of ad-
ditional attributes appeared to affect the relative preferences for severity of illness and 
fair innings. This indicates that although not all attributes may be considered relevant 
for decision making from a normative perspective, including them in choice experi-
ments may still contribute to our understanding of societal preferences for each single 
attribute. This issue is further emphasized in a recent review by Whitty et al. [22]. They 
argue that the omission of relevant criteria (i.e. information) in a choice experiment may 
explain some of the inconsistent findings between studies.
Finally, the estimation of latent class models in chapter 6 revealed distinct preference 
patterns in the data, which stresses the importance of accounting for preference hetero-
geneity among the public in value-laden issues such as prioritizing health care. This is 
relevant for both research and decision-making. Analysis of data at the aggregate level 
may result in recommendations that do not reflect actual preferences in society. There-
fore, it is important for future studies to consider multiple models in order to explore 
possible decision patterns in the data.
10.2. PARt B: HAPPinEss in ECOnOMiC EVALuAtiOns
The second part of this thesis focused on happiness as a broader outcome measure for 
economic evaluations, addressing the research questions below:
f ) Do respondents focus on health, happiness or both in prioritizing patients in health 
care?
g) What are the determinants of happiness and the role of health therein?
h) Is there a causal effect of health on happiness?
Chapter 7 answered research question f and showed that about half of the respondents 
in our study were unwilling to discriminate between patient groups based on their 
health and happiness levels in allocating health care. This seems to reflect a general 
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aversion against choosing between patients in need of health care. The other half of the 
respondents in the experiment were willing to make choices between patient groups 
based on their health and happiness, suggesting that both health and happiness could 
play a role in priority setting. In this latter group, gains in health received a marginally 
higher weight than gains in happiness. The finding that about half of the respondents 
considered both health and happiness in their decisions which patient group to pri-
oritize indicates that broader outcome measures may yield relevant information for 
allocation decisions in health care [10].
With respect to research question g, the results of chapter 8 showed that happiness is 
a multidimensional concept that is determined by many factors. Moreover, people can 
differentiate their happiness experienced in different life domains. A strong association 
was found between health and overall happiness, directly and indirectly (i.e. through 
domain-specific happiness). However, the domain-specific effects of health on hap-
piness differed substantially; differences in health appeared to have a stronger effect 
on happiness at school than on happiness at home. The results of this chapter clearly 
illustrated the broad scope of happiness and the significant role of health therein.
Chapter 9 addressed research question h, exploring the causal effect of health on happi-
ness as well as the endogeneity that is present when subjective health measures are used 
to explore the relationship between health and happiness. Correcting for endogeneity, 
a stronger association was found between health and happiness. Multiple instruments 
showed similar results. The sensitivity analyses for the selection of instruments, using 
a different measure of health, and the dependent variable, using a different measure 
for happiness, confirmed the findings of the main analysis. The findings of this study 
are at variance with existing literature since many empirical studies demonstrated that 
the association between objective health and happiness is weaker than the association 
between subjective health and happiness [210, 234]. However, the results of our study 
are consistent with those of Garrido et al. [37], the only other study that also explored 
the simultaneous relationship between health and happiness. Nonetheless, more 
research remains warranted to further explore the causal relationship between health 
and happiness.
The main findings of Part A and Part B provide novel insights with respect to equity 
weights in resource allocation and happiness as a broader outcome measure for eco-
nomic evaluations. As a way of bridging these two parts of the thesis, happiness may 
also function as an equity consideration in economic evaluations and thus contribute to 
a more equitable distribution of health and healthcare.  As shown in chapter 7, respon-
dents were willing to discriminate between groups of people based on different health 
and happiness levels before treatment and gains in happiness and health. This supports 
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the idea that people may be willing to prioritize patient groups that are relatively 
unhappy, or diseases that have a greater impact on happiness. Therefore, the findings 
are an important contribution to the further refinement of economic evaluations with 
the overarching aim of reconciling the discrepancy between current recommendations 
based on the outcomes of economic evaluations and the socially desired allocation of 
health care resources.
10.3. LiMitAtiOns AnD REsEARCH iMPLiCAtiOns
Several limitations of the work presented in this thesis need to be mentioned, next to 
the limitations already mentioned in the separate chapters.
While working on this thesis many theoretical and methodological choices had to be 
made that deserve discussion. The design of the studies and the analyses of the results 
were not solely a technical exercise, but often required fundamental value judgments. 
These choices were made carefully and were justified in line with the (policy relevant) 
research questions that needed to be addressed, but obviously they still affected the re-
sults presented in this thesis. Therefore, we have described the methodological process 
as transparently as possible, so that other researches can judge the usefulness of our 
questions, methods and results for their own research.
In this respect, many techniques have been developed to elicit preferences or WTP val-
ues from respondents. DCE and CV studies are considered useful tools and are increas-
ingly popular, as shown in a recent review by Whitty et al. [22]. However, the influence 
of the context of the choice scenarios and the framing of questions on respondents’ 
preferences complicates the comparability between different studies and restricts their 
external validity. Therefore, we propose that validity checks judging the usefulness of 
the results and the quality of the studies should become standard procedure in future 
studies. Several checklists are already available for DCE’s, but these should be expanded 
to include all studies on this topic, as well as studies that use different techniques [22, 
239]. Doing so will increase the ability to compare and interpret results of different stud-
ies in a meaningful way and stimulate a more consistent methodological approach. This 
is required to be able to build a sufficient level of evidence on the distributional prefer-
ences in society, lending stronger support to their consideration in decision making.
Furthermore, stated preference methods with hypothetical scenarios were used to 
determine the preferences in society, using online surveys. Therefore, it is questionable 
whether respondents understood all the questions and whether their preferences for 
hypothetical situations resemble actual behaviour. Online surveys make it possible to 
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reach larger, representative samples efficiently and use more complex and interactive 
designs, but make monitoring the intelligibility of the questions and the engagement 
of respondents more difficult. The studies presented in this thesis were all carefully 
pilot-tested, some included consistency checks, and time limits were defined to exclude 
respondents rushing through the questionnaire. Nevertheless, the reliability and valid-
ity of stated preference data collected online still remain issues of concern and deserve 
further investigation. Future studies should address these issues carefully as well. For 
instance, findings could be presented to the study participants to investigate the valid-
ity of their preferences.
In this thesis, preferences of the public were collected only from Dutch citizens. Therefore, 
the geographical and cultural generalizability of the results is limited. An avenue for fu-
ture research would be to replicate our experiments in different settings. However, given 
the impact of the context on decisions, it might be preferable to derive equity weights 
for priority setting that are country and context specific and, hence, locally relevant. 
With respect to the happiness studies presented in this thesis, it would be interesting 
to study panel data in addition to the cross-sectional data used here, to investigate the 
impact of time-invariant factors on happiness measures. This would contribute to the 
understanding of what constitutes happiness and would further advance the estimation 
of the causal relation between health and happiness.
While the findings of Part B contribute to the happiness literature, many relevant ques-
tions remained unaddressed and new questions have emerged. Chapter 7 showed that 
a considerable proportion of the general public was willing to consider both health and 
happiness in their allocation decisions. However, how happiness can be incorporated in 
economic evaluations and subsequent decision making remained unanswered. In order 
to determine whether happiness can ultimately replace or complement health as an 
outcome measure for economic evaluations, future research should for instance investi-
gate the extent to which happiness instruments adequately capture all relevant health 
aspects. Moreover, since happiness measurement is relatively new in health economics, 
the reliability of current measures for its use in economic evaluation should be further 
investigated. Another option may be to include both health and happiness measures 
in economic evaluations and decision making. Then, obviously, double counting needs 
to be avoided and suitable ways to combine these measures (also in decision making) 
need to be found. 
Future research should also pay attention to the possible contribution of happiness 
measures to equity weighting. The results of this thesis showed that people might be 
willing to prioritize patient groups that are relatively unhappy, or diseases that have 
a greater impact on patients’ happiness. How happiness as an equity consideration 
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should be operationalized to be able to reflect the preferences of the population for 
a fair distribution of happiness, is an important question for future research. If both 
health and happiness considerations would be included in decision making, the relative 
importance of the two should also be further investigated. A DCE might be a useful 
method for doing so.
Furthermore, as already briefly mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, different 
definitions of happiness are used interchangeably in the literature and the formulation 
of the happiness measures and corresponding measurement scales differs between 
studies as well [32]. This complicates the comparability between different studies, a 
meaningful interpretation of the study results and hampers their external validity. 
Future research should aim to improve the consistency in definition and measurement 
of happiness.
More generally, in order to move forward in this field, additional research is required on 
both topics addressed in this thesis. Further empirical research is essential to gain more 
insight into distributional preferences in society, the monetary social value of a QALY, 
and the role of happiness as an outcome measure for economic evaluations. In doing so, 
it needs to be emphasized that not all derived preferences are necessarily appropriate 
from a normative perspective. Therefore, in future studies, close collaboration between 
researchers and policy makers may be beneficial.
10.4. gEnERAL COnCLusiOn AnD POLiCY iMPLiCAtiOns
This thesis has provided more insight into distributional concerns and the scope of the 
outcome measures in health care allocation decisions. The results may contribute to 
improving health economic evaluations and (subsequent) health care decision making.
Different equity principles have been proposed with which equity concerns could be 
captured in the context of health care allocation decisions. In the literature, the con-
cepts of severity of illness and fair innings have been frequently discussed. Moreover, 
on a practical level, several countries are attempting to operationalize equity concepts 
in their decision making frameworks. Well-known examples are the Dutch concept of 
proportional shortfall and the special treatment of ‘end-of- life interventions’ of NICE, in 
the UK. While evidence accumulates about distributional preferences in society, related 
to a desire for an equitable distribution of health and health care, policy makers should 
be aware that these may be difficult to describe with one particular set of weights or de-
cision rules. Distributional preferences seem to be context specific and heterogeneous. 
Further investigation into suitable equity concepts and potentially more complex 
191
Discussion
10
weighting schemes remains important. It would also be interesting for policy makers to 
elaborate further the equity concerns related to the desirability of the health state after 
treatment and its relevance for policy making.
The underlying differences of opinion in the general public further emphasize the com-
plexity of the task of incorporating the distributional preferences of society in economic 
evaluations and health care decisions. Achieving full consensus regarding an appropri-
ate equity principle or an appropriate set of equity weights may not only be challenging, 
but in fact may be impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, it seems worthwhile to take fur-
ther steps on the road to quantifying preferences in society, providing more insight into 
the complexity of the decision making process and situations in which equity concerns 
may conflict. This knowledge is of great value for the further development of equity 
concepts in decision making frameworks and for better understanding the nature and 
degree of public support for specific choices. Moreover, policy makers should establish 
the normative boundaries of defining an equitable distribution of health care resources, 
since not all empirically derived preferences may be considered relevant or desirable 
from a normative viewpoint.
With respect to conditional reimbursement, decision makers need to be aware that 
stopping reimbursement proves to be more difficult than not starting in the first place. 
Against the benefit of allowing more time to gather appropriate scientific evidence 
for a permanent reimbursement decision without unduly delaying market access of a 
technology, there is the risk that engaging in conditional reimbursement schemes may 
lower the chances of subsequent withdrawal of reimbursement.
This thesis also addressed happiness as a broader outcome measure for economic evalu-
ations. In an era of ageing populations and increasing demand for long term care, the 
boundaries between health and social care and between health and wellbeing become 
increasingly blurred. Therefore, considering happiness as an outcome measure seems 
directly relevant for policy makers attempting to assess all relevant impacts of health 
interventions. Happiness is a broader outcome measure than health and therefore 
may be expected to reflect individual welfare better, or at least, to provide relevant 
complementary information for allocation decisions. When interventions, such as in the 
long term care sector or in elderly care, aim to improve wellbeing rather than health 
(alone), such broader measures may be necessary in order to capture the full benefits of 
these interventions. A more comprehensive representation of welfare then may help to 
improve decisions about the allocation of health care resources. Moreover, it can lead to 
a more efficient allocation of resources between sectors of the economy, based on their 
relative contributions to societal wellbeing. Hence, a full welfare economic assessment 
of interventions may require a broader set of outcome measures than currently typi-
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cally the case. Happiness measures may then be useful, as may other measures, such as 
capability measures [169], which were not included in this thesis.
Health has been shown to be an important contributor to overall happiness, which may 
also add to the relevance of happiness as an outcome measure for health care alloca-
tion decisions. However, it is important for policymakers to realize that health is only 
one determinant of happiness. Happiness is a broad, multidimensional concept, which 
captures many more aspects of human quality of life than health alone. Hence, health 
care interventions may mainly improve just one element important to overall happiness. 
Furthermore, in the debate on broader outcome measures, the relationship between 
health and happiness may suffer of endogeneity bias when based on subjective mea-
sures. Policymakers who consider the impact of health on happiness should be aware 
that they may underestimate this effect when not correcting for endogeneity bias.
This thesis underlines the additional value of happiness as an outcome value for 
economic evaluations. However many questions remain. Whether and how happiness 
should be incorporated in economic evaluations and health care decision making is an 
important question that requires further research, but also policy debate. Policy makers 
could consider to start collecting information on happiness alongside information on 
health in order to improve the understanding of the relationship between health and 
happiness and the additional value of happiness as a broader outcome measures in 
economic evaluations. While writing this thesis in November 2015, Statistics Netherland 
published the first results of a survey of wellbeing in The Netherlands [240]. This under-
lines the rising social relevance of happiness indicators for the debate on social progress.
10.5. FinAL REMARks
Given limited health care resources, implicit or explicit decisions regarding the allocation 
of scarce health care resources are inevitable. When economic evaluations are used to 
inform such decisions, it is pivotal that they are adequately performed, align with equity 
concerns in society and the goal of improving social welfare. This thesis has contributed 
to the theoretical and practical knowledge regarding equity weights and happiness as a 
broader outcome measure to capture outcomes beyond the QALY. Many relevant ques-
tions in these areas remain unanswered. Therefore, sufficient room should be left in the 
appraisal phase of the decision making process to address those aspects that have not 
yet been (or perhaps can ever be) adequately captured and quantified in the assessment 
phase. For instance, sufficient room should be present to judge whether quantified eq-
uity weights accurately reflect public preferences or normative principles in particular 
circumstances. Moreover, continuous attention should be given to further improvement 
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and refinement of equity concepts and their operationalization. Furthermore, it may be 
worthwhile to collect happiness information alongside QALYs in economic evaluations, 
in particular when it concerns interventions not purely aimed at cure.
Hence, it is important to continue developing and refining equity concepts and out-
come measures that better reflect and support a socially desired allocation of health 
care resources. Defining and quantifying the relevant elements in the decision making 
process where possible may help increase the transparency and consistency of health 
care allocation decisions. Many steps still have to be taken in improving economic evalu-
ation as an optimal tool for supporting fair and welfare improving policy decisions in 
health care. This thesis hopes to have contributed to that ultimate goal.
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In health care, economic evaluations are used to inform decision makers about the 
costs and effects of interventions on the health and welfare of the population. Decision 
makers use this information to select which treatments will be included in the basic 
benefits package and which treatments will not. Scientific studies and frequent reports 
in the media regularly show that there is a discrepancy between the recommendations 
from economic evaluations and public preferences for the allocation of health care 
resources. To reduce this discrepancy and so make economic evaluations more useful 
for health care decision makers, some important methodological challenges need to be 
addressed. This thesis investigated two of these methodological issues, related to the 
measurement and valuation of outcomes in economic evaluations. The first part of this 
thesis addressed the concerns in society with respect to the distribution of health and 
health care. The public my for instance prefer to give priority to treating more severely 
ill patients, even if the potential health gains are relatively small, in favour of a more 
equitable distribution of health and health care. The second part focused on happiness 
as a broader outcome measure for economic evaluations. Some interventions in the 
health care sector, for example in elderly care, may not affect the health of patients, but 
improve their wellbeing. Happiness as a broader outcome measure than health alone 
may better capture the benefits of such interventions. Addressing these issues we aimed 
to contribute to the improvement of economic evaluations in health care, reconciliation 
of recommendations based on economic evaluations with preferences in society, and 
ultimately to a better allocation of scarce health care resources.
The preferences in society with respect to the distribution of healthcare resources can 
be integrated in the decision making process by weighting health benefits, measured 
in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), according to some equity principle. This 
equity principle should ideally reflect the relevant distributional preferences in society. 
Chapter 2 discussed how efficiency and concerns for equity are combined in the Dutch 
decision making framework and described the difficulties the Netherlands faced when 
the equity principle proportional shortfall was put in practice. The findings emphasize 
the need to further develop and refine this equity principle and its use in practice, and 
provide important lessons for other countries, since many of these issues seem to be 
universal and irrespective of the equity principle chosen.
In chapters 3 to 6 the distributional preferences of the Dutch population with respect to 
health care allocation were investigated. Chapter 3 presented results of an experiment 
deriving the relative weights of the equity principles ‘severity of illness’ and ‘fair innings’ 
and some additional characteristics of patients and their disease. All these characteristics 
were important for explaining respondents’ preferences. In chapters 4 and 5 we inves-
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tigated how much society was willingness to pay (WTP) for QALY gains in subgroups of 
patients which were characterised by specific equity characteristics. Distinct preferences 
were found for different descriptions of severity as an equity principle, and the willing-
ness to pay for a QALY ranged between €94,700 and €296,756. The distinct preferences 
and the wide range of WTP values are consistent with the scientific literature and seem 
to result from the chosen equity principle, the context of the decision and the different 
methods used.
Chapter 6 investigated the policy instrument conditional reimbursement, and showed 
that the current reimbursement status of an intervention (i.e. whether or not an inter-
vention is currently included in the basic benefits package) affects the value society 
attaches to QALY gains. Both the general public and decision makers valued a currently 
reimbursed intervention higher than an intervention that is currently not yet reim-
bursed. Hence, policy makers need to be aware of the fact that engaging in conditional 
reimbursement may lower the chances of subsequent withdrawal of reimbursement.
The second part of this thesis focused on the scope of outcome measures in economic 
evaluations. Broader outcome measures than health, such as happiness, may better 
capture all socially relevant benefits of an intervention. The results of chapter 7 showed 
that about half of the respondents were willing to discriminate between patient groups 
based on differences in levels and gains in both health and happiness. This supports 
the idea that broader outcome measures such as happiness may provide additional 
information that is relevant for the decision how to distribute health care resources.
The last two chapters of this thesis addressed the concept of happiness and the relation-
ship between health and happiness. Chapter 8 provided an extensive overview of what 
constitutes happiness and emphasized the broad scope of the happiness and the sig-
nificant role of health therein. The results of chapter 9 indicated that health has a direct 
effect on happiness, but that the use of subjective measures of health and happiness 
may bias this relation. In the debate on broader outcome measures, policy makers who 
consider the effect of health on happiness should be aware that they might underesti-
mate this effect when not correcting for this endogeneity bias.
This thesis contributes to the development and refinement of outcome measures for 
economic evaluations. However, many relevant questions remained unanswered. There-
fore, sufficient room should be left in the decision making process to judge whether 
outcomes of economic evaluations accurately reflect and support public preferences 
regarding the allocation of health care resources. Meanwhile, it is important to further 
develop and refine equity principles and their use in practice. Furthermore, to stimulate 
and further develop the debate on happiness measures in economic evaluations it 
seems worthwhile to start collecting happiness information alongside health effects in 
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economic evaluations. Moreover, still many steps have to be taken to further improve 
economic evaluations with the overarching aim to make economic evaluations a more 
useful source of information for health care decision making that is more aligned with 
distributional preferences in society. This thesis hopes to have contributed to that ulti-
mate goal.
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In de gezondheidszorg worden economische evaluaties gebruikt om beleidsmakers te 
informeren over de kosten en effecten van interventies op de gezondheid en het welzijn 
van de bevolking. Beleidsmakers gebruiken deze informatie bij het bepalen van welke 
interventies worden opgenomen in het basispakket, en welke niet. De aanbevelingen 
op basis van economische evaluaties komen echter niet altijd overeen met de maat-
schappelijke opvattingen over een eerlijke verdeling van middelen in de gezondheids-
zorg. Om deze discrepantie te verkleinen en economische evaluaties bruikbaarder te 
maken voor beleidsmakers dient een aantal belangrijke (methodologische) uitdagingen 
te worden overwonnen. In dit proefschrift zijn twee van deze vraagstukken nader 
onderzocht. Beide hebben betrekking op het meten en waarderen van uitkomsten in 
economische evaluaties. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift onderzocht de maatschap-
pelijke voorkeuren voor een optimale verdeling van middelen in de gezondheidszorg. 
Het kan bijvoorbeeld zo zijn dat mensen uit oogpunt van een rechtvaardigere verdeling 
van gezondheid en gezondheidszorg meer waarde hechten aan de behandeling van 
patiënten met een ernstige aandoening, zelfs wanneer de gezondheidswinst bij deze 
patiënten relatief klein is. Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift richtte zich op geluk als 
een bredere uitkomstmaat voor economische evaluaties. Sommige interventies in de 
gezondheidzorg, zoals bijvoorbeeld in de ouderenzorg, hebben geen of weinig effect 
op gezondheid maar verbeteren wel het welzijn van patiënten. Welzijn als bredere 
uitkomstmaat dan gezondheid lijkt in die situaties beter in staat om alle baten van een 
interventie te omvatten. Door het behandelen van deze twee vraagstukken hopen we 
bij te dragen aan het verbeteren van economische evaluaties in de gezondheidszorg 
zodat zij beter aansluiten bij de maatschappelijke voorkeuren voor een rechtvaardige 
verdeling van zorgmiddelen. Op deze manier hopen we dat economische evaluaties 
meer invloed krijgen in het besluitvormingsproces over de aanwending van schaarse 
middelen in de gezondheidszorg.
De maatschappelijke voorkeuren voor de optimale verdeling van middelen in de 
gezondheidszorg kunnen geïntegreerd worden in het besluitvormingsproces. Dit kan 
door de gezondheidseffecten, uitgedrukt in voor kwaliteit gecorrigeerde levensjaren 
(QALYs), te wegen op basis van een bepaald rechtvaardigheidsprincipe. Hoofdstuk 2 
beschrijft hoe doelmatigheids- en rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen worden gecombi-
neerd in het Nederlandse besluitvormingsproces. Tevens beschrijft dit hoofdstuk de 
uitdagingen waarmee Nederland geconfronteerd werd bij de operationalisering van 
het rechtvaardigheidsprincipe ‘proportional shortfall’. De bevindingen benadrukken de 
noodzaak tot een verdere ontwikkeling en verfijning van dit rechtvaardigheidsprincipe 
en de toepassing ervan in de praktijk. De uitdagingen die gepaard gingen met de ope-
202
Samenvatting
rationalisering van het principe ‘proportional shortfall’ zijn veelal ook relevant wanneer 
een ander rechtvaardigheidsprincipe wordt gekozen. De bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk 
zijn derhalve ook relevant voor andere landen die rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen in 
economische evaluaties willen meenemen.
In de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 6 zijn de rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen van de Neder-
landse bevolking met betrekking tot de verdeling van middelen in de gezondheidszorg 
empirisch onderzocht. Hoofdstuk 3 presenteerde de resultaten van een experiment 
naar de relatieve gewichten van de rechtvaardigheidsprincipes ‘severity of illnes’, ‘fair 
innings’ en ‘proportional shortfall’, en een aantal additionele kenmerken van de patiënt 
en de ziekte. Alle kenmerken bleken belangrijk bij het verklaren van de voorkeuren van 
respondenten voor de verdeling van zorg. In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 werd de maatschap-
pelijke betalingsbereidheid per QALY gezondheidswinst onderzocht voor subgroepen 
van patiënten die werden gekenmerkt door specifieke rechtvaardigheidskenmerken. 
Uiteenlopende voorkeuren werden gevonden voor verschillende definities van ‘seve-
rity of illness’ als rechtvaardigheidsprincipe, en de maatschappelijke waarderingen per 
QALY varieerden van €94,700 tot €296,756. De verscheidenheid aan voorkeuren en de 
grote variatie in betalingsbereidheid per QALY zijn consistent met de wetenschappelijke 
literatuur, en lijken samen te hangen met het gekozen rechtvaardigheidsprincipe, de 
context van de besluitvorming, en de verschillende onderzoeksmethoden die worden 
gebruikt.
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzocht het beleidsinstrument ‘conditionele vergoeding’, ofwel voor-
waardelijke vergoeding van interventies vanuit het basispakket. De resultaten lieten 
zien dat de huidige vergoedingsstatus van een interventie (d.w.z. of een interventie op 
het moment wel of niet vergoed wordt) invloed had op de waardering van een QALY 
gezondheidswinst. Zowel de algemene bevolking als beleidsmakers hechtten meer 
waarde aan de vergoeding van een interventie die op dat moment al werd vergoed dan 
een interventie die niet werd vergoed. Beleidsmakers moeten zich zodoende realiseren 
dat conditionele vergoeding het moeilijker maakt om de vergoeding later te beeindigen.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift richtte zich op de reikwijdte van uitkomstmaten 
in economische evaluaties. Bredere uitkomstmaten dan gezondheid, zoals geluk, zijn 
mogelijk beter in staat om alle maatschappelijk relevante baten van een interventie 
te omvatten. De resultaten van hoofdstuk 7 lieten zien dat ongeveer de helft van de 
respondenten bereid was onderscheid te maken tussen verschillende groepen patiën-
ten op basis van verschillen in huidige gezondheid en geluk en de winst daarin door 
behandeling. Dit ondersteunt het idee dat bredere uitkomstmaten zoals geluk relevante 
informatie bevatten voor de besluitvorming over de verdeling van middelen in de ge-
zondheidszorg. Gezondheid was meestal iets belangrijker dan geluk in deze keuzen.
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De laatste twee hoofdstukken behandelden het concept geluk en de relatie tussen 
gezondheid en geluk. Hoofdstuk 8 presenteerde de resultaten van een onderzoek naar 
determinanten van geluk. Dit onderzoek toonde een breed overzicht van aspecten die 
bijdragen aan geluk, waarbij gezondheid een belangrijke rol speelde. De resultaten van 
hoofdstuk 9 lieten zien dat gezondheid een direct effect heeft op geluk maar dat het 
subjectieve karakter van beide grootheden de relatie kan vertekenen. Beleidsmakers 
dienen zich te realiseren dat ze het effect van gezondheid op geluk mogelijk onder-
schatten wanneer ze niet corrigeren voor deze endogeniteit.
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de ontwikkeling en verfijning van uitkomstmaten voor 
economische evaluaties. Veel vragen blijven echter onbeantwoord. Daarom moet er 
genoeg ruimte blijven in het besluitvormingsproces om te beoordelen of de uitkomsten 
van economische evaluaties overeenkomen met de maatschappelijke voorkeuren voor 
de verdeling van middelen in de gezondheidszorg. In de tussentijd is het belangrijk om 
rechtvaardigheidsprincipes en hun praktische operationalisatie verder te ontwikkelen 
en te verfijnen. Om het debat over welzijn als uitkomstmaat in economische evaluaties 
te stimuleren is het belangrijk om naast informatie over gezondheid ook informatie over 
welzijn te verzamelen in economische evaluaties. De bruikbaarheid van economische 
evaluaties in het besluitvormingsproces over de aanwending van schaarse middelen in 
de gezondheidszorg wordt vergroot wanneer zij beter aansluiten bij maatschappelijke 
voorkeuren voor een optimale verdeling van gezondheid en gezondheidszorg. Om dit 
te bewerkstelligen is er nog een lange weg te gaan in het verbeteren van de methodo-
logie van economische evaluaties. Dit proefschrift heeft hopelijk een bijdrage geleverd 
aan het bereiken van dit ultieme doel.
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New expensive technologies and aging populations increase the 
pressure on health care budgets. To promote an effi cient use of 
limited health care resources, priorities must be set and choices 
regarding access to health care become inevitable. Economic 
evaluations are increasingly used to inform such decisions. However, 
there seems to be a discrepancy between the recommendations 
from economic evaluations and public preferences for the 
allocation of health care resources. This thesis investigated two 
methodological issues related to the measurement and valuation 
of outcomes in economic evaluations. The fi rst part of this thesis 
investigated concerns in society for the distribution of health and 
health care. The second part explored happiness as a broader 
outcome measure for economic evaluations. 
This thesis contributes to the improvement of economic evaluations 
with the overarching aim to make economic evaluations a more 
useful source of information for health care decision making, 
better aligned with distributional preferences in society. 
